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ABSTRACT 
Out of a myriad of sensory stimulations, our brain constructs a unified, self-
consistent reality that we consciously experience. Little is known about how or 
where in the brain’s processing stream of physical input a conscious percept 
emerges into awareness. A remarkable property of conscious perception is that 
even though external input is often ambiguous, the perceptual interpretation of the 
world that our brain generates is consistent across multiple layers of 
representation, e.g., figure-ground segmentation and object identity. We thus set 
out to study how the interaction between different nodes in the brain generates and 
propagates new conscious percepts. Since the code of object identity is already 
well-understood, in particular for faces as reviewed in this thesis, we decided to get 
a handle on segmentation signals first. It turned out that consistent segmentation 
signals are hard to find, however, we found functionally defined modules in the 
brain that contained consistent cells from which figure-ground signals can be 
decoded. We next investigated whether face cells in object recognition areas 
actually encode the conscious percept of a face or are just passive filters of visual 
input. To distill conscious perception from other cognitive processes, such as 
decision making, introspection, and reporting of the percept, which often 
accompany new conscious percepts, we developed a no-report binocular rivalry 
paradigm that relies on an active fixation task rather than report, and therefore 
eliminates these confounding factors. We found that face patches in 
inferotemporal cortex indeed encode the conscious percept of a face. Using novel 
high-yield electrodes, we were able to decode what the animal was consciously 
perceiving at a given time. Preliminary and future experiments of population 
recordings from multiple nodes of the cortical hierarchy simultaneously promise to 
go beyond correlates of consciousness and reveal the mechanisms of how and 
where conscious percepts are constructed.  
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NOMENCLATURE 
Binocular rivalry. The phenomenon that if two incompatible inputs are presented 
to the left and right eyes, respectively, rather than seeing a superimposition of the 
two, one’s percept usually switches between the two images. 
Face patch. A cortical region in the macaque brain that responds selectively to 
viewed faces. Besides the six canonical face patches (PL, ML, MF, AL, AF, and AM) 
in each hemisphere that are found in IT cortex, face patches have been reported 
outside of IT, such as the upper bank of the superior temporal sulcus, perirhinal, and 
prefrontal cortex. 
Firing rate. The number of action potentials a neuron fires per second. Action 
potentials or “spikes” are electrical impulses generated by neurons to send 
information to each other. 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). A method to image activation of 
the entire brain over time. Has low temporal and spatial resolution compared to 
invasive electrophysiology. 
Inferotemporal cortex (IT). A cortical region in the inferior convexity of the temporal 
lobe of the macaque brain thought to be homologous to the human ventral temporal 
cortex. IT is part of the ventral visual stream and important for object recognition. 
Local Field potential (LFP). A signal picked up by the electrode that is generated 
by the current flow of several nearby neurons. 
Receptive field. A portion of sensory space that can elicit sensory activation when 
stimulated. For visual neurons, receptive fields are usually defined as the region of 
visual space that can modulate activity of the neuron if a specific stimulus is 
presented in it. 
Retinotopic cortex. A collection of visual areas that each have a retinotopic map of 
visual space. That is, for every position on the retina, there is a corresponding 
location in the visual area that represents it. Neighboring locations in the visual area 
correspond to neighboring areas in visual space. In general, early to mid-level 
regions V1, V2, V3, V3A, V4, and V4A are all considered part of retinotopic cortex, 
whereas the higher-level stages of the visual hierarchy such as inferotemporal 
cortex, where cells exhibit more spatial invariance, are not. 
 
 
 
1 
C h a p t e r  I  
INTRODUCTION 
Motivation 
Having conscious experience is the most important reason why it matters to us 
whether we are dead or alive. Imagine having a critical car accident, and your doctor 
gives you two options: either you can live your normal life for another year, until the 
resulting brain damage takes your life; or you can be put into a dreamless coma, 
with little robots and artificial intelligence controlling your muscles so that you behave 
the same as before, but you will not have any conscious experience for the rest of 
your life (Revonsuo and Kamppinen, 2013). The question is a no-brainer: if you are 
not able to see, hear, feel, and experience the world, you may as well be dead. 
Given this life-or-death importance of conscious experience, it is not surprising that 
humanity has been trying understand its nature, origin, or function for millennia 
(Parker, 1999; RielSalvatore et al., 2001). Yet, success in these domains has so far 
evaded humanity given that conscious experience is, while on the hand the most 
familiar, first-hand thing we know, at the same time also the most mysterious 
(Chessick, 2008). Although Aristotle claimed that to understand consciousness one 
must study the heart (Hicks, 2015), nowadays it is believed that, for studying 
consciousness, looking at the brain is not a bad idea. Therefore, in this thesis we 
want to describe our modest progress in understanding which signals in the brain 
are correlated with consciousness and give a glimpse into what mechanisms may 
be involved in evoking a change of conscious percept. To have a crack at the 
neuroscience of consciousness, one needs to decide which angle to tackle it from. 
Here, we investigate it through electrophysiological recordings in macaque monkeys 
and take their visual system as an entry point. In particular, two important visual 
processes, object segmentation and object recognition, will come up in this thesis. 
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Figure I-2: Frontal-profile illusion. 
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Bistable phenomena 
The saying is that a picture says more than a thousand words, which is particularly 
true for Fig. I-1. This was the first image my advisor and I looked at in the very 
beginning of my PhD; it weaves throughout like a red thread and sparked the 
inspiration for a fundamental question about consciousness that I am now finally 
close to answering at the end. When looking at the picture, you will either see a 
frontal face looking at you, or the profile of a face looking sideways. After looking for 
it for a few seconds, you percept will switch to the other interpretation, and back, 
and forth, in an endless dance. That is, the physical, visual input is fixed, but your 
conscious percept of the object is changing. This allows distilling the changes in the 
conscious percept from changes of physical input, which usually go hand-in-hand in 
the real world and are thus easily conflated. The stimulus also demonstrates another 
feature of conscious experience, namely its unity and self-consistency: looking at 
the stimulus again, you may notice that it is not just the view of the object that is 
changing, but with it also the figure-ground organization of the scene. If you perceive 
the face as facing you, you will perceive the white region on its right as background, 
with the border between them belonging to the outline of the face object. If you 
perceive the face as facing to the side, you will perceive the white region on its right 
it as a foreground surface occluding the face, with the border between them 
belonging to the outline of the occluder. Importantly, the switch of view always 
coincides with the switch in figure-ground organization, so that your interpretation of 
the scene is always self-consistent. We believe that figure-ground organization is 
represented in earlier, retinotopic visual cortex, whereas features of an object such 
as view are represented in the face patch network which is located in the higher-
level inferotemporal cortex. Thus, the first question we asked during my PhD was: 
how do these two regions coordinate switches so that the interpretation is still 
consistent as a whole? What is the direction of information flow? Does the lower-
level retinototopic region first switch the interpretation of figure-ground segmentation 
and then propagate that information to the higher-level region to switch the object 
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view? Or does the higher-level region switch first, and then update figure-ground 
segmentation in lower-level regions? In broader terms, when your conscious percept 
changes, does that switch originate from feedforward or feedback mechanisms? At 
the end of this thesis, I will show some preliminary experiments that make me 
believe I am now closer than ever to conclusively answering this question. Note that 
Fig. I-1 represents only one of many examples encompassed by the general 
category of bistable phenomena, where the same stimulus has multiple 
interpretations. As an exercise, the reader can try to find the two interpretations for 
each of the stimuli in Fig. I-2 without reading the figure legend. For many of them, 
the figure-ground assignment switches as well. The next chapter outlines how, 
throughout this thesis, we tried to figure out the information flow across different 
brain areas during these perceptual switches. Indeed, understanding how brain 
regions interact during perceptual switches may give us general insights into how 
the brain arrives at an interpretation of the world that makes sense even for non-
reversible stimuli. In everyday life, the world is often ambiguous, with the same input 
capable of having several interpretations. For example, the two processes of 
segmentation and recognition of objects in a visual scene constitute a bit of a 
chicken-egg problem and are hard to solve separately from each other. When trying 
to segment an ambiguous scene, it is helpful to already know the present objects 
and their shapes. However, for recognizing an object in clutter, one would like to 
consider its isolated segment alone to not get confounded by features of other 
objects. Thus, it is possible that corresponding visual regions recurrently interact to 
converge onto a self-consistent interpretation which is then broadcasted as a 
conscious percept into our awareness. 
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Figure I-2: Bistable phenomena. (a) The famous Rubin vase switches perceptually 
between two black faces and a white vase (Rubin, 1980). (b) A female face or two 
horses. (c) An old lady or a young girl facing backwards. (d) A rabbit or a duck (e) A 
native American face or an Inuit facing backwards. (f) One face or two lovers kissing. 
(g) A woman’s face or a horn player. (h) A skull or a woman and a man at a table. 
(i) When two incompatible stimuli such as a face and monkey body are presented 
to the left and right eye, respectively, one’s percept is not a superimposition of the 
two but stochastically alternates between the two every few seconds. 
Outline 
The way to answer the question of which direction information flows during 
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switches of conscious percept seemed straightforward: if we stick an electrode 
into retinotopic regions that represent segmentation signals and at the same time 
stick an electrode into face patches, which represent object view, we should be 
able to find out whether during a perceptual switch segmentation areas or face 
patches change their activity first. As often, the actual path to the holy grail proved 
to be more complicated and full of detours to circumvent obstacles on the way. 
Through previous studies, mostly from our lab, we already had a good handle on 
signals in the face patches encoding face view and identity, which is reviewed in 
Chapter II: The Macaque Face Patch System. Thus, we decided that the first step 
should be to get a good handle on segmentation signals in retinotopic cortex, as 
described in Chapter III: Figure-Ground Segmentation. We surmised that the best 
bet for a reliable segmentation signal may be the so-called border-ownership cells 
discovered by von der Heydt and collaborators, which signal for a border in their 
receptive field on which side the object is that it belongs to. Contrary to our prior 
beliefs, consistent border-ownership cells were hard to find and not as prevalent in 
random locations of retinotopic regions as we thought. Yet, using fMRI we were 
able to find functionally defined clusters of neurons from which we could 
reasonably decode figure-ground segmentation. After obtaining improved 
segmentation signals, we wanted to know whether face patches actually do 
represent if the monkey was conscious of a face or not. Alternatively, face cells 
could just be passive filters of the visual input regardless of percept. One of the 
categories of switchable face stimuli that we considered using to answer this 
question was a type of degraded face image called Mooney faces. This endeavor 
is described in Chapter IV: Mooney Faces. Humans usually very rapidly recognize 
this stimulus as a face if it is presented upside down, concomitantly causing the 
perception of subjective/illusory contours of the face, however, anecdotally most 
monkeys do not. Hence, we asked whether we could make monkeys see the face 
in Mooney face stimuli and study this moment of switch in their perception. It 
turned out that responses to Mooney faces could be improved by animating them 
or adding an outline, but even after this exposure, responses to Mooney faces 
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remained relatively low. Following this interlude, in the second half of this thesis 
we study the neural correlates of conscious perception more directly. In Chapter V: 
A Philosophical Treatise on Consciousness we distinguish between different 
definitions of consciousness, give a review on previous electrophysiological 
studies aiming to distill neural correlates of consciousness, analyze confounding 
factors that can foil these attempts, and dissect what it means for a signal in the 
brain to truly be a neural correlate of consciousness. Using these insights, we 
developed a no-report binocular rivalry paradigm to isolate neural correlates of 
consciousness as rigorously as possible and avoid confounds such as report that 
beset previous studies. We then employed this paradigm in monkeys and asked 
whether neurons in face patches actually do represent the conscious percept of a 
face or are just passive filters of visual input. The main results of this study, which 
are described in Chapter VI: Binocular Rivalry, are that face cells are indeed 
modulated by conscious percept even without report. Moreover, they may 
multiplex both conscious percept and the veridical physical stimulus, and the 
conscious percept can be decoded with high accuracy from a population of single 
neurons. In the last chapter, Chapter VII: Future Directions, we describe 
preliminary studies that finally hone in on answering the first question of this thesis 
– in which direction information flows (feedforward vs. feedback) during conscious 
switches – by recording with ultra-high-yield electrodes from two directly connected 
nodes of a hierarchy, face patches ML and AM. Moreover, we give an outlook on 
future experiments that could further reveal the source of conscious switches and 
the causal role different parts of the brain play in propagating and broadcasting a 
switch across the brain. These investigations hold the promise to go beyond mere 
correlates of consciousness and yield a mechanistic understanding of 
consciousness.
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C h a p t e r  I I  
THE MACAQUE FACE PATCH SYSTEM 
From: Hesse and Tsao (2020). "The macaque face patch system: a turtle’s 
underbelly for the brain". Submitted to: Nature Reviews Neuroscience. 
 
Objects constitute the fundamental currency of our consciousness: they are the 
things that we perceive, remember, and think about.  One of the most important 
objects for a primate is a face. Research on the macaque face patch system in 
recent years has given us a remarkable window into the detailed processes 
underlying object recognition. Here, we review the macaque face patch system, 
including its anatomical organization, coding principles, role in behavior, and 
interactions with other brain regions. We highlight not only how it constitutes an 
archetypal object recognition system, but also how it may provide a key to 
understanding mechanisms for higher cognitive function. 
 
Introduction 
The neural circuits underlying visual perception constitute one of the grand 
mysteries of neuroscience, spawning a huge number of discoveries concerning the 
development, structure, and function of the brain. More than a century ago, 
Sherrington marveled at the miracle of vision:  
The eye sends . . . into the cell-and-fibre forest of the brain throughout the 
waking day continual rhythmic streams of tiny, individually evanescent, 
electrical potentials . . . . A shower of little electrical leaks conjures up for me, 
when I look, the landscape; the castle on the height, or, when I look at him 
approaching, my friend's face (Sherrington, 1940).  
 
How is this possible? We know that after entering the eye, visual information travels 
in the cortex through a sequence of retinotopic visual areas before entering a large 
brain region called inferotemporal (IT) cortex, the site of high-level object 
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representation (Tanaka, 1996). Here, we review our current understanding of one 
particular system within IT cortex, the macaque face patch system, a network of 
regions dedicated to processing faces. 
 
Why study the processing of faces? Wouldn’t it be of greater interest to study 
“general” object recognition? Faces are indisputably a rather peculiar category of 
objects (see Box 1, “Are faces special?”). One thing that makes faces peculiar is 
that we are all experts at face recognition, able to distinguish two people based on 
the subtlest of differences in facial structure. And faces, unlike most objects around 
us, carry enormous social importance. For example, social psychologists have found 
that a split-second judgment of competence based solely on facial appearance could 
predict 69% of Senate races in 2004 (Todorov et al., 2005). 
 
We focus our attention on the face patch system of the macaque monkey because 
we believe it constitutes the currently best understood system for high-level object 
representation. We will review its anatomical organization, coding principles, role in 
behavior, development, and interactions with other brain regions. In his famous book 
for young scientists, Sir Peter Medawar advised that a key to success in science is 
to find the “turtle’s underbelly, the soft spot that makes a hard problem tractable” 
(Medawar, 2008). In this review, we argue that the macaque face patch system 
provides a useful model not only for understanding the neural mechanisms of high-
level object representation, but also the myriad brain systems that operate on the 
output of these mechanisms including memory, thought, and action. 
 
Face cell discovery 
The discovery of face cells seems like one of those remarkable, unaccountable 
accidents of experimental science. How did it happen? As with most historical 
events, it seems that many forces contributed to this singular, serendipitous event. 
Charles Gross, as a young junior faculty member at MIT, was inspired by stories 
that he heard from his colleague Hans Lukas Teuber (Gross, 2006) about how 
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temporal lobe lesions induced object agnosias including prosopagnosia. He was 
also stimulated by work on bug detectors in the frog’s retina and superior colliculus 
by his colleague Jerry Lettvin, as well as the famous work of Hubel and Wiesel 
across the river at Harvard Medical School on complex cells in area V1 and their 
speculation that even more complex cells would lie more anterior in the brain. He 
was also influenced by the Polish psychologist Konorski’s speculations on gnostic 
neurons (“grandmother cells” that encode highly specific concepts) (Konorski, 
1967). And finally, there was a very relatable human element of seeking a new 
beginning after repeated failures. Gross recalls, “Discouraged by my inability to 
understand the frontal lobe, I decided it lay in an inaccessible limbo bearing little 
relationship to anatomy, physiology, and psychology…So I decided to turn my 
attention to the cortex on the inferior convexity of the temporal lobe: inferotemporal 
cortex.” (Gross, 2006) Here, we see the first glimmer of the turtle’s underbelly. 
 
Gross and his colleagues reported the astonishing discovery of cells that responded 
selectively to various complex objects such as hands, faces, and trees, in both the 
upper and lower banks of the superior temporal sulcus (STS) (Gross et al., 1972; 
Bruce et al., 1981; Desimone et al., 1984). This finding was initially greeted with 
great skepticism by the neuroscience community. David Marr even commented, 
“Suppose, for example, that one actually found the apocryphal grandmother cell. 
Would that really tell us anything much at all?” (Marr, 1982). One major reason for 
the skepticism was that the cells seemed more or less randomly scattered across 
the temporal lobe, with some concentration in the STS (Baylis et al., 1985; Baylis et 
al., 1987), and it wasn’t clear how one might go about understanding them at a 
deeper level. 
 
In 1997, Nancy Kanwisher and colleagues published a landmark paper reporting 
discovery of a face-selective area in the human brain using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) (Kanwisher et al., 1997) (this is  the most-cited paper ever 
published in the Journal of Neuroscience). Several previous neuroimaging studies 
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had strongly suggested the existence of such an area (Malach et al., 1995; Puce 
et al., 1995; Clark et al., 1996; Puce et al., 1996; Courtney et al., 1997; Haxby et al., 
1999), including an early PET study by Sergent et al. from 1992(Sergent et al., 
1992). The fMRI response of this area, which Kanwisher dubbed the “fusiform face 
area” (FFA), was about three times as strong to faces as to any other object. This 
area was located in the same place in every single subject. In addition to the FFA, 
several other face-selective regions were also found. The discovery of these face-
selective regions in human ventral temporal cortex was remarkable because it 
suggested that face processing might be localized to specific chunks of cortex. If 
one could only record from these regions, perhaps one could understand how facial 
identity is represented. And this, in turn, could shed light on how other objects are 
represented, since the central computational challenge of face recognition, to 
recognize a face despite myriad “accidental” changes due to changes in lighting, 
viewing angle, partial occlusion, and so on, is the same as that of general object 
recognition (DiCarlo and Cox, 2007). 
 
Various studies tried to deduce coding properties of the human FFA using fMRI. For 
example, in one approach, researchers used a method called fMRI adaptation to 
deduce that face-selective voxels are more invariant to changes in size and position 
than to changes in viewpoint and illumination (Sapountzis et al., 2010). Ultimately, 
however, one cannot sort rice grains using a forklift. The BOLD signal remains only 
an indirect and coarse measure of neural activity, and the response properties of 
single cells within face-selective regions remained unclear from human fMRI 
experiments. 
 
Some studies even questioned the exclusivity of the FFA for face processing and 
suggested that it might actually be a region specialized for processing any category 
at which one is an expert (Gauthier et al., 1999). The key evidence in favor of the 
expertise hypothesis was that within the FFA, experts show higher activation to 
objects of their expertise compared to non-experts. In particular, it was found that 
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bird experts show higher activation to birds, and greeble experts to greebles (a 
“greeble” is an artificial object category). But since both birds and greebles are 
somewhat face-like, this result could also indicate that the FFA codes objects fitting 
a coarse face template, rather than any object of expertise (with attentional 
modulation in experts). A subsequent study supported this viewpoint  (de Beeck et 
al., 2006): expertise in discriminating three artificial categories (spikies, cubies, and 
smoothies) produced changes in distributed response patterns outside the FFA but 
not within the FFA, except in one subject who construed the smoothies as human-
like (“women wearing hats”). 
 
A path out of the confusion concerning what single cells in face-selective areas 
actually represent emerged with the discovery of face-selective regions in the 
macaque monkey using fMRI (Tsao et al., 2003a; Moeller et al., 2008) (see Box 2, 
“Face patches across species”). Comparing fMRI responses to images of faces vs. 
non-face objects revealed activation in several regions of IT cortex. This discovery 
made it possible to record electrophysiologically from single cells in fMRI-identified 
face patches and to systematically study the detailed selectivity of cells within these 
patches. 
Early fMRI experiments found three face-selective regions (Tsao et al., 2003a), and 
later experiments using improved methods revealed approximately six face-
selective regions (Moeller et al., 2008) in each hemisphere of macaque IT cortex 
(Fig. II-1): the posterior lateral (PL), middle lateral (ML), middle fundus (MF), anterior 
lateral (AL), anterior fundus (AF), and anterior medial (AM) patches. The finding of 
face-selective regions in the macaque with fMRI has been replicated by multiple 
groups (Pinsk et al., 2005; Pinsk et al., 2009; Issa and DiCarlo, 2012; Srihasam et 
al., 2012; McMahon et al., 2014; Afraz et al., 2015; McMahon et al., 2015; Aparicio 
et al., 2016; Arcaro and Livingstone, 2017). 
 
Electrophysiological recordings targeted to face patches ML/MF revealed an 
astonishing phenomenon: almost all (97%) of the visually-responsive neurons in 
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these two regions were strongly face selective (Fig. II-1c) (Tsao et al., 2006). 
Interestingly, in addition to a strong response to faces, many ML/MF cells showed a 
strong response to a clock and an apple; this gave a further hint that cells in these 
patches are coding faces and not arbitrary objects of expertise – even non-face 
objects effective in eliciting spikes were face-like. Subsequently, recordings in face 
patches PL (Issa and DiCarlo, 2012), AL (Freiwald and Tsao, 2010), AF(McMahon 
et al., 2014), and AM (Freiwald and Tsao, 2010) showed high concentrations of face 
cells as well (Fig. II-1c). 
 
The discovery of such high concentrations of face cells was not at all expected 
based on previous electrophysiology in IT cortex (Baylis et al., 1985; Baylis et al., 
1987) and suggested that the turtle’s underbelly for object recognition might be at 
hand. A large number of detailed questions about the neural mechanism for object 
recognition suddenly appeared tractable. What are cells in each patch coding? What 
are the functional differences between patches? What is the connectivity of these 
specialized patches to each other and the rest of the brain? How does activity in 
each patch contribute to perception and behavior? Is the invariance problem for 
faces solved by this system of patches and if so, how? Is this system of patches 
unique to faces or does it generalize across all of IT cortex? 
 
Figure II-1: Face-selective patches in macaque cortex. (a) Schematic of patches 
shown on inflated right hemisphere of a macaque. The canonical six in IT cortex are 
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labeled in white, while additional patches are labeled in cyan. (b) Patches shown 
on coronal slices, mm relative to inter-aural canal indicated in upper right corner. (c) 
Top: Response profiles of all visually responsive cells recorded from ML, AL, and 
AM, to 96 pictures, consisting of faces, human headless bodies, fruits, gadgets, 
hands, and scrambled patterns (left to right, 16 images/category). Stimuli were 
presented for 200 ms and separated by 200 ms inter-stimulus intervals. The two 
non-face stimuli with the highest response in ML are shown (clock and apple). 
Bottom: Normalized population response to each image (averaged across all units). 
For each cell, responses were summed from 100 to 300 ms, averaged over all 
presentations, baseline subtracted, and normalized to the maximum average 
response. Panels (a) & (b) adapted from (Moeller et al., 2008) panel (c) (left) from 
(Tsao et al., 2006), and panel (c) (middle, right) from (Freiwald and Tsao, 2010). 
 
Anatomical organization 
 
Spatial organization of face patches. The face patches are located within 
cytoarchitectonic areas TEO (PL) and TE (ML, MF, AL, AF, AM), the posterior and 
anterior part of IT cortex, respectively (Fig. II-1a, II-1b). The six patches are located 
symmetrically in the two hemispheres and in similar locations across different 
monkeys (Tsao et al., 2003a; Tsao et al., 2008a). This provided one of the first hints 
that the patches might constitute a system for face processing, rather than being 
simply random islands of face-selective cortex. There is individual variability both in 
the number and position of patches. Some animals show only a subset of the typical 
pattern of six bilateral patches, while some show even more than the canonical six 
(Tsao et al., 2008a). In many animals, patches PL and ML are confluent, making it 
hard to distinguish the two. In some animals, AL and AM are also confluent. 
 
In addition to this canonical pattern of six patches, several additional patches 
activated by the contrast faces versus objects can be found in the temporal lobe, 
in the upper bank of the STS (middle dorsal patch MD and anterior dorsal patch 
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AD) (Fisher and Freiwald, 2015), perirhinal cortex (PR), and the temporal pole 
(TP) (Landi and Freiwald, 2017) (Fig. II-1a). These patches are more variable 
across animals. Ku et al. reported further additional face patches in entorhinal 
cortex, parahippocampal cortex, amygdala, ventral TE, and hippocampus, using a 
high-field spin-echo sequence (Ku et al., 2011). 
 
Face patches reside not only in the temporal lobe. Within prefrontal cortex, there are 
three regions of face-selective cortex in ventral prefrontal cortex: PO (prefrontal 
orbital), PA (prefrontal pre-arcuate), and PVL (prefrontal ventrolateral) (Tsao et al., 
2008b) (Fig. II-1a). 
 
Anatomical connectivity of face patches. A large number of anatomical studies 
have probed the connectivity of IT cortex. These studies have generally found 
patchy connectivity within IT, hinting at the presence of modular networks (Saleem 
et al., 1993; Borra et al., 2010). However, most of these studies have been 
conducted independently of functional testing in the same animals. It is hard to learn 
about the life of a snake by observing its long abandoned coil. The study of face 
patches has introduced a new paradigm for investigating how functional properties 
and anatomical connectivity relate, leveraging the ability to target tracers to 
anatomical regions defined by functional selectivity. 
 
To map the connectivity of macaque face patches, Moeller et al. electrically 
microstimulated specific face patches while performing simultaneous fMRI (Moeller 
et al., 2008). Stimulation of each of five targeted face patches produced strong 
activation in other face patches. For example, stimulation of ML produced activation 
in PL, ML, AL, AF, and AM (Fig. II-2a). Activation was largely ipsilateral. Within IT 
cortex, activation elicited by face patch stimulation was almost entirely confined 
within other face patches. Another study that directly compared face patch 
stimulation and body patch stimulation found that there was very little overlap 
between functional connectivity patterns of the two, suggesting that the face patch 
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network and body patch network are largely parallel systems (Premereur et al., 
2016). 
 
Stimulation of IT face patches also activated several subcortical regions, including 
the amygdala, claustrum, and pulvinar (Moeller et al., 2008). In particular, stimulation 
of AM elicited activation in the amygdala and claustrum, while stimulation of ML and 
AL both activated the inferior pulvinar (Moeller et al., 2008) (Fig. II-2b). Because the 
pulvinar, claustrum, and amygdala were the only brain structures consistently 
activated by stimulation of the face patches outside the face patch network, these 
structures may constitute three hubs by which face patches communicate with other 
regions of the brain. 
 
More recently, direct injections of retrograde tracers have been made into four face 
patches: PL, ML, AL, and AM (Grimaldi et al., 2016). Grimaldi et al. found strong 
inputs to the most posterior face patch PL from specific regions in area V4 and TEO, 
and V2 and V3 more weakly (Grimaldi et al., 2016). Within IT cortex, anatomical 
tracing experiments largely confirmed electrical microstimulation experiments: the 
IT inputs to a particular face patch largely came from other face patches (Fig. II-2c). 
 
It is generally thought that processing increases in complexity from posterior to 
anterior in the temporal lobe (Tanaka, 1996), raising the question whether there is a 
hierarchy between face patches. Grimaldi et al. did not find anatomical evidence for 
a strict hierarchy (despite functional evidence for this, see “Coding principles” 
below).  For example, a retrograde tracer injection into AM, the most anterior face 
patch, revealed inputs from both AL and ML (Fig. II-2c, right). And in the same 
animal, when ML was injected, inputs were found from both AL and AM (Fig. II-2c, 
left). Thus there is extensive feedback within the system, and each patch talks to 
multiple other patches (Fig. II-2d). Furthermore, the neurons projecting from one 
patch to another were located in both supra and infragranular layers, consistent with 
a bidirectional hierarchical relationship (Felleman and Van Essen, 1991). 
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The major inputs from higher order areas to face patches as revealed by tracers 
came from the medial temporal lobe as well as three subcortical regions, the 
claustrum, pulvinar, and amygdala, largely confirming microstimulation results. 
Claustrum cells were strongly clustered and segregated by their target face patch. 
Projections from prefrontal cortex were extremely weak; this is very surprising in light 
of previous retrograde injections in IT showing strong prefrontal input (Borra et al., 
2010; Saleem et al., 2014), as well as results of electrical microstimulation showing 
that stimulation of AM activates prefrontal face patches PO, PA, and PVL (Moeller 
et al., 2008). This discrepancy between results of electrical stimulation and 
anatomical tracing may indicate that the connection from IT to prefrontal face 
patches is not direct. 
 
Interestingly, one animal in this tracer study showed an extra patch at an unusual 
location, and this patch also showed highly specific anatomical connections with 
other face patches in IT cortex (Fig. II-2e), suggesting it was a full-fledged node of 
this animal’s face processing system (Grimaldi et al., 2016). This underscores that 
individual variability between animals is real and not due to noise, and could explain 
findings of “extra” clusters of face-selective cortex outside the canonical six in 
electrophysiological and imaging experiments.  
 
Overall, the specificity of connections between face patches suggests that they 
constitute a specialized system for face processing, and the small number of 
connected nodes outside the face patch system suggests that the output of the 
system is read out by a small number of downstream nodes. 
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Figure II-2: Anatomical connectivity of face patches. (a) Connectivity of IT face 
patches revealed by microstimulation combined with fMRI. The electrode targeted 
ML in the right hemisphere. Areas significantly activated by microstimulation of ML 
are shown overlaid on a flatmap. (b) Microstimulation of face patch AM (top) and ML 
(bottom) activates the amygdala (LA: lateral amygdala), claustrum, and pulvinar (PI: 
inferior pulvinar; PM: medial pulvinar; PL: lateral pulvinar). (c) Left: Retrograde 
injections into ML revealed labeled cells in PL, AL, and AM; right: retrograde 
injections into AM revealed labeled cells in ML and AL. Blue indicates labeled cells, 
yellow indicates fMRI-identified face patches. (d) Wiring diagram schematic of face 
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patches. Black arrows indicate results from the tracer injections into ML and AM 
in (c). Grey arrows indicate further results from tracer injections into PL and AL not 
shown in (c). (e) Top: Face patch AP in coronal slice. Bottom: Tracer injections in 
ML (red) and AL (green) both revealed labeled cell bodies in AP. Panels (a) and (b) 
adapted from (Moeller et al., 2008), panels (c), (d) and (e) adapted from (Moeller et 
al., 2008; Grimaldi et al., 2016). 
 
Sub-compartmentalization within patches. Do face patches constitute atoms of 
IT cortex, or can they be further subdivided into finer modules? The size of face 
patches is only roughly estimated by fMRI experiments and depends on the 
threshold. We mapped the extent of face patch ML using both fMRI and 
electrophysiology, and found that the size of fMRI-defined ML (at threshold of p<10-
10) was ~4 mm in diameter, while the electrophysiology-defined patch was ~2 mm in 
diameter, with a sharp border going from all to no face-selective cells (Grimaldi and 
Tsao, unpublished). In contrast, Aparicio et al. reported that the maximum diameter 
of face patch ML as mapped with electrophysiological recordings was 6 mm, i.e., 
similar to its fMRI activation, with the fraction of face-selective cells decreasing 
monotonically from its center (Aparicio et al., 2016). 
 
To determine whether there is finer structure within a face patch, Sato et al. 
performed optical imaging to identify face-selective regions in the vicinity of AL and 
then performed single-unit recordings in multiple sites within identified face-selective 
regions (Sato et al., 2013). They found heterogeneity in selectivity for human versus 
monkey faces and scrambled versus intact faces across different sites, but similar 
selectivity within each site, suggesting the existence of finer feature columns (~0.5 
mm in diameter) within face patch AL.  
 
Rajimehr et al. used retinotopic face stimuli to map face patches in an fMRI 
experiment and found heterogeneous retinotopic organization within face patches 
(Rajimehr et al., 2014). For example, ML/MF was subdivided into a posterior-ventral 
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subregion that showed variations in eccentricity and polar angle selectivity and an 
anterior-dorsal subregion with no retinotopic selectivity. Using high-resolution fMRI, 
Janssens et al. mapped retinotopy across IT and found that ML showed a foveal 
bias, while more anterior patches showed no retinotopic organization (Janssens et 
al., 2014). 
 
Further insight into clustering of feature selectivity within face patches comes from 
a multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) study that used activity from fMRI voxels to 
decode specific features of faces that monkeys viewed (Dubois et al., 2015). The 
authors found that within single face patches, different voxels were tuned to different 
viewpoints of a face, and the viewpoint of a face could be decoded from the fMRI 
response pattern in face patches ML/MF. On the other hand, face identity could not 
be decoded from the voxel response pattern. This suggests that viewpoint, but not 
identity, shows clustering of tuning on the coarse scale of fMRI voxels (~1 mm). 
Ultimately, higher resolution techniques for functional mapping, e.g., two-photon 
calcium imaging (Tang et al., 2018b ), will be needed to more clearly understand 
sub-compartmentalization in face patches and to clarify whether the border between 
face patches and neighboring IT regions is gradual or discrete. 
 
Coding principles 
What are cells in face patches coding? In general terms, cells could be detecting 
faces, identifying faces, or recognizing other aspects of faces such as expression, 
dominance, or gender (Bruce and Young, 1986). The simple fact that almost all cells 
within a face patch are face-selective suggests that face detection is one major 
computational goal. But even a cursory glance at responses across a population of 
ML/MF cells to 16 different faces shows that individual cells respond differently to 
different faces (Tsao et al., 2006) (Fig. II-1c). An early study reported that face-
selective cells in IT encode the physical structure of faces while cells in the anterior 
superior temporal polysensory area encode familiarity of faces (Young and Yamane, 
1992). However, lack of access to face patches precluded a detailed understanding. 
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In this section, we summarize the different aspects of faces that are coded by cells 
in face patches. 
 
Figure II-3: Probing feature selectivity of face cells. (a) Mean response time 
course from 66 ML/MF cells to four stimulus categories: faces, gadgets, cartoons, 
and cartoon parts. (b) Top: depiction of cartoon stimuli varied across inter-eye 
distance. Bottom: Two example cells show ramp-shaped tuning. Asterisks mark 
significant modulation (P < 0.001). (c) Population response (110 cells) to images 
containing some or all of the face parts in the context of the face outline. (d) 
Significant contrast feature histogram showing consistency of selectivity for contrast 
relationships across the population. Blue (red) bars indicate the number of cells 
significantly preferring the intensity of part A to be greater (less) than the intensity of 
part B. Triangles indicate feature pairs predicted to elicit significant contrast polarity 
tuning across the population by three different models, together with the predicted 
direction of tuning. Pred monkey: A monkey face was illuminated from different 
directions and the contrast relationships that were robust to changes in illumination 
were identified. Pred human: the same was done for a human face. Pred Sinha: 
similar to Pred human, reported in a different study(Sinha, 2002). Panels (a) and (b) 
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adapted from (Freiwald et al., 2009), panel (c) from (Issa and DiCarlo, 2012), 
panel (d) from (Ohayon et al., 2012). 
 
Probing face coding in ML/MF using cartoon faces. Early experiments tried to 
probe mechanisms for face detection, face identification, and holistic processing 
using cartoon faces (Freiwald et al., 2009). The motivation for using cartoons was 
twofold. First, cartoons are able to convey rich information about not only the 
presence of a face, but also individual identity and expression. Second, a much 
smaller set of parameters is required to specify a cartoon face compared to a real 
face. 
 
To address the mechanism for face detection, cartoon faces were constructed using 
composites made of 7 cartoon parts (face outline, irises, mouth, nose, hair, eye, 
eyebrow), resulting in 27 possible combinations of parts being either present or 
absent. Cells in ML/MF responded strongly to the cartoon faces, with the mean 
response to cartoon faces being ~80% that to photographs of real faces (Fig. II-3a). 
Single cells were selective for the presence of specific subsets of parts. Half of the 
response variance (52%) could be explained by linear regression on presence or 
absence of the 7 face features. An additional 18% of the variance could be explained 
by second order effects. This dependence of responses on multiple parts and part 
interactions shows that middle face patch neurons are not just detecting isolated 
features. However, because 70% of the response variance could be explained by 
first and second order effects alone, middle face patch cells are not highly nonlinear 
holistic cells either. 
 
To address the mechanism for face identification, 19 features defining a cartoon 
face (including inter-eye distance, face aspect ratio, iris size, etc.) were 
parametrically varied. Single cells showed ramp-shaped tuning to subsets of face 
features, i.e., a monotonically increasing response from one feature extreme to the 
opposite extreme (Fig. II-3b) (Leopold et al., 2006). 
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To address the mechanism for holistic processing (see Box 1, “Are faces special?”), 
the effect of context on face feature tuning was examined (Freiwald et al., 2009). 
When tuning to a particular feature (e.g., face aspect ratio) was measured while 
other features were present, the gain of tuning was on average twice that when the 
same feature was shown in isolation. This provides a mechanistic explanation for 
the whole-part effect (Tanaka and Farah, 1993). Is the gain increase due to simple 
proximity of other facial features, or does their spatial arrangement also matter? 
Measurement of tuning to features in both upright and inverted faces revealed that 
cells were tuned to 25% fewer features when faces were inverted. Furthermore, 
substantial tuning to mouths appeared. This result suggests that mere proximity of 
other features alone is insufficient: face cells match the incoming feature 
constellation to an upright face template, and interpret features in the context of this 
template (thus, mouths may become interpreted as eyes in some cells). 
 
Issa and DiCarlo selectively unveiled different parts of a natural face to ask which 
parts triggers cells to fire (Issa and DiCarlo, 2012). They targeted their experiments 
to the most posterior face patch PL, reasoning that this should reveal the earliest 
template used by the brain for face detection. They found that the presence of a 
single eye surrounded by a face outline could drive a significant response in nearly 
all PL cells. Indeed, images containing only an eye evoked almost the same 
response as full-face images (Fig. II-3c).  
 
In natural faces, unlike cartoon faces, diagnostic shape elements (eyes, nose, etc.) 
occur with stereotyped contrast relationships (e.g., the eyes are usually darker than 
the nose). Pawan Sinha has suggested that the brain could detect faces by pooling 
contrast features, with the relevant contrast features being ones that are invariant to 
changes in lighting (Sinha, 2002). A similar scheme was used by one of the most 
powerful early algorithms for face detection, the Viola-Jones algorithm (Viola and 
Jones, 2001).   
 
 
24 
 
To investigate whether face cells exploit contrast features as well, Ohayon et al. 
presented artificial face stimuli consisting of 11 different regions varying in 
brightness (Ohayon et al., 2012). In half the cells, activity could be driven from no 
response to a response greater than that to a real face by changing contrast 
combinations. Cells were highly consistent in their contrast polarity preferences (Fig. 
II-3d). Moreover, these preferences matched features used by a computer vision 
algorithm for face detection. Finally, most cells showed tuning to both contrast 
polarity and geometry of facial features, suggesting single cells contribute to both 
detection and recognition. 
 
Overall, experiments with simplified face stimuli reveal the exquisite precision with 
which face cells measure physical properties of faces, including which features are 
present, their geometry and contrast, and surrounding context. 
 
Cells show increasing view invariance in more anterior patches. One of the 
central computational challenges of object recognition is to recognize an object’s 
identity despite view, partial occlusion, lighting, and other “accidental” changes. 
Freiwald and Tsao presented 25 different identities each at 8 different head 
orientations while recording face cells from multiple patches, and discovered a 
striking functional distinction between patches in terms of their view tuning (Freiwald 
and Tsao, 2010). In ML and MF, neurons respond selectively to specific views. In 
AL, there are two populations of neurons that respond similarly to left and right profile 
views, and to up/down/frontal views, respectively, thereby achieving partial view 
invariance. In AM, the most anterior patch, neurons respond invariantly across all 
views (Fig. II-4a). Some cells in AM responded extremely sparsely to only a small 
subset of face identities, with invariance across changes in view (Fig. II-4b). A major 
purpose of the face patches may thus be to construct a representation of individual 
identity invariant to view direction. Furthermore, cells not only increase in view 
invariance from ML to AM, but also in size and position invariance (Fig. II-4c). 
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The existence of cells showing mirror symmetric identity selectivity in AL is puzzling. 
It makes sense that there should exist a patch where cells have a view-specific 
representation, since the actual visual input is view specific. And it makes sense that 
there should exist a patch where cells have a view-invariant representation, since 
this is the end goal; however, a representation where the responses to left and right 
views are the same is surprising, and various attempts have been made to explain 
this computationally. In one study, Leibo et al. showed that a feedforward network 
trained on sequences of images of faces rotating from left to right using Hebbian 
learning develops a mirror-symmetric representation of faces in an intermediate 
layer and a view-invariant representation in a later layer (Leibo et al., 2017), just as 
observed in the face patch system. In another study, using a model that inverts a 
generative 3D face graphics engine, Yildirim et al. were also able to replicate the 
three stages of increasing view invariance observed in the face patch system 
(Yildirim et al., 2018). A definitive explanation for why Nature has broken up the 
problem of invariant face representation into this particular set of steps (ML/MF -> 
AL -> AM) remains elusive. Furthermore, the actual sequence of steps leading to a 
view-invariant representation in AM may be more complex, given that the anatomical 
connectivity is inconsistent with a strict hierarchy (e.g., there is a direct projection 
from the middle face patch ML to the most anterior face patch AM, Fig. II-2c). 
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Figure II-4: Increasing view invariance across the face patch hierarchy. (a) 
Representation similarity matrices computed from responses to the 200 face view 
stimuli for ML/MF, AL, and AM. (b) Top: Mean response time course of an example 
AM cell that responded very sparsely to the 200 face view stimuli. Bottom: Mean 
response to 25 individuals at 8 views. (c) Mean response time courses of an 
example AM cell to a set of faces and objects, each at five different sizes (stimulus 
size indicated in upper right). (Middle) Mean responses to the 40 images, with each 
color indicating one size. (Bottom) Examples images from the 40 image set. Only 3 
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of the 40 images elicited responses from this cell, corresponding to the face of 
one individual regardless of view and size. Adapted from (Freiwald and Tsao, 2010). 
  
Cracking the code for facial identity. Finding robust tuning of neurons along some 
stimulus dimensions (e.g., identity, viewpoint) falls short of fully understanding the 
code of the neurons. If one could reconstruct an arbitrary real face seen by a monkey 
using responses of face cells and predict a neuron’s response to an arbitrary real 
face, then one could claim to truly understand the code for facial identity. 
 
To discover the brain’s code for realistic facial identity, Chang and Tsao 
parameterized a large database of faces using 50 features per face (Chang and 
Tsao, 2017), adopting an approach to generating faces originally developed in 
computer vision called the “active appearance model” (Cootes et al., 1998; Chang 
and Tsao, 2017). Specifically, for each face in the database, they placed a set of 
landmarks on key features by hand. The (𝑥, 𝑦) coordinates of these landmarks 
describe the “shape” of the face. They then morphed these landmarks to match 
those in a standard template. The resulting image describes the “shape-free 
appearance” of the face (Fig. II-5a). Finally, they performed principal components 
analysis independently on the shape vectors and appearance vectors across the 
entire set of faces. By taking the top 25 shape principal components and the top 25 
appearance principal components, they created a 50 dimensional face space (Fig. 
II-5b). 
 
They randomly drew 2000 faces from the 50-d face space and presented them to 
the monkey while recording cells from two face patches, ML/MF and AM. Single 
cells showed ramp-shaped tuning to a subset of the 50 face parameters (Figure II-
5c). ML/MF cells were preferentially tuned to shape parameters while AM cells were 
preferentially tuned to appearance parameters, consistent with the increased 
invariance to view of AM cells found earlier (Freiwald and Tsao, 2010). 
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The finding of ramp-shaped tuning to subsets of face features suggests that the 
response of each cell can be roughly approximated by a linear combination of facial 
features. Conversely, the 50 face features should be a linear transform of the 
population response vector. Importantly, because the experimenters presented the 
same set of 2000 faces to each cell, they could directly test this. Reconstructions of 
faces using linear regression on activity of just 205 face cells from ML/MF and AM 
were strikingly accurate (Fig. II-5d).  
 
If a neuron’s response can be completely explained by linear regression, this implies 
a very simple geometric picture of the underlying computation: the neuron is 
projecting incoming faces onto a specific preferred axis and measuring the value 
along that axis. This has the surprising consequence that the neuron should respond 
exactly the same to all faces in the hyperplane orthogonal to the preferred axis (Fig. 
II-5e). Note that this is not a logical necessity of ramp-shaped tuning (Fig. II-5f). To 
test this prediction, Chang and Tsao generated a series of faces with very different 
identity whose variation was orthogonal to the preferred axis of the cell. All of these 
faces turned out to elicit exactly the same response (Fig. II-5g). 
 
In sum, for faces, the brain’s code fortuitously turns out to coincide with a classic 
approach to parametrizing faces from computer vision: shape-appearance 
coordinates. 
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Figure II-5: The neural code for facial identity. (a) Parameterizing faces: for 200 
face images, 58 landmark points were annotated, as in the example shown (left). 
The positions of these landmarks describe the shape of the face (middle). The 
landmarks were morphed to an average template, resulting in an image describing 
the shape-free appearance of the face (right). (b) The first principal component for 
shape (top) and appearance (bottom). (c) Tuning to first three shape and first three 
appearance dimensions for an example neuron. Asterisks indicate neurons showing 
significant tuning. (d) Facial images reconstructed using facial features decoded by 
linear regression from responses of 205 cells in ML/MF and AM. Predicted faces 
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and the corresponding actual stimuli presented in the experiment are shown. (e) 
Geometric picture of essential computation performed by a face cell: projection of 
incoming faces, formatted as shape appearance coordinates, onto a specific 
preferred axis. (f) Ramp-shaped tuning along a preferred axis does not imply flat 
tuning along orthogonal axes. Different examples of 2D tuning functions are shown. 
While all exhibit ramp-shaped tuning along face axis 1, only the leftmost example 
shows flat tuning along the orthogonal axis. (g) The responses of an AM cell to 144 
faces evenly sampled from the 2D space spanned by the preferred axis and principal 
orthogonal axis, synthesized specifically for this cell, are color coded and plotted. 
(h) Left: responses of a sparse AM cells to 25 identities reveals strong responses to 
three disparate identities. Right: The response of this cell to 2000 faces reveals axis 
tuning. The three effective identities from the left plot are indicated by arrows: their 
difference lies on the null space of this cell. Adapted from (Chang and Tsao, 2017). 
 
From faces to objects. Is the mechanism used by the brain to encode facial 
identity, through a set of patches with increasing view invariance that collectively 
represent faces by projection onto a set of axes spanning face space, unique to 
faces? Bao et al. (Bao et al., 2019) recently explored the overall large-scale 
organization of IT cortex using very similar methods to those used to decipher the 
face patch system: fMRI, fMRI-guided electrophysiology, electrical microstimulation, 
and mapping of response selectivity within a computationally-generated object 
space framework. Using a deep network, they built a parametric object space by 
computing the first 50 principal components of responses of units in a deep neural 
network (AlexNet) to a large set of objects (Fig. II-6a). They then measured 
responses of monkey IT cells to dimensions of this space and found that cells are 
clustered to form a coarse topographic map of the first two dimensions of this space 
(Fig. II-6b). Furthermore, this map is replicated three times, with increasing view 
invariance (Fig. II-6c). In particular, the map consists of four quadrants 
encompassing face patches, body patches, as well as two newly discovered 
networks, one representing “spiky” objects and another representing “stubby” 
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objects. Electrical microstimulation combined with simultaneous fMRI revealed 
that patches within the two newly discovered networks are anatomically connected, 
just like the face (Moeller et al., 2008) and body (Premereur et al., 2016) networks. 
Cells in each network approximately project incoming objects, formatted as vectors 
in object space, onto specific preferred axes, with the sign of the first two 
components of this axis dictated by the cell’s anatomical position in IT cortex.  
 
This work shows that IT cortex contains multiple siblings of the face patch network, 
which each share its hallmark properties of modular connectivity, functional 
hierarchy, and axis coding. Furthermore, the sibling networks are arranged in a way 
that is predicted by the topography of object space (Fig. II-6c). Thus a new general 
principle of IT cortex organization, “mapping object space,” can explain both 
category and non-category selective regions. Furthermore, arbitrary objects could 
be reconstructed using responses of cells from this IT object-topic map (Fig. II-6d), 
suggesting that cells in this map provide a close-to-complete basis for general object 
space. Thus within IT cortex, the original promise of the face patches, to provide a 
turtle’s underbelly for understanding the brain more generally, has been powerfully 
delivered. 
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Figure II-6: The neural code for object identity in general. (a) Schematic showing 
the four quadrants spanned by the first two PCs of object space. The stimuli in each 
of the quadrants were used for mapping four networks (face patches, body patches, 
NML patches, and Stubby patches) using fMRI. (b) Projection of preferred axis of 
each cell (N = 482) onto PC1 versus PC2 for all neurons recorded across four 
networks (NML network: yellow, body network: green, face network: blue, stubby 
network: magenta). (c) Schematic showing the threefold-repeated topographic map 
in IT that is organized according to the four quadrants of object space. (d) Example 
reconstructed images. Random objects were reconstructed using activity of 482 
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cells sampled from the four networks and a generative adversarial network. 
Adapted from (Bao et al., 2019). 
 
Selectivity for dimensions beyond facial identity. Besides shape and 
appearance dimensions, other face-related properties such as expression, 
familiarity, and gaze have been found to be encoded inside and outside the 
canonical face patch system. 
 
Facial expression is an extremely important feature for social interactions, and 
appears to be explicitly extracted by regions outside the canonical IT face patches, 
including the amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, and motion-selective areas in the STS. 
FMRI experiments comparing expressive vs. neutral faces show only weak 
modulation in canonical IT face patches, but strong modulation in prefrontal face 
patch PO in the lateral orbital sulcus (Tsao et al., 2008b). Consistent with this, single-
unit study targeting face cells in the lateral orbital sulcus, where PO is typically 
located, reveal many cells modulated by facial expression as well as other social 
dimensions such as gender and age (Barat et al., 2018). An fMRI study in monkeys 
(Hadj-Bouziane et al., 2008) reported that both IT and amygdala have maps of 
valence of facial expressions, and these valence maps overlap but don’t coincide 
with the canonical face patches. Further supporting an anatomical dissociation 
between processing of facial expression vs. identity, multivariate pattern analysis 
applied to monkey fMRI data revealed that both dynamic and static facial expression 
can be read out better from motion-selective areas in the STS than from face-
selective areas (Furl et al., 2012). 
 
Gaze is another important feature for inferring intent of other social agents. Using 
fMRI, Marciniak et al. found a patch in TEO that is activated when monkeys follow 
the gaze direction of a presented face (Marciniak et al., 2014). This patch is not 
activated when monkeys are trained to saccade based on identity rather than gaze 
direction. In face patch AD located in the upper bank of the STS, She and Tsao 
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found cells that respond to facial movements, in particular change of gaze (She 
and Tsao, 2017). Behaviorally, Roy et al. found that inactivation of posterior STS 
causes an impairment of gaze following in monkeys (Roy et al., 2012). These results 
suggest the presence of modules separate from the canonical face patches that 
infer the gaze target of other agents.  
One of the most important functions of face recognition is to identify familiar 
individuals. Landi and Freiwald reported that face patches PR and TP in the medial 
temporal lobe show more fMRI activation to faces that a monkey is personally 
familiar with than unfamiliar faces (Landi and Freiwald, 2017). She and Tsao 
recorded from PR and AM and found that in both regions, cells use axis codes for 
representing identity which are modulated by familiarity (She, 2018). 
To study face patches in a more naturalistic setting, researchers have probed 
responses of face patches to natural movies. Park et al. showed natural movies to 
monkeys during both single-unit recordings and while performing fMRI. They found 
that even within a small volume of a few hundred microns in face patch AF, there 
is a large diversity in activity profiles of individual cells, with only a small 
subpopulation (~16%) of cells showing a time course resembling their local voxel 
or LFP signal (Park et al., 2017). In particular, McMahon et al. found that neural 
populations in AF are tuned to the size of a face in a natural movie, which 
correlates with the social variable of how close it is to the observer (McMahon et 
al., 2015). Fisher and Freiwald reported that patch MD in the upper bank of the 
STS is activated by natural movies of moving faces but responds much less to 
static faces or incoherent movies in which frames are presented in random order 
(Fisher and Freiwald, 2015). 
At the other end of the spectrum, selectivity of face cells for low-level feature 
statistics has also been probed. Face cells in IT are tuned to spatial frequency 
invariant to distance of the face, unlike face cells in the amygdala, which are tuned 
to spatial frequency in retinal coordinates (Inagaki and Fujita, 2011).  A study 
 
 
35 
probing selectivity for the orientation content of faces found that ML cells are 
preferentially tuned to horizontally-filtered faces while AL cells are preferentially 
tuned to vertically-filtered faces (Taubert et al., 2016). 
  
Coding of multiple objects. In the real world, primates need to recognize objects 
in the presence of other objects, and this presents a major coding challenge for IT, 
since IT cells have large receptive fields that typically encompass multiple objects. 
Bao and Tsao studied how cells in two category-selective regions of the macaque, 
one of them a face patch, integrate multiple objects. They found that cells in face 
and body patches consistently perform winner-take-all under certain conditions (Bao 
and Tsao, 2018). For example, when a face is presented above a non-face object, 
face cells respond as if only the face is present. They showed that this winner-take-
all behavior could be parsimoniously explained by normalization within a pool of 
clustered face cells.  Indeed, accomplishing winner-take-all, which can be construed 
as a form of hard-wired attention, could be one important evolutionary driving force 
for modularity in IT.  
 
Causal role in behavior 
Face patches have constituted a battlefield for addressing one of the oldest 
questions in neuroscience: whether discrete regions of the brain are specialized for 
discrete tasks. Many of the physiological properties of face cells discussed so far 
suggest that they subserve a particular behavioral function, namely, enabling a 
monkey to detect faces and recognize their identity. For example, the role for face 
patches in face detection is supported by the match between the contrast template 
coded by ML cells and the statistical properties of faces in the real world illuminated 
from different directions (Fig. II-3d). Similarly, the role of face patch cells in 
identification is supported by the finding that facial identity can be linearly 
reconstructed from small numbers of these cells (Fig. II-5d). Yet, these findings do 
not rule out the possibility that the actual cells responsible for face detection and 
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identification are located elsewhere in the brain, interspersed with cells 
responsible for other tasks. Here, we first review behavioral evidence that monkeys 
are adept at detecting and recognizing faces, and then review evidence for the 
causal role of face patches in these functions.  
 
Monkeys are able to detect faces starting in infancy, with baby macaques tending 
to look at pictures of humans and monkeys over non-face objects (Sugita, 2008) 
(this tendency requires prior face experience though, see Box 3, “Development”). 
They share this face detection ability with human infants who, from birth, 
preferentially track faces over non-face objects (Goren et al., 1975; Johnson et al., 
1991; Valenza et al., 1996). As adults, humans are experts at face recognition, 
capable of memorizing large numbers of faces over many years (Bahrick et al., 
1975) and recognizing faces more accurately and quickly than other visual stimuli 
(Yin, 1969). Macaques are also adept at individual face recognition. A 1979 study 
by Rosenfeld and Van Hoesen found that rhesus macaques are able to discriminate 
faces of conspecifics invariant to changes in orientation, posture, size, color, or 
illumination (Rosenfeld and Van Hoesen, 1979). Several studies since confirmed 
that monkeys can recognize faces (Bruce, 1982; Overman Jr and Doty, 1982; Wright 
and Roberts, 1996). More recently, Moeller et al. found that monkeys could readily 
learn to discriminate a large number of new human identities, showing almost 
immediate generalization from delayed match to sample on a set of five faces to a 
new set of 32 different faces (Moeller et al., 2017); the recognition demand in this 
study was especially high: the 32 faces were all synthetic, hairless, and identical in 
complexion, and expressions of the same individual were varied to preclude 
matching based solely on low-level image features. Studies exploring the 
spontaneous, untrained viewing behavior of macaque monkeys also support a 
natural ability of macaques to recognize familiar faces. For example, Gothard et al. 
presented a pair of faces of the same monkey during a familiarization trial, followed 
by a pair of faces consisting of the just seen monkey (with altered gaze/view) and a 
new monkey (Gothard et al., 2009). Monkeys strongly preferred to look at the novel 
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face, indicating that they could distinguish the two faces (see also (Pascalis and 
Bachevalier, 1998)).  
 
Despite this evidence for strong face recognition capabilities in macaques, a recent 
review has argued that monkeys are very poor at individuating faces of conspecifics, 
unlike humans, and hence the macaque face patch system is not relevant for 
understanding the neural basis for human face recognition (Rossion and Taubert, 
2019). The authors cited papers showing that monkeys need many trials to 
discriminate a small number of faces, show poor performance even after long 
training, and generalize poorly to novel images of the same individuals or images of 
new individuals (e.g., (Parr et al., 2008)). We believe the discrepancies in the 
monkey face recognition behavioral literature stem from the fact that monkeys 
cannot be instructed verbally, and hence generalization strategies as well as overall 
motivation of monkeys may differ widely across different labs and different training 
paradigms. Given the existence of studies clearly showing strong face recognition 
ability in macaques, we believe the poor face recognition performance observed in 
some behavioral studies is not due to a fundamental inability of monkeys to 
recognize faces proficiently, but rather to specifics of training procedures in those 
studies (e.g., use of food vs. water reward, use of a free viewing touch screen 
paradigm vs. a fixation paradigm, etc.). Next, we review causal intervention studies 
probing the specific role of the face patch system in face detection and recognition. 
 
An early study aimed to test the necessity of cortex in the upper and lower banks of 
the STS for face perception. Heywood and Cowey bilaterally removed both banks 
and the fundus of the STS, extending from AP +5 mm to +25 mm (Heywood and 
Cowey, 1992). Prior to the lesion, the animals learned various face-related tasks: to 
discriminate between faces and inanimate objects, to select the odd face from a 
group, to inspect a face then select the matching face from a pair of faces, to 
discriminate between novel and familiar faces, and to discriminate between direct 
versus averted gaze in faces. Surprisingly, the only task in which animals were 
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impaired following STS removal was gaze discrimination. The authors concluded 
that the “face-cell area of the brain” is primarily concerned with representation of 
social signals and not facial identification. This conclusion is clearly at odds with 
recordings from IT face patches showing a strong signal related to representation of 
invariant facial identity. The discrepancy can be readily explained: the six IT face 
patches are not confined to the upper and lower banks of the STS. While patches 
ML, MF, and AF are in the STS (with ML on the outer lip), patch PL is on the lateral 
surface, patch AL is typically a few mm ventral of the outer lip on the lateral surface 
(though sometimes it is directly on the outer lip), and patch AM is on the ventral 
surface of the brain, far from the STS. Thus it is possible that PL, AL, and AM were 
all spared in the lesion, and activity in these three patches alone is sufficient to 
support performance of the various face-related tasks tested by Heywood and 
Cowey. 
 
To explore the causal role of face cells in face detection, Afraz et al. electrically 
stimulated face-selective clusters in IT in monkeys trained to judge whether noisy 
visual images depicted faces or not (Afraz et al., 2006). Microstimulation of face-
selective sites biased animals to detect faces, and the magnitude of the effect 
correlated with the degree of face selectivity of the site. This result suggests a causal 
relationship between activity of face cells and face detection. 
 
To explore the causal role of face cells in face identification, Afraz et al. trained 
animals to perform a face gender discrimination task and then applied optogenetics 
to inhibit cells in a face-selective cluster of macaque IT cortex (Afraz et al., 2015). 
Silencing a face cluster decreased performance by 2%, while silencing an adjacent 
region had no significant effect. Due to the tiny effect size, the question of whether 
face patches truly have a privileged role in representing faces remained 
unanswered. Furthermore, the study did not specifically target fMRI-defined face 
patches. 
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In a microstimulation study, Moeller et al. specifically stimulated face patches 
while macaques performed a delayed match-to-sample task (Moeller et al., 2017). 
An earlier electrical microstimulation study in humans found that stimulation of the 
FFA caused human subjects to perceive dramatic distortions of the experimenter’s 
face (“You just turned into somebody else, your face metamorphosed; your nose got 
saggy and went to the left; you almost looked like somebody I’d seen before, but 
somebody different”) (Parvizi et al., 2012; Schalk et al., 2017). However, because 
human subjects are available for only a short period of time, parametric exploration 
of microstimulation effects in humans is challenging. Consistent with the human 
findings, Moeller et al. found that stimulation of macaque face patches had a large 
effect on the percept of face identity. When monkeys saw two identical faces, they 
reported them as identical ~90% of the time; but when a face patch was electrically 
stimulated during presentation of the second face, judgement of “same identity” went 
down to ~10% (Moeller et al., 2017). The effect depended strongly on precise 
targeting to the center of a face patch, underscoring the privileged role of face 
patches in coding facial identity. The same effect was found for stimulation of 
multiple face patches (ML, MF, AL, AF, and AM), supporting the idea that these 
patches work in concert to generate face perception.   
 
Does microstimulating a face patch influence the perception of non-face objects? 
Indeed, given that people can see faces in cars, bread, buildings, and electrical 
outlets, what is a face for a face patch? To address the specificity of face patches 
for representing real faces, Moeller et al. microstimulated face patches while 
monkeys observed a variety of non-face objects. They found that microstimulation 
of face patches does not affect the percept of clearly non-face objects. Surprisingly, 
face patch stimulation does have a significant effect on the percept of face-
compatible non-face objects, including apples, citrus fruits, and cartoon houses. 
Thus it is possible that face patches are used by the brain not only to represent 
faces, but also non-face objects eliciting weak but significant responses (Haxby et 
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al., 2001) (conversely, these responses may be why we can see faces in non-face 
objects).  
 
A study by Sadagopan et al. inactivated face patch ML pharmacologically using the 
GABA agonist muscimol while monkeys performed an object detection task 
(Sadagopan et al., 2017). Monkeys were trained to find an object from one of three 
categories (human faces, macaque bodies, shoes) embedded in a cluttered scene 
on a touch screen and select it by pressing the object. Inactivation of face patch ML 
reduced face detection performance by 11%, whereas detection of the other 
categories was unimpaired. Thus, even inactivation of only one of the 12 IT face 
patches causes a change in behavior specific to faces. When a nearby region 
outside the face patches was pharmacologically inactivated, face detection was not 
significantly reduced.  
 
In sum, evidence is clear that face patches play an important causal role in face 
detection and recognition, and this effect is demonstrably absent for neighboring IT 
regions outside face patches. Zooming out, the space of face-related behaviors that 
have been tested during face patch recordings and stimulation so far has been 
extremely limited. Little is known about the causal role of face patches in judgements 
of expression, gaze, head orientation, and other changeable features. Furthermore, 
the role of face patches during visual search, episodic recall, and other naturalistic 
behaviors remains unknown. 
 
Interaction with other brain areas 
One cannot learn the rules of chess by observing only one chess piece per game. 
The face patches are not a closed system. They provide essential input to 
downstream regions responsible for orchestrating multiple face-dependent 
behaviors. For example, to interpret the state of mind of other agents or judge the 
social context of a situation, multiple aspects of a face need to be read out including 
identity, expression, gender, age, ethnicity, attractiveness, and familiarity. 
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Simultaneously observing activity in face patches and connected functional 
modules offers a paradigm to understand how two brain regions interact to fulfill their 
respective purposes. In this section, we first review what is known about interactions 
between face patches before moving to interactions between face patches and 
downstream brain areas associated with diverse functions including memory, 
emotion, and value computation.  
 
Interactions between IT face patches. The computations performed by the face 
patch system are not a simple feedforward hierarchy from posterior to anterior, 
culminating in a view-invariant representation of facial identity in face patch AM. 
Tracer and microstimulation experiments show that the face patches are densely 
and recurrently connected rather than a unidirectional chain of modules (Moeller et 
al., 2008; Grimaldi et al., 2016). This suggests that recurrent computations occur, 
where the signal takes several iterations through the face patches. The recurrent 
connectivity of the face patch system carries potential to perform more powerful 
computations than the same network with only feedforward connections. One 
possibility is that the feedback connections are used for learning or to deploy 
attention. Another possibility is that for challenging visual scenes that cannot be 
recognized at a glance in a single feedforward sweep, the recurrent computations 
help resolve ambiguities (Tang et al., 2018a; Kar et al., 2019). 
 
An observation by Ohayon et al. provides an entry point to this problem (Ohayon et 
al., 2012). They found that in response to an inverted contrast face, face cells in 
ML/MF show an increase in response latency of about 50 ms, while their response 
magnitude stays the same. Presumably the contrast-inverted features do not match 
the feedforward filters of cells in the middle face patch, so the initial response of 
these cells, which occurs around 100 ms after face onset, is omitted. What signal 
triggers the delayed response? Does AM or another higher-level structure recognize 
the inverted contrast face as a face, or are multiple recurrent iterations within the 
face patches necessary to resolve the contrast-inversion? Currently, we still have 
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very little understanding of detailed network dynamics across the face patch 
system in situations like this, where the face input is degraded. Interestingly, if the 
contrast-inverted image is cropped so that the outline and hair of the face are not 
visible, the response becomes not only delayed but also strongly reduced in 
amplitude (Ohayon et al., 2012), suggesting that even recurrence cannot fully 
restore responses in this situation.  
  
Schwiedrzik and Freiwald (Schwiedrzik and Freiwald, 2017) found evidence that 
feedback from higher- to lower-level face patches may implement predictive coding 
(Rao and Ballard, 1999; Friston, 2009; Huang and Rao, 2011): While monkeys 
passively learned sequences of faces, they observed prediction error signals in face 
patch ML whenever an unexpected face was shown during the sequence. However, 
unlike the face tuning in ML, the tuning of this prediction error was view-invariant 
and identity-specific, as in anterior face patches. The authors argued that the 
prediction error in ML may thus be computed from a top-down prediction from more 
anterior face patches. 
 
Interactions with claustrum and consciousness. Both tracer and stimulation 
studies reveal strong connections between face patches and the ventral part of the 
claustrum (Moeller et al., 2008; Grimaldi et al., 2016). The claustrum is a thin sheet 
of gray matter adjacent to cortex that is remarkable in that it connects reciprocally to 
the entire cortex (Pearson et al., 1982; Tanné‐Gariépy et al., 2002; Fernández-
Miranda et al., 2008). Due to its broad connectivity, it has been speculated to be 
involved in cross-modal integration (Sherk, 1986; Ettlinger and Wilson, 1990; 
Edelstein and Denaro, 2004) and binding of features into a unifying conscious 
experience (Crick and Koch, 2005), although its precise function remains unclear.  
Thus inputs from the face patches may be broadcast via the claustrum throughout 
the brain and inputs from the claustrum to the face patches may provide contextual 
information from other brain areas. This way, the claustrum may serve as a hub 
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between areas that are not directly connected with the face patches but still 
require face-related information or provide important information to the face patches. 
  
Related to the question of whether the claustrum is the seat for consciousness (Crick 
and Koch, 2005) is the question of whether face patches themselves reflect the 
conscious percept of a face or just measure the physical visual input. Both the 
human FFA and 90% of monkey IT cells respond to reported switches of the 
conscious percept in binocular rivalry (Tong et al., 1998). It has been debated 
whether these modulations reflect the conscious percept or just the cognitive factors 
associated with actively reporting the percept (Frässle et al., 2014; Tsuchiya et al., 
2015; Overgaard and Fazekas, 2016). Recently, however, electrophysiological 
recordings targeted to face patches found that in both ML and AM, a majority of cells 
follow perception even in a binocular rivalry paradigm without report (Hesse et al., 
2019). 
 
Interactions with pulvinar and attention. The pulvinar has been implicated in 
selective attention (Desimone et al., 1990; Robinson and Petersen, 1992; 
Olshausen et al., 1993; Shipp, 2004; Saalmann and Kastner, 2011), as deactivation 
leads to attentional impairment (Petersen et al., 1987; Desimone et al., 1990; Wilke 
et al., 2010; Wilke et al., 2013). As a possible mechanism, it has been proposed that 
pulvinar induces synchrony between IT and retinotopic regions to preferentially route 
behaviorally relevant information between the two areas (Saalmann et al., 2012). 
The pulvinar may be especially important when paying attention to objects rather 
than just locations in visual space, as it is preferentially activated when subjects pay 
attention to a region bound by an object compared to an unbound region of space 
(Arrington et al., 2000).  
 
The purpose of the reported connections between face patches and pulvinar may 
thus be twofold. First, faces strongly attract spatial attention, demonstrated by the 
fact that when free-viewing images, subjects rapidly saccade to faces about 16 times 
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more often than to similar regions containing no faces (Cerf et al., 2009). The face 
patch → pulvinar connection may thus entail a mechanism by which detection of a 
face automatically draws spatial attention to that region. Second, during active 
search for a face the reciprocal pulvinar → face patch connection may mediate 
feature-based attention to faces, facilitating their detection in clutter (Maunsell and 
Treue, 2006). Recording from face patches and pulvinar simultaneously while 
monkeys perform various attention tasks may shed more light on these 
mechanisms. 
  
Interactions with amygdala and emotion processing. The anterior face patches 
form connections with the basal nucleus, accessory basal nucleus, and lateral 
nucleus of the amygdala (Moeller et al., 2008; Grimaldi et al., 2016). The amygdala 
contains large proportions of cells that respond selectively to faces (Sanghera et al., 
1979; Nakamura et al., 1992; Fried et al., 1997; Calder and Nummenmaa, 2007; 
Kuraoka and Nakamura, 2007; Rutishauser et al., 2011). Many of these neurons 
encode the perceived expression of the face (Wang et al., 2014), and damage to 
the amygdala causes impairments in recognizing expressions but not identity 
(Adolphs et al., 1994). Amygdala neurons in both humans and monkeys respond 
more strongly to faces of their own species (Sigala et al., 2011; Minxha et al., 2017). 
Moreover, amygdala cells respond when human subjects saccade to a face (Minxha 
et al., 2017) or when monkeys make eye contact (Mosher et al., 2014). Lesioning 
monkey amygdala eliminates their preference to look at faces (Taubert et al., 2018), 
suggesting that the amygdala may also play a role in establishing the salience or 
value associated with faces. 
  
Compared to other objects, faces are a unique in how much information about the 
emotion and intention of another agent can be inferred from them. It remains an 
open question if and how face patches and amygdala work together to achieve this 
feat. One possibility is that the amygdala builds a code for expression and gaze 
using information about the physical properties of a face relayed from the face 
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patches. Alternatively, the amygdala may only receive information about facial 
identity from IT face patches, and acquire expression/gaze information through an 
independent pathway.  
 
Interactions with medial temporal lobe and memory. Grimaldi et al. found 
connections between face patches and perirhinal cortex as well as parahippocampal 
regions TF/TH and TFO (Grimaldi et al., 2016). These regions have been implicated 
to play a role in memory, recency, and familiarity (Fahy et al., 1993). It is possible 
that the connections between face patches and the medial temporal lobe help to 
recognize a face as familiar and evoke all the memories of the individual associated 
with it. Consistent with this, face patch PR in perirhinal cortex is modulated by the 
familiarity of faces (Landi and Freiwald, 2017). However, it remains unclear whether 
this familiarity coding is inherited from face patches in IT or if it arises initially in PR 
or an ever more downstream area.  
 
The interaction between face patches and the medial temporal lobe may also may 
provide a tractable entry point to studying imagination (Kornblith and Tsao, 2017). 
When a subject is asked to visualize the face of a person, the human FFA is 
activated (O'Craven and Kanwisher, 2000). Is the code used by face patches to 
represent an imagined face the same as the code used to represent a physically 
presented face? If so, how is the memory of a familiar face transformed into the 
perceptual representation of a face during visual imagery? 
  
Interactions with frontal cortex and value-based decision making. Tracer 
studies have found only weak connections between anterior face patches and 
orbitofrontal area 13 as well as ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (Grimaldi et al., 2016). 
However, as mentioned above, a simple face localizer scan reveals three face-
selective patches in prefrontal cortex, within ventrolateral, orbifrontal, and pre-
arcuate regions (Moeller et al., 2008). These regions are activated by electrical 
microstimulation of IT face patches (Moeller et al., 2008), suggesting they may 
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inherit their selectivity through interactions with IT face patches. It is believed that 
orbitofrontal cortex is used for value judgement and lateral prefrontal cortex then 
uses these values to compute decisions on which actions to take (Wallis, 2007). 
Faces can have very different values depending on their gender, age, expression, 
and face cells in both orbitofrontal (Barat et al., 2018) and ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortex (Romanski and Diehl, 2011) show selectivity for these social dimensions. This 
opens an avenue for studying how value is computed from identity information 
encoded in IT face patches and how prefrontal cortex then uses this information to 
inform decisions and behavior. 
 
Conclusion and boxes 
Returning to Marr’s question, whether finding a face cell would tell us anything much 
at all, we think the answer is a resounding yes. The clustering of face cells into 
distinct patches performing different steps of face processing has made it possible 
to identify the sequence of transformations in face representation and decipher the 
code for representation of facial identity used by these patches. This knowledge now 
gives us a powerful key to unlocking not only object recognition in general, but also 
higher-level functions including memory, attention, consciousness, and decision 
making that operate on faces. When trying to decipher an encrypted communication, 
the key step is to identify the meaning of the first word. Using the same approach of 
fMRI and targeted electrophysiology that has been instrumental to dissecting the 
face patch system, several additional networks in IT have now been discovered, 
including color patches (Lafer-Sousa and Conway, 2013; Chang et al., 2017), scene 
patches (Kornblith et al., 2013), and body patches (Tsao et al., 2003a; Popivanov et 
al., 2012; Kumar et al., 2017). Most strikingly, the recent discovery of a set of parallel 
IT networks tiling object space, each harboring the same anatomical organization 
and object coding mechanism as the face patch network, suggests that the face 
patch network is truly a model for all of IT cortex (Bao et al., 2019). For 
understanding higher-level cognition beyond IT, our knowledge of the code for facial 
identity in AM makes it possible to transcend studying shadows of cognitive 
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processes, to directly study the link between a palpable high-level percept and the 
downstream cognitive processes it triggers. The turtle’s underbelly is staring us in 
the face.  
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Boxes 
 
Box 1: Are faces special? 
 
Figure II-B1: The Thatcher illusion. At first glance, neither the left nor the right 
image seem particularly odd since the faces are upside-down. However, if one turns 
the page upside-down, one notices that the local features in one of the faces have 
been inverted. This demonstrates the impairments of face recognition when faces 
are presented upside-down, and simulates the effect of a face patch lesion. Adapted 
from (Thompson, 1980). 
 
Are faces special, in the sense that special neural mechanisms are used to process 
faces that are not used for other object classes? And if so, do monkeys also show 
hallmarks of this special form of processing? Evidence that humans are experts at 
recognizing faces comes from several behavioral effects including the composite 
effect (Young et al., 2013) (combining the top and bottom halves of two different 
faces by aligning them interferes with the percept and identification of the 
constituents), the whole-part effect (Tanaka and Farah, 1993) (a face feature is more 
easily recognized if it is part of a whole face rather than in isolation), and the face 
inversion effect (Yin, 1969; Valentine, 1988) (a face is more easily recognized when 
upright than when upside down). In monkeys, the face inversion effect has been 
controversial, with some studies claiming that monkeys do show recognition 
differences between upright and inverted faces (Parr et al., 1999; Gothard et al., 
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2009), and others claiming that they do not (Rosenfeld and Van Hoesen, 1979; 
Bruce, 1982; Parr et al., 2008). Freiwald et al. found that cells in ML become less 
tuned to facial features of cartoon faces when the faces are inverted (Freiwald et al., 
2009). Taubert et al. reported that face-selective cells in ML and AL but not outside 
of face patches preferentially encode upright faces compared to inverted faces 
(Taubert et al., 2014). This finding suggests functional differences between face-
selective cells inside face patches vs. those scattered across IT outside of face 
patches, and the possibility that specialized processing for faces may be restricted 
to the former. An effect related to the face inversion effect is the Thatcher illusion 
(Thompson, 1980): when a face is presented upside-down and local features such 
as the mouth and the eyes are relatively inverted, the face does not appear unusual 
(see Fig. II-B1); however, if the whole face is reverted back to upright, the inverted 
local face features become strikingly apparent. Monkeys show this configural effect 
behaviorally (Adachi et al., 2009). Taubert et al. found a neural correlate of the 
Thatcher illusion in  face patch ML but not in AL or IT cortex outside of face patches 
(Taubert et al., 2015) (see also (Sugase-Miyamoto et al., 2014)).  
 
Tan and Poggio argued that the three behavioral markers of specialized holistic face 
processing (composite effect, whole-part effect, and inversion effect) can all be 
modeled using the single neural factor of neural tuning size (Tan and Poggio, 2016), 
i.e., there is nothing fundamentally different about face processing compared to 
general object processing. In their HMAX model (Riesenhuber and Poggio, 1999), 
which contains two layers each consisting of simple and complex cells, the neural 
tuning size is defined as the size of the template of simple cells in the second layer, 
which detect parts or features of the face. For small neural tuning sizes, where the 
template covers only one face part such as the eye or nose, the output of the model 
is non-holistic and more like general object recognition, whereas for larger neural 
tuning sizes, where the template covers multiple face parts, the output of the model 
is holistic like face recognition and reproduces the three behavioral markers 
described above. 
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A theoretical study by Leibo et al. offers a computational perspective on why face 
recognition should be separated from recognition of other objects in the brain (Leibo 
et al., 2011). They argue that the transformation of a face image evoked by 3D 
rotation of the face is class-specific and different from the transformations of other 
objects. By training a class of models on 3D rotations of faces, they show that the 
models learn to generalize to other faces and can extract their identity in a view-
invariant way but fail on other object classes. The argument that identity-preserving 
image transformations are class-specific thus suggests the need for specialized 
modules for specific classes such as faces. 
 
These computational studies suggest that processing of faces is not that unique 
after all: classic markers of a supposedly unique “holistic” processing style can be 
boiled down to increased receptive field size of face cells, and modularity can be 
explained by a principle, class compatibility of 3D transformations, that applies to all 
objects. The finding that at least half of IT cortex shares similar anatomical 
organization and coding principles as the face patches (Fig. II-6) further supports 
the idea that processing of faces is not unique. 
  
Box 2:  Face patches across species 
 
Figure II-B2: Face patches across different primate species. Face patches 
mapped in the human, macaque, and marmoset are shown. Human and macaque 
maps adapted from (Tsao et al., 2008a), marmoset map adapted from (Hung et al., 
2015). 
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Face-selective areas have been identified using fMRI in humans (Kanwisher et 
al., 1997), macaques (Tsao et al., 2003a), and marmosets (Hung et al., 2015) (Fig. 
II-B2). In addition, there is a report of a face area in dogs (Cuaya et al., 2016). Face 
cells have been reported not only in humans (Khuvis et al., 2017) and macaque 
monkeys (Gross et al., 1972), but also in sheep (Kendrick and Baldwin, 1987). 
Finally, the behavioral ability to identify faces has been reported in a wide range of 
organisms including cattle (Coulon et al., 2009), pigeons (Stephan et al., 2012), 
archer fish (Newport et al., 2016), wasps (Tibbetts, 2002), and crayfish (Van der 
Velden et al., 2008). 
     
The study of face processing is a wonderful example of the fruitful interplay between 
human and macaque research and underscores the importance of non-human 
primate research. The discovery of face areas in humans was one of the major 
motivations to look for such areas in monkeys. In turn, understanding of face areas 
in monkeys has shed new light on face areas in humans, and even instigated the 
discovery of a new face area in the human anterior temporal lobe (Tsao et al., 2008b; 
Rajimehr et al., 2009). Monkey electrophysiology experiments also reveal the 
limitations of fMRI and the importance of recording from single cells to understand 
what an area is coding: Dubois et al., using MVPA on fMRI data from face patch 
AM, were unable to decode any identity information (Dubois et al., 2015), whereas 
single-unit reconstructions of face identity from AM activity are strikingly accurate 
(Fig. II-5d). Because brain structures supporting face processing exist across 
primate species, experiments can be designed that maximally leverage the 
advantage of each species: deep probing of neuronal mechanisms in non-human 
primates, and use of complex task designs exploiting language and introspection in 
humans. 
What is the homology between human and macaque face areas (Tsao et al., 2008a; 
Yovel and Freiwald, 2013)? Human face areas include the occipital face area (OFA), 
fusiform face area (FFA), several anterior temporal face areas, and a face area in 
the superior temporal sulcus (STS-FA). Evidence has been put forward that these 
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areas have different functional specializations, with the OFA involved in 
processing face parts (Pitcher et al., 2011), the STS-FA in processing changeable 
aspects such as gaze direction (Haxby et al., 2000; Pitcher et al., 2011), and the 
FFA in processing identity (Rotshtein et al., 2005). One might guess based on spatial 
position and functional properties that human OFA, FFA, STS-FA, and anterior face 
patches correspond respectively to macaque PL, ML/MF, upper bank MD, and 
AL/AF/AM. However, fMRI-guided single-unit recordings in humans will be 
necessary to make definitive conclusions concerning homology (Khuvis et al., 2018). 
 
The discovery of face areas in marmosets is an exciting recent development that 
portends even deeper understanding of the development and function of face 
patches (Hung et al., 2015), given the short generation time of marmosets and the 
wide range of tools available for marmoset neural circuit dissection, including large-
scale surface electrode arrays, two-photon imaging, and CRISPR gene editing. So 
far, ECOG recordings from the marmoset confirm existence of multiple face patches 
(Hung et al., 2015), but the detailed single-unit properties of individual fMRI-
identified marmoset face patches remains unknown. 
 
Box 3: Development of face patches 
How do face patches develop? Are the locations of face patches already laid out 
during development by the primate’s genetic program or does their development 
require experience with faces? In humans, Dehaene et al. found that literacy induces 
increased activation to text in a brain region specialized for representing word forms 
from a familiar language called the “visual word form area.” This occurred regardless 
whether literacy was acquired during childhood or adulthood (Dehaene et al., 2010). 
The increased response to text comes with the cost of a slightly smaller face-
selective area compared to illiterates. On the other hand, Deen et al. found that in 
human infants a few months after birth, extrastriate cortex shows modules that 
respond preferentially to faces or scenes with a spatial organization similar to adults, 
which are then refined throughout development (Deen et al., 2017). In monkeys, 
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some functional organization of face-selective regions exists already one month 
after birth, which is then refined and stabilized into the face patch system within two 
years (Arcaro and Livingstone, 2017). Importantly, experience with faces appears to 
be necessary for these modules to acquire their selectivity: Arcaro et al. raised 
monkeys without exposure to faces, and these monkeys did not show any domains 
selective for faces (Arcaro and Livingstone, 2017). Moreover, the face-deprived 
monkeys did not show preference for looking at faces over other objects. 
 
These findings suggest the importance of experience in IT development. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that IT already possesses a proto-organization into 
modules at birth that is then activated by experience with a specific object class. 
Indeed, IT cortex is organized retinotopically, albeit much more coarsely than 
retinotopic cortex (Janssens et al., 2014; Kolster et al., 2014), with face patches lying 
in the foveal zone (Janssens et al., 2014). Unlike selectivity to object categories, this 
retinotopic organization is already present at birth (Arcaro and Livingstone, 2017), 
i.e., before visual experience. Srihasam et al. trained juvenile monkeys to recognize 
three sets of artificial shapes (Srihasam et al., 2014). The three sets consisted of 
“Helvetica” symbols, Tetris shapes, and cartoon face symbols, respectively. 
Following intense exposure to these shapes, monkeys developed patches in IT for 
each set that were selectively activated by shapes in that set. Even though the order 
in which monkeys were introduced to the three sets of shapes was different for each 
monkey, the locations of the patches for each set was similar across monkeys. 
Together, these results suggest that IT has a retinotopic proto-organization inherited 
from inputs from earlier visual areas (Hasson et al., 2003), and exposure to a certain 
class of objects causes the formation of category-selective domains at specific 
locations within this retinotopic map. These retinotopic locations may be influenced 
by where the monkey tends to look (e.g., faces are represented in the foveal zone 
because monkeys tend to foveate them) as well as intrinsic properties of an object 
class (e.g., curvature) that are preferred by locations with a certain eccentricity (Levy 
et al., 2001; Srihasam et al., 2014). Besides coarse retinotopy, topography in the IT 
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map is governed by clustering in object space (Fig. II-6). This additional clustering 
could be enforced by purely self-organizing principles independent of both genetic 
hard-wiring and retinotopic selectivity of inputs (Erickson et al., 2000). 
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C h a p t e r  I I I  
FIGURE-GROUND SEGMENTATION 
Consistency of  border-ownership cells 
From: Hesse and Tsao (2016), "Consistency of border-ownership cells across 
artificial stimuli, natural stimuli, and stimuli with ambiguous contours." In: Journal 
of Neuroscience 36.44 (2016): 11338-11349. 
 
 
Abstract. Segmentation and recognition of objects in a visual scene are two 
problems that are hard to solve separately from each other. When segmenting an 
ambiguous scene, it is helpful to already know the present objects and their 
shapes. However, for recognizing an object in clutter, one would like to consider its 
isolated segment alone to avoid confounds from features of other objects. Border-
ownership cells (Zhou et al., 2000) appear to play an important role in 
segmentation, as they signal the side-of-figure of artificial stimuli. The present work 
explores the role of border-ownership cells in dorsal macaque visual areas V2 and 
V3 in the segmentation of natural object stimuli and locally ambiguous stimuli. We 
report two major results.  First, compared to previous estimates, we found a 
smaller percentage of cells that were consistent across artificial stimuli used 
previously. Second, we found that the average response of those neurons that did 
respond consistently to the side-of-figure of artificial stimuli also consistently 
signaled, as a population, the side-of-figure for borders of single faces, occluding 
faces and, with higher latencies, even  stimuli with illusory contours such as 
Mooney faces and natural faces completely missing local edge information. In 
contrast, the local edge or the outlines of the face alone could not always evoke a 
significant border-ownership signal. Our results underscore that border ownership 
is coded by a population of cells, and indicate that these cells integrate a variety of 
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cues, including low-level features and global object context, to compute the 
segmentation of the scene. 
Significance. In order to distinguish different objects in a natural scene, the brain 
must segment the image into regions corresponding to objects. The so-called 
“border-ownership” cells appear to be dedicated to this task, as they signal for a 
given edge on which side the object is that owns it. Here, we report that individual 
border-ownership cells are unreliable when tested across a battery of artificial 
stimuli used previously but can signal border-ownership consistently as a 
population. We show that these border-ownership population signals are also 
suited for signaling border-ownership for natural objects and at longer latency, 
even for stimuli without local edge information. Our results suggest that border-
ownership cells integrate both local, low-level and global, high-level cues to 
segment the scene. 
Introduction. The two most important tasks of the ventral stream of visual cortex 
are arguably segmentation of the visual scene and object recognition. 
Segmentation tells us which groups of pixels in a scene constitute the fundamental 
units that we can interact with, and recognition gives these units a meaning by 
telling us what they are. Often, vision is considered as a sequence of processing 
steps in a feedforward hierarchy (Marr, 1982),  where recognition of objects 
happens after a series of nonlinear operations on the input image (Riesenhuber 
and Poggio, 2002). Since segmentation, which is thought to happen in retinotopic 
cortex, is earlier in the feedforward hierarchy of visual areas, it is often assumed to 
be a necessary step to be completed before recognition, so that the segmented 
regions corresponding to the object surfaces can be fed to inferotemporal cortex 
(IT) and recognized individually (Rubin, 1958; Nakayama et al., 1995; Driver and 
Baylis, 1996). On the other hand, psychophysical studies (Peterson and Gibson, 
1993, 1994; Peterson and Kim, 2001; Grill-Spector and Kanwisher, 2005)  have 
suggested that object recognition influences or even precedes segmentation. For 
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example, Peterson and Gibson (1993) found that recognition of object shape 
can overwrite depth order defined by disparity.  Moreover, observers asked to 
report their first perceived figure-ground organization are influenced by symmetry 
and orientation-dependent object recognition processes and are more likely to 
perceive regions as figure compared to ground if they match their object memory 
(Peterson and Kim, 2001) 
One of the most insightful neurophysiological findings for understanding how the 
brain segments the visual scene are the remarkable border-ownership cells 
discovered by von der Heydt and colleagues (Zhou et al., 2000). Border-ownership 
cells are thought to be crucial for segmentation, as their responses signal the side-
of-figure for a number of artificial stimuli. However, it is not entirely clear if and how 
the side-of-figure signal observed in border-ownership cells aids recognition of 
objects in natural scenes. Conversely, it is not known whether object recognition in 
IT can influence border-ownership signals in retinotopic cortex.  
Like most cells in early visual cortex a border-ownership cell will respond to an 
edge presented at a given orientation in its receptive field, but it responds 
differentially depending on the side of the figure that the edge belongs too: a 
vertical edge can be the border of a foreground object that is either to the left or to 
the right of it. Zhou et al. showed that for a variety of artificial stimuli, border-
ownership cells respond consistently more strongly if the edge belongs to a figure 
on its preferred side than its non-preferred side, even if the stimuli are locally 
identical within the receptive field of the cell. Artificial stimuli that were previously 
shown to evoke consistent border-ownership responses include single luminance 
squares, occluding luminance rectangles, single and occluding outlines of 
rectangles, C-shapes (Zhou et al., 2000), disparity-defined squares (Qiu and Von 
Der Heydt, 2005), and squares evoking the percept of transparent overlay (Qiu 
and Von Der Heydt, 2007)  (see stimuli used in Fig. III-5a-d). Here, we asked 
whether border-ownership cells can also infer border-ownership for natural objects, 
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with not necessarily straight edges and inhomogeneous, possibly confounding 
textures. In fact, in natural scenes, segmentation can often be ambiguous based 
on only local, low-level cues (McDermott, 2004). Consider for example the famous 
Dalmatian dog display or the camouflaged owl in Fig. III-1. It appears impossible 
for an algorithm that uses only local, low-level cues to infer the correct 
segmentation. Yet, once we recognize the Dalmatian dog, we perceive it as an 
object with a contiguous surface. And we are able to infer the boundary of the owl. 
Bottom-up, purely feedforward algorithms would likely come to the critically 
different, erroneous interpretation that it is a texture. Is this perceived 
segmentation signal for recognizable, natural objects present in the side-of-figure 
signal of border-ownership cells?  
To answer this question, we recorded from border-ownership cells and 
systematically presented a battery of both artificial stimuli and natural face stimuli, 
as well as face stimuli with ambiguous contours, in order to find out how cells that 
respond consistently to the side-of-figure of artificial stimuli would respond to the 
presented natural object stimuli. 
 
Figure III-3: Segmentation can be ambiguous based on low-level cues.  (a) 
While the famous Dalmatian dog display is considerably more difficult to segment 
without knowing that there is a dog present, once one recognizes the dog, one 
also perceives it as a contiguous surface. (b) The camouflaged owl seems 
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impossible to segment based on local cues (red square, inset), but as one 
recognizes the owl one can infer and perceive the boundary.  
Results. We targeted regions in dorsal V2 and V3 that elicited strong fMRI 
activation in response to disparity-defined shapes vs. full-field disparity. Fig. III-2 
shows responses of a border-ownership cell at a representative location (Fig. III- 
2a, functional activation overlaid). Fig. III-2b shows the receptive field of the 
example cell mapped by computing the STA. All analyses below are based on a 
sample of a total of 201 single units (126 Monkey T, 75 Monkey J) for which we 
manually verified correct positioning on the receptive field and orientation tuning. 
This sample is biased, as we were explicitly looking for border-ownership cells and 
skipped cells that were not promising candidates (see Methods). For Monkey J, 
where the fMRI signal was weak and we were just guided by anatomical locations 
where monkey T had shown high functional activation, we found slightly fewer 
border-ownership cells (p=0.04, two-sided unpaired t-test on average modulation 
indices across artificial stimuli). Receptive fields were in the lower left and lower 
right quadrant of the visual field for monkey T and monkey J, respectively and 
eccentricity ranged from 1° to 5°. 
 
Figure III-2: An example border-ownership cell.  
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(a) Electrode targeting V3d; fMRI activation for disparity checkerboard vs. full 
field disparity is overlaid. Green cross: Location of electrode tip. Dotted blue lines: 
Retinotopically defined area boundaries of V2d and V3d. lu: lunate sulcus. (b) 
Receptive field as computed by the spike-triggered average. (c) Orientation tuning 
of the cell. Radius and angle of the polar plot correspond to firing rate and 
presented orientation of moving sine grating, respectively. This example cell had a 
preferred orientation of about 30°. (d) PSTHs of responses to luminance squares 
(presented for 500 ms). Four square stimuli with different contrasts and different 
sides (right panel) with the edge on the receptive field (purple ellipse). This cell’s 
response was increased when the figure was on the top right side. (e) Position test 
of the cell. To test the robustness of the border-ownership signal across positions 
within the receptive field, the stimulus was swept across different positions 
orthogonal to its preferred orientation (x-axis, indicated by the positions 1-11 at the 
top right of (d)). Across all positions within the receptive field, the response (y-axis) 
was consistently higher when the figure was on the preferred side of the receptive 
field. Blue and red conditions are equivalent to the stimuli used in (d). Error bars 
indicate standard error mean. 
Initially, the primary goal of this study was to determine how border-ownership 
cells respond to the side-of-figure of natural stimuli. However, preliminary 
recordings with a variety of artificial stimuli revealed almost no cells that were 
consistent in their border-ownership preference across all artificial stimuli tested, 
leading us to carry out a systematic characterization of the consistency of border-
ownership cells across a large population of cells and a large battery of artificial 
stimuli (See Fig. III-5a-d for the battery of artificial stimuli used). Previous studies 
or border-ownership cells have each focused on specific subsets of artificial 
stimuli. Thus, a major question remains open: whether there exists a significant 
fraction of “true” border-ownership cells that signal the side-of-figure reliably across 
all types of artificial stimuli containing object borders. Moreover, there has been 
considerable variability in the reported proportions of consistent cells across 
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different studies and stimuli.  Zhou et al. (2000) found more than more than half 
of cells in V2 to be selective to the side-of-figure of single luminance squares; 
among those cells, 20/42 cells were tuned significantly and consistent to the side-
of-figure of occluding squares, 1/42 cells was tuned significantly but inconsistent, 
and 21/42 cells were not significantly tuned. For C-shapes, Zhou et al. found 4/16 
cells to be tuned significantly and consistent, 12/16 to be not significantly tuned, 
and no cells to be significantly tuned and inconsistent.  (Qiu and Von Der Heydt, 
2005) found 35% of 174 neurons in V2 to be selective to the side-of-figure of a 
luminance square, 40% to be selective to depth order, and 21% selective to both, 
of which 81% were consistent between luminance-defined and disparity-defined 
side-of-figure. For a transparent overlay stimulus, Qiu and Von Der Heydt (2007) 
found 127 of 244 of cells to be tuned to the side-of-figure of the luminance square 
and 30 of those cells to be significantly tuned to the side-of-figure of the 
transparent bars and consistent with the preferred side-of-figure for the luminance 
square; they did not report the number of significantly tuned, inconsistent cells.  
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Paradigm Significantly 
consistent 
Significantly 
inconsistent 
Not significant 
 All cells Top 
50 
All cells Top 
50 
All cells Top 50 
Standard test 
(Single luminance 
square) 
55% 
(111/201
)  
84% 
(42/50
) 
n/a n/a 44% 
(90/201) 
16% 
(8/50) 
Occluding squares 19% 
(21/110)  
30% 
(13/42
) 
10% 
(11/110) 
2% 
(1/42) 
71% 
(78/110) 
67% 
(28/42) 
Occluding outlines 11% 
(12/111) 
17% 
(7/42) 
16% 
(18/111) 
5% 
(2/42) 
73% 
(81/111) 
79% 
(33/42) 
C-shapes 11% 
(12/108) 
19% 
(8/42) 
22% 
(24/108) 
10% 
(4/42) 
67% 
(72/108) 
71% 
(30/42) 
Transparent 20% 
(21/107) 
26% 
(11/42
) 
5%  
(5/107) 
2% 
(1/42) 
76% 
(81/107) 
71% 
(30/42) 
Four squares 
control 
37% 
(40/107) 
55% 
(23/42
) 
10% 
(11/107) 
0% 
(0/42) 
52% 
(56/107) 
45% 
(19/42) 
Single full faces 41% 
(45/111) 
69% 
(29/42
) 
17% 
(19/111) 
7% 
(3/42) 
42% 
(47/111) 
24% 
(10/42) 
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Occluding full 
faces 
14% 
(16/111) 
29% 
(12/42
) 
5% 
(6/111) 
2% 
(1/42) 
80% 
(89/111) 
69% 
(29/42) 
Single ambiguous 
face 
20% 
(22/111) 
29% 
(12/42
) 
10% 
(11/111) 
0% 
(0/42) 
70% 
(78/111) 
71% 
(30/42) 
 
Table III-1: Consistency of cells for border-ownership stimuli. For different 
stimuli presented during the experiment, we computed the percentage of cells that 
were significantly tuned to the side-of-figure of the stimulus and consistent with the 
preferred side-of-figure for the single luminance square. Significance criterion was 
p<0.01 as in Zhou et al. (2000). For the single luminance square (first row), the 
proportion of significantly tuned cells merely indicates the proportion among all 201 
analyzed cells, and among the 50 cells with highest average modulation index 
across artificial stimuli, respectively, that were significantly tuned the side-of-figure 
of the single luminance square by two-way anova on side-of-figure and contrast 
polarity. For the remaining stimuli, we only considered cells that were significantly 
tuned to the side-of-figure of the single luminance square, which was the case for 
111 out all 201 cells and 42 out of the top 50 cells, and computed the proportions 
of cells from these two populations that were (a) significantly tuned to the side-of-
figure of the stimulus and consistent with the side-of-figure preference for the 
single luminance square, (b) significantly tuned to the side-of-figure but 
inconsistent with the single luminance square, or (c) not significantly tuned to the 
side-of-figure of the given stimulus. Note that 4 of the 111 cells were lost too early 
to present all artificial stimuli. For comparison, Zhou et al. (2000) found that among 
the cells that were significantly tuned the side-of-figure of the single luminance 
square 20/42 cells were tuned significantly and consistent to the side-of-figure of 
occluding squares, 1/42 cells was tuned significantly but inconsistent and 21/42 
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cells were not significantly tuned. For the C-shapes Zhou et al. found 4/16 cells 
to be tuned significantly and consistent, 12/16 to be not significantly tuned, and no 
cells to be significantly tuned and inconsistent. For the transparent stimulus, Qiu 
and Von Der Heydt (2007) found 30/127 cells to be tuned significantly and 
consistent (note that the significance criterion was p<0.05 in Qiu and Von Der 
Heydt (2007) and p<0.01 in Zhou et al. (2000)). 
 
Similar to the findings of Zhou et al. (2000), we found that a little more than half of 
all neurons were significantly selective to the side-of-figure of the single luminance 
squares (two-way anova p<0.01). Compared to Zhou et al. (2000), however, we 
found a substantially higher proportion of cells that showed inconsistent border-
ownership selectivity when comparing tuning for side-of-figure in luminance-
defined figures and another artificial stimulus (Table 1). In particular, for C-shapes 
and overlapping outlines, we found even more cells that significantly preferred a 
side inconsistent with the single luminance square preference than cells that 
preferred a consistent side. For the overlapping luminance squares, the 
transparent stimulus, and its four square control, in turn, there were more cells that 
were consistently significantly selective than cells significantly preferring the 
opposite side, which is more consistent with the findings of Zhou et al. (2000).  
Demonstrating that we were recording from the same general class of cells as von 
der Heydt’s group, we reconstructed their population analysis for the transparent 
stimulus from Qiu and Von Der Heydt (2007) and found qualitatively similar results 
(Fig. III-3). A subtle difference in the stimuli (Fig. III-3, top) leads to the perception 
of either two transparent overlaid bars or four rounded squares, which changes the 
border-ownership at the receptive field location. Although the scale of the marginal 
distributions of border-ownership modulation indices was somewhat different 
between our sample of cells and Qiu and Von Der Heydt (2007), we replicated the 
switching in border-ownership signaled by the cell population. 
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Figure III-3: Comparison of population analysis to Qiu and Von Der Heydt 
(2007).  We reconstructed the population analysis performed in Qiu and Von Der 
Heydt (2007) to compare border-ownership tuning of the recorded cells. (a) shows 
the border-ownership modulation index for the single luminance square on the x-
axis against border-ownership modulation index of the transparent overlay 
stimulus (left) and the four square control (right) on the y-axis for all cells we 
recorded that were significantly tuned to the side-of-figure of the single luminance 
square. (b) shows the original data adapted from Qiu and Von Der Heydt (2007). 
Note that for this figure, we used the same formula for modulation indices as used 
in Qiu and Von Der Heydt (2007), which is slightly more complicated than the one 
in the rest of this article. Thick black lines indicate Standard Model I regression 
lines, i.e., the ordinary least squares fit of the abscissa to the ordinate. P-values 
were computed by comparing a transform of the Pearson correlation coefficient to 
a Student’s t-distribution. Note that this represents a relatively conservative 
measure of correlation. Since the sign of border-ownership for each cell is 
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arbitrary, we also computed correlations after duplicating all points by reflecting 
them over the origin.  This measure yielded the same signs of correlations and 
even higher explained variances (𝑟2 = 22.2% and p = 3.15𝑒 − 13 for transparent 
overlay stimulus, 𝑟2 = 24.7% and p = 9.56𝑒 − 15 for transparent overlay stimulus).  
We next quantified how many cells were significantly tuned to a given number of 
artificial stimuli and consistent with the preferred side-of-figure for the single 
luminance square (Fig. III-4a).  We found that 40% of cells were not significantly 
and consistently tuned for any of the artificial stimuli, and not a single cell was 
significantly and consistently tuned for all artificial stimuli. There were 11 cells that 
were tuned consistently across all artificial stimuli, but not significant for all, i.e., the 
sign of the modulation index, averaged across the two contrast conditions, was the 
same for each artificial stimulus as for the single luminance square (standard test). 
In sum, we failed to find a population of cells that were significantly tuned to the 
side-of-figure across the whole large battery of artificial stimuli in a consistent 
manner; in particular, many ostensible border-ownership cells that were 
significantly tuned to the side-of-figure of luminance squares turned out to be 
inconsistent when tested with a battery of other stimuli.  These results strongly 
suggest that border ownership is encoded by a population of cells, which are each, 
individually, imperfect in their border-ownership selectivity.   
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Figure III-4: Quantification of response consistency across artificial and 
natural stimuli. 
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Histograms show the proportions of cells that are consistent and significant for a 
given number of artificial (a) and natural stimuli (b). The five artificial stimuli and 
nine natural stimuli based on which the consistency of the cell was tested are 
shown at the top of (a) and (b), respectively. A cell is considered consistent for a 
given stimulus if the modulation index for that stimulus has the same sign as for 
the single luminance square (standard test). Significance criterion is p<0.01. Red 
lines show the proportion of cells among all cells that were significantly tuned to 
the side-of-figure of the single luminance square, whereas blue lines only take into 
account the 50 cells with the highest modulation index across artificial stimuli, 
respectively.  
To see whether, despite the inconsistencies of many cells, we could still extract a 
population signal that is consistent across all artificial stimuli, we next computed 
the average population response across the most consistent cells. We evaluated 
each neuron’s consistency by computing the average modulation index across all 
artificial stimuli (shown in Fig. III-5a-d). The average modulation index across 
artificial stimuli had a mean of 0.038 and a standard deviation of 0.081 across all 
201 cells (see also histograms in Fig. III-6, top). We then chose the 50 most 
consistent cells based on this average modulation index. The exact number of 
chosen cells did not qualitatively influence the results. Cells were pooled across V2 
and V3; when comparing consistency to artificial stimuli between V2d and V3d, we 
found slightly but significantly more consistent border-ownership signals in V3d 
than in V2d (p=0.02, unpaired t-test on average modulation indices across artificial 
stimuli based on 137 cells recorded from V2d and 64 cells recorded from V3d). As 
can be seen from the green line in Fig. III-4a, by selecting the 50 top cells with this 
method, the proportion of cells that were consistent across a high number of 
artificial stimuli substantially increased.  Fig. III-5a-d shows the average PSTHs of 
these 50 selected cells to artificial stimuli. By focusing on the most consistent 
border-ownership cells, we obtained a border-ownership signal that was reliable 
across artificial stimuli: the response difference for the standard luminance square 
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test (Fig. III-5a) was strong and consistent, which is expected since we defined 
the preferred side of each cell based on the luminance square responses. The 
responses to the other artificial stimuli (Fig. III-5b-d) were also significantly stronger 
when presented on the preferred side, which is a sanity check that the population 
of 50 cells indeed represented consistent border-ownership cells. The population 
border-ownership signal for occluding outlines and C-shapes was weaker than for 
other artificial stimuli, but was nevertheless consistent (see also Table 1). 
 
Figure III-5: Responses of border-ownership cells to simple and natural 
stimuli. The PSTHs on the left of each plot show the population mean responses 
(±1 standard error mean, shaded region) of 50 selected border-ownership cells to 
stimuli shown on the right outlined with the corresponding color. Both artificial and 
natural stimuli were rotated and positioned such that the central edge (indicated by 
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purple ellipse) was in the preferred orientation and centered on the receptive 
field of each cell. Preferred side of figure of border-ownership cells was determined 
based on the response to simple luminance squares (shown in a) alone. Blue 
colors correspond to conditions where the figure was on the preferred side and red 
are matched conditions, where the stimulus looks identical/similar in the receptive 
field (purple ellipse) but the figure is on the non-preferred side. The 50 cells were 
determined to be consistent border-ownership cells based on their responses to 
simple, artificial stimuli alone. P-values were determined using two-tailed paired t-
tests. (a) Population mean responses to luminance squares. A higher response to 
the preferred side is expected as the preferred side was determined based on the 
response to the luminance square. (b) Population mean responses to occlusion 
stimuli. (c) Population mean responses to occluding outlines and C-shapes.  (d) 
Population mean responses to four squares (top), single squares (middle), and 
transparent overlay (bottom). (e) Population mean responses to single faces. (f) 
Population mean responses to overlapping faces. (g) Responses to isolated edge 
stimulus of faces alone. This stimulus was generated by removing the part outside 
the receptive field for stimuli in (f). (h) Magnified version of stimuli in (g). (i) 
Population mean responses to occluding and single faces with illusory contour, 
where the local stimulus inside the receptive field was removed. (j) Population 
mean responses Mooney faces (top) and to stimulus on bottom of (f) but with low-
contrast border, where the contrast was reduced locally inside the receptive field 
(bottom). (k) Population mean responses to outlines of occluding faces and faces 
occluding an apple.  
Next, we asked how this population of border-ownership cells that responded 
consistently to the side-of-figure of artificial stimuli responded to a variety of natural 
stimuli.  We found that the side-of-figure selectivity to artificial stimuli generalized to 
natural stimuli (Fig. III-5e-k): when presenting the edge of a single face in the 
receptive field, the average response of border-ownership cells was significantly 
higher when the face was on the preferred side compared to when it was 
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presented mirror-symmetrically on the non-preferred side. Interestingly, the 
consistency of responses was even stronger and more significant than for most 
artificial stimuli based on which the cells were selected for. Moreover, the response 
was higher when the foreground face of two overlapping faces was presented on 
the preferred side. We also presented the isolated local part of the overlapping 
face stimulus to determine how much border-ownership information was given in 
the local edge alone. For the first pair of overlapping faces (Fig. III-5f top) we had 
chosen a central edge that was located on the forehead and fairly straight (see Fig. 
III-5g for the isolated stimulus and Fig. III-5h for an enlarged version). For this pair, 
we could find no significant response difference for the isolated local stimulus 
alone. For the second pair, we chose a more convex edge at the chin and the local 
stimulus exhibited a T-junction at the bottom of the stimulus (Fig. III-5f-h bottom). 
This local stimulus by contrast did evoke a significant response difference that was 
consistent with the border-ownership of the cells. We next presented faces with 
illusory contours, namely Mooney faces and the natural faces mentioned above 
with the local edge over the receptive field deleted. For each of these stimuli, we 
ensured that within the receptive field, the stimulus was identical to the background 
presented during the 150 ms OFF time. As can be seen from Fig. III-5i-j, the 
response amplitude was much weaker when deleting the local stimulus, but the 
response difference was still significant and consistent with the border-ownership 
selectivity. When presenting a stimulus with the local edge not completely deleted 
but strongly reduced in contrast (Fig. III-5j bottom), the amplitude was in between 
the amplitudes to the full face and the locally deleted face, and again the response 
difference was consistent with the border-ownership. We tested whether the 
response difference could be evoked by presenting the mere outlines of the 
overlapping faces (Fig. III-5k, top), and found the outlines alone did not evoke a 
significant response difference. The border-ownership selectivity for natural stimuli 
was not limited to faces, as a face occluding an apple also evoked consistent 
border-ownership (Fig. III-5k, bottom). Note, however, that for this stimulus, we 
cannot exclude that the response difference was due to the contrast difference 
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between the two different objects. Fig. III-4b shows the proportions of cells that 
were consistent and significantly tuned to a given number of natural stimuli. 
Interestingly, among the 50 cells that were selected based on consistency for 
artificial stimuli (green line), there was a higher proportion of cells that was 
consistent and significant across many natural stimuli. This shows that the 
consistency across artificial stimuli generalizes to natural stimuli. Note also that for 
the natural stimuli in Table 1, the percentage of inconsistent cells substantially 
decreases when taking into account only the 50 cells with highest modulation 
indices averaged across artificial stimuli. 
We next further examined the relationship between side-of-figure preference for 
artificial stimuli and natural stimuli (Fig. III-6). In general, the modulation indices for 
artificial and natural stimuli showed small but strongly significant correlations, 
indicating that cells signaling the side-of-figure of artificial stimuli correctly also tend 
to correctly signal the side-of-figure of natural stimuli. Yet, there is considerable 
residual variance of natural stimuli modulation indices left, indicating that not every 
cell is consistent for every stimulus, but the correct side-of-figure needs to be 
inferred from the population activity. Both the luminance square modulation index 
and average modulation index across artificial stimuli were positively correlated 
with natural stimulus modulation indices; however, for both single and overlapping 
full faces, the average modulation index across artificial stimuli explained almost 
twice as much variance as the modulation index for luminance squares alone. 
Indeed, we found that for most natural stimuli, the average modulation index 
across artificial stimuli explained more variance than the modulation indices of 
each individual artificial stimulus. This suggests that for these natural stimuli, using 
a battery of artificial stimuli is a better predictor for whether a cell is a border-
ownership cell and will respond consistently to these natural stimuli than just using 
the luminance square standard test alone. In contrast, for the stimuli with 
ambiguous contours, the average modulation index across artificial stimuli was a 
worse predictor than the modulation index for the standard test alone. This could 
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suggest that the populations of border-ownership cells that represent the side-of-
figure of illusory contours might not always carry complete information about the 
correct segmentation of certain artificial stimulus conditions. Note, however, that, 
for the single ambiguous face (Fig. III-5i, bottom) the modulation index averaged 
across artificial stimuli actually explained more variance than the single luminance 
square modulation index. It is noteworthy that the single ambiguous face was the 
stimulus for which none of the top 50 cells was inconsistent (Table 1), whereas for 
artificial stimuli there tended to be many inconsistent cells. For other natural 
stimuli, the number of inconsistent cells was also low compared to artificial stimuli. 
There were three out of 50 cells that were significantly tuned to the single full face 
stimulus but inconsistent with the luminance square stimulus, and no cells that 
were significantly tuned to the single full face stimulus and inconsistent with the 
single ambiguous face. 
Justifying our choice to focus on the most consistent cells, the consistency 
between border-ownership selectivity for artificial and natural stimuli was greatly 
weakened when we analyzed all cells regardless of their consistency across 
artificial stimuli (compare marginal distributions using all cells (gray bars) with the 
distributions using only the top 50 cells (blue bars) in Fig. III-6). When we included 
all cells, the population average could not significantly determine the border-
ownership of occluding faces. For single faces, there was still a consistent border-
ownership signal left even when averaging across all cells but it was less 
significant than when averaging across the top cells (despite larger sample size). 
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Figure III-6: Correlations between modulation indices of artificial stimuli 
and modulation indices of natural stimuli. The six scatter plots show how 
responses to the side-of-figure of artificial stimuli correlate with responses to the 
side-of-figure of natural stimuli. The scatter plots on the left have the modulation 
indices of the single luminance square on the x-axis while the scatter plots on the 
right have the average modulation index across all artificial stimuli on the x-axis. 
Both types of modulation indices are plotted against the average modulation index 
across a class of natural stimuli on the y-axis: The first category (a) includes full 
single faces shown in Fig. III-5e, the second category (b) contains overlapping 
faces (Fig. III-5f) and the third category (c) includes faces with ambiguous contours 
(Fig. III-5i,j). Red lines indicate Standard Model I regression lines, i.e., the ordinary 
least squares fit of the abscissa to the ordinate. P-values were computed by 
comparing a transform of the Pearson correlation coefficient to a Student’s t-
distribution. Using a permutation test on the Pearson correlation coefficient yielded 
qualitatively the same results. The vertical dashed blue line in the right plots 
indicates the average modulation index which was the threshold for being chosen 
for the 50 selected cells used in Fig. III-5. The histograms at the top and on the 
right show the marginal distributions of average modulation indices for luminance 
squares, artificial stimuli and natural stimuli, respectively, across all 201 cells (blue 
histograms show modulation indices for the 50 selected cells).  
We compared latencies of the border-ownership signal for the full face stimulus 
and the ambiguous face stimulus. Fig. III-7a shows raster plots of an example 
cell’s responses to full and ambiguous face stimuli. As can be seen from the 
difference of the PSTHs for the preferred and non-preferred condition, the border-
ownership signal for the stimulus with illusory contour is smaller and delayed. As 
discussed in the previous paragraph, the 50 cells most consistent for artificial 
stimuli formed a population that signaled border-ownership of the ambiguous 
stimulus reliably. Thus, we compared latencies for the single full face stimulus and 
corresponding single ambiguous stimulus for the 17 out of 50 cells that were 
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consistently and significantly border-ownership selective for both stimuli. The 
latency for the full stimulus was on average 65 ms and significantly shorter than 
the latency to the stimulus with illusory contour, which was on average 100 ms. 
 
Figure III-7: Latency differences between full stimuli and stimuli with illusory 
contours.  (a) Raster plots of example cell responses to full faces presented on its 
preferred side (blue) and non-preferred side (red), respectively, and responses to 
the stimulus with locally deleted edge (yellow and purple). The preferred side was 
defined by the cell’s responses to luminance squares. (b) Difference of the PSTHs 
for preferred side and non-preferred side, for the full face (solid line) and the face 
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with locally deleted edge (dashed line). The vertical solid and dashed lines show 
the latencies for full and ambiguous faces, respectively, defined as the time the 
difference reaches half of its peak value. (c) Population scatter plot of latencies of 
border-ownership signal of full face stimulus shown at the x-axis against border-
ownership latency for the stimulus with locally deleted edge shown at the y-axis. P-
value was computed with a paired Wilcoxon rank sum test.  
Discussion. We were interested in how border-ownership cells, which have been 
shown to respond consistently to the side-of-figure of artificial stimuli, respond to 
natural stimuli and stimuli with ambiguous contours. In our study, we probed 
responses of a large number of V2 and V3 cells for border-ownership selectivity 
across a large battery of different stimuli, both artificial and natural, enabling us to 
rigorously assess the extent to which each cell showed consistent tuning across 
different stimulus conditions.  As can be seen from Table III-1, we found many 
cells that were ostensibly border-ownership cells based on selectivity to the side-
of-figure of single luminance squares but responded inconsistently to other artificial 
stimuli. Indeed, there was not a single border-ownership cell (out of 201 tested) 
that was significantly tuned and consistent to every single artificial stimulus. The 
considerable number of partially inconsistent cells in Table III-1 contradicts the 
simplistic concept of the perfect border-ownership cell, despite the intuitive appeal 
of a single cell explaining a variety of perceptual phenomena. Instead, it seems 
that single border-ownership cells carry incomplete information about figure-
ground segmentation for only a subset of conditions. Thus, in order for the brain to 
reliably determine the correct segmentation of the scene, it needs to average the 
activity of multiple border-ownership cells that each carry information about border-
ownership in different situations. Indeed, we found that by averaging across the 
most consistent cells, it was possible to get a population signal which was reliable 
across artificial stimuli.  
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We found that this population signal also consistently signaled the side-of-figure 
of a battery of natural face and object stimuli. This further supports the notion that 
border-ownership cells play a vital role for segmenting the visual scene into 
objects. For rather simple stimuli, such as the single faces, one could argue that 
the consistent response might simply be caused by asymmetric receptive fields 
such that the cells prefer more complex texture on one side of their receptive field 
center. In contrast, the consistent response to overlapping faces, which are 
visually very similar in both conditions, indicates that border-ownership cells are 
indeed inferring the side of the foreground object. For the pair of overlapping faces 
at the bottom of Fig. III-5g, where the local edge is convex and contains a telling T-
junction, even the isolated local stimulus evoked a consistent, though smaller, 
response difference (Fig. III-5h, bottom). This is consistent with psychophysical 
and computational evidence by Fowlkes et al. (2007) that the local bottom-up cues 
of borders in natural scenes are in many situations enough to decide border-
ownership. On the other hand, when the local stimulus is ambiguous and does not 
evoke a significant response difference (Fig. III-5h, top), global context cues can 
help to decide border-ownership (Fig. III-5g, top). To test whether shape of the 
object is sufficient for border-ownership cells to determine the side-of-figure, we 
presented the outlines of the overlapping faces alone. This did not evoke a 
significant response difference, which is consistent with the subjective experience 
that the border-ownership of the outlines alone is ambiguous without the texture 
and other features of the face. These results suggest that border-ownership cells 
integrate a variety of the object’s features, including local cues, as well as shape 
and texture outside the receptive field. 
Illusory contours have been a major subject of study for figure-ground 
segmentation in psychological literature (Heitger et al., 1994), and von der Heydt 
et. al (1984) found neurons in V2 that responded to illusory contours; however, the 
amplitude was smaller and the latency 10 ms longer compared to real contours 
(von der Heydt and Peterhans, 1989). The existence of such cells in V2 and also 
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V1 was confirmed by several other studies (von der Heydt and Peterhans, 1989; 
Grosof et al., 1993; Sheth et al., 1996; Lee and Nguyen, 2001; Ramsden et al., 
2001), and Bakin et al. (2000) found that they also respond to depth-defined 
illusory contours. Yet, up to now, it has not been known whether border-ownership 
cells consistently signal the side-of-figure for illusory contours (Kogo and 
Wagemans, 2013), although there have been several computational models 
(Finkel and Sajda, 1992; Sajda and Finkel, 1992; Kogo et al., 2010) where border-
ownership and illusory contours both emerge from a dynamic network computing 
figure-ground organization.  Recently, there has also been a discussion paper 
(Kogo and Wagemans, 2013) suggesting the intertwinedness of illusory contours 
with border-ownership, which received many commentaries. Among them, von der 
Heydt (2013) argued that illusory contours and border ownership might be 
represented by distinct populations in V2. Here, we have shown that border-
ownership cells do consistently signal the side-of-figure for illusory contours even 
though local edge information is missing. The number of cells significantly 
signaling the correct side-of-figure for illusory contours was slightly lower than for 
full contours (31 out of 50 significant cells for full stimulus vs. 20 out of 50 
significant cells for ambiguous stimulus, unpaired t-test, p<0.05), which may be 
partly due to the reduced amplitude of responses to illusory contours in general. 
Among the 50 cells most consistent for artificial stimuli, there were only 3 cells that 
were significantly tuned for the full face stimulus but inconsistent for the luminance 
square, and no cells that were significantly and inconsistently tuned to the side-of-
figure of the ambiguous stimulus and the luminance square. It is surprising that the 
ambiguous face stimulus turned out to be the stimulus where no cell signaled 
inconsistent border-ownership. A possible explanation is that the local stimulus in 
the classical receptive field causes the transient response, which can lead to errors 
for the unambiguous stimuli, whereas for the ambiguous face stimulus, the border-
ownership signal is evoked entirely by feedback from context (Gilbert and Li, 
2013), which is more reliable. Analogously to the onset responses of illusory 
contours studied by von der Heydt and Peterhans (1989), the response differences 
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signaling border-ownership of illusory contours were also smaller and delayed by 
about 30 ms compared to the full stimuli.  
Previously, the responses of border-ownership cells have been modeled as a 
result of pure feedforward operations (Heitger et al., 1994; Sakai and Nishimura, 
2006; Supèr et al., 2010), of intra-areal dynamics (Baek and Sajda, 2005; 
Zhaoping, 2005), and of feedforward and feedback interactions between areas 
(Craft et al., 2007; Jehee et al., 2007; Kogo et al., 2010), respectively. Our findings 
falsify pure feedforward models as they predict the same latencies of border-
ownership signals irrespective of the stimulus. Instead, recurrent (Lamme and 
Roelfsema, 2000) connections might need to be utilized to resolve ambiguous 
scenes. It is conceivable that the latency of the border-ownership signal is 
increased because intra-areal network dynamics or feedforward-feedback 
interactions between V2 and V4 require more iterations to resolve the border-
ownership. Note, however, that at least for the Mooney face, which evokes a 
significant and consistent border-ownership signal (Fig.  III-5j), it seems unlikely 
that contour completion mechanisms building from low-level cues would be 
sufficient to infer the illusory boundary of the face, but instead knowledge about 
face shape appears to be required. Assuming that the border-ownership signal 
that emerges around 100 ms for the full face originates from feedback from V4, it is 
also possible that the later signal for the border-ownership of the illusory contour 
arises from feedback from an area later in the hierarchy, e.g., posterior IT. Such 
cortico-cortical feedback loop interactions have been shown to exist between V1 
and V4 by (Chen et al., 2014). The most posterior face patch PL has latencies of 
80 ms to distinguish faces from objects (Issa and DiCarlo, 2012) and is thus a 
possible candidate feedback source.  
Previously, there has been a debate (Vecera and Farah, 1997; Vecera and O'reilly, 
1998; Peterson, 1999) on whether segmentation precedes recognition or vice 
versa. Our results (Fig. III-7) suggest the possibility of a third alternative that is 
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consistent with models of Bayesian inference (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Lee and 
Mumford, 2003; Yuille and Kersten, 2006). According to this hypothesis, initially, 
retinotopic areas try to segment the scene into regions corresponding to objects 
based on low-level cues, potentially using a combination of feedforward 
mechanisms utilizing local cues as T-junctions, intra-areal, and inter-areal 
dynamics. However, since segmentation of natural scenes is inherently ambiguous 
based on low-level cues and not every edge is an object border, this initial 
segmentation wave can only make guesses about which regions correspond to 
objects and relay these regions to IT. IT then attempts to recognize objects in the 
hypothesized regions and can accept or falsify the hypotheses by exciting or 
inhibiting border-ownership cells via feedback. In this way, IT would generate a 
representation of object surfaces in retinotopic cortex. Note, however, that the 
found latencies are merely suggestive evidence, and simultaneous recordings and 
perturbations of multiple areas will be necessary to dissect the exact mechanisms. 
Overall, we found that many ostensible border-ownership cells, as determined by 
the single luminance square, turned out to be inconsistent for one or more stimuli 
when presented with a larger battery of artificial stimuli, and not a single cell 
showed consistent border-ownership preference across all stimulus conditions 
tested. This emphasizes the necessity for future studies to present a larger set of 
stimuli in order to identify the most consistent border-ownership cells and the need 
to use a population code for decoding segmentation. Importantly, the population of 
border-ownership cells that was consistent across most artificial stimuli could also 
reliably segment both natural face and object stimuli and, with some delay, even 
ambiguous stimuli where local edge information was completely missing, which 
suggests that border-ownership cells integrate both local, low-level cues and 
global, high-level object cues to segment the visual scene.   By exploiting new 
techniques such as population calcium imaging, optogenetics, and simultaneous 
recordings in retinotopic and IT cortex, future work might be able to reveal how 
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border ownership cell populations are read out across different stimulus 
configurations. 
Materials and Methods. All animal procedures used in this study complied with 
local and NIH guidelines. Two male rhesus macaques were implanted with MR-
compatible head posts and trained to maintain fixation on a dot for a juice reward. 
Targeting. Since the interest of this study lies explicitly in recording from border-
ownership cells rather than an exhaustive analysis of V2/V3, our electrode 
targeting was guided by fMRI. Monkeys were scanned in a 3T TIM (Siemens) 
magnet. Scanning procedures were the same as described in Tsao et al. (2006), 
Freiwald and Tsao (2010), and Ohayon and Tsao (2012). For functional MRI, 
monkeys passively viewed stimuli on a screen. MION contrast agent was injected 
to improve signal to noise ratio. In order to identify V2 and V3, we first mapped 
retinotopy by presenting horizontal and vertical checkerboard wedges and defined 
area boundaries based on horizontal and vertical meridians. Within V2 and V3, we 
targeted areas with high functional activation in response to border-rich disparity-
defined checkerboard stimulus vs. a full field changing disparity stimulus (Tsao et 
al., 2003b) in order to increase the yield of recorded border-ownership cells (Fig. 
III-2a), since Qiu and Von Der Heydt (2005) had previously found that a majority of 
border-ownership cells are also selective to the side-of-figure of stereo-defined 
edges, which were abundant in the former stimulus. In addition, we were guided by 
anatomical landmarks, and targets were confined to the banks and fundus of the 
lunate sulcus. For monkey J, we did not get good signal in the fMRI and therefore 
targeted the same anatomical locations that yielded high activation in monkey T. 
We found slightly less border-ownership cells than in monkey T (see Results). 
Placement of recording chambers and electrode trajectories towards the targeted 
regions were planned with the software Planner (Ohayon and Tsao, 2012). In 
monkey T, we recorded from the right hemisphere and in monkey J from the left 
hemisphere. 
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Fixation. Monkeys were head fixed and passively viewed a screen in a dark 
room. A small fixation spot (0.25° in diameter) was presented in the center of the 
screen and eye position was monitored using an iScan system. Monkeys were 
rewarded with juice for maintaining fixation every 2-3 seconds.  
Electrophysiology. Tungsten electrodes (FHC) with 1 MΩ impedance were used 
for recording. Custom grids were printed and guide tubes were cut to extend 2 mm 
below the dura. Electrodes were advanced using an oil hydraulic microdrive 
(Narishige). Neural signals were recorded using a MAP system (Plexon). Local 
field potentials (LFPs) were filtered at 0.7–300 Hz, and single units and multi-units 
were filtered at 0.15– 8 kHz and recorded at 40 kHz. 
Online Data Analysis. Spikes were isolated and sorted online using the box-
method of the SortClient (Plexon). Initially, approximate receptive field location was 
determined by manually sweeping a small blinking square (0.2 º) across the 
screen. Based on this approximate location, receptive fields were mapped by 
computing the spike-triggered average (STA) in response to a random stimulus of 
size 8º that was centered on the hand-mapped location (Pack et al., 2003). The 
random stimulus was a series of images alternating at 100 ms that consisted of a 
grey background and two squares of size 0.5º appearing at random positions, with 
one of the squares being white and the other square randomly chosen to be either 
black or white. Subsequently, a 2-dimensional Gaussian was fitted to the spike-
triggered average (STA) of the stimulus to determine the position and size of 
subsequent stimuli. Receptive field maps were also computed by considering 
either the only black squares or the white squares alone and yielded similar 
receptive fields. Next, moving sine wave gratings were presented, and the 
preferred orientation of the cell was determined based on the sine grating 
orientation that evoked the highest response. For all subsequent stimuli, the 
central edge (indicated by a purple ellipse in the figures) was adjusted to the 
position and size of the receptive field and rotated to match the preferred 
 
 
84 
orientation. We recorded a total of 545 cells in monkey T and 121 cells in 
monkey J. We subjectively assessed for each recorded site whether it contained 
promising border-ownership cells based on clear receptive fields, clear orientation 
preferences, and consistent responses to the side-of figure of luminance squares 
and for a total of 298 out of 545 recorded cells proceeded to present a battery of 
border-ownership tests consisting of both artificial stimuli and natural stimuli of 
faces (note that some of these cells were included because they were recorded 
simultaneously as ones which passed the subjective assessment, but were not 
themselves subjectively assessed). In the offline analysis, further cells were 
excluded based on unclear STAs or insufficient samples of responses, yielding a 
total of 201 valid cells (see Offline Data Analysis). Artificial stimuli consisted of 
stimuli that had been shown by von der Heydt and colleagues to evoke consistent 
border-ownership signals, including the standard test with single luminance 
squares (Zhou et al. 2000), two occluding squares (Zhou et al. 2000), occluding 
outlines, C-shapes, and squares that evoke the perception of either four single 
squares or a transparent overlay (Qiu et al. 2007). To further verify the correct 
mapping of the receptive field and test position invariance within the receptive field, 
we also performed position tests by sliding the luminance square across 11 
positions orthogonal to its preferred orientation. Natural stimuli consisted of single 
faces, overlapping faces, the isolated local edge of overlapping faces alone, faces 
with local edge deleted, Mooney faces, outlines of overlapping faces, and faces 
occluding apples. The whole battery of artificial and natural stimuli is shown in Fig. 
III-5. We chose to use mostly faces for the natural stimuli as they represent a 
natural, complex, high level object category that is of strong behavioral and social 
relevance and with which monkeys have extensive experience. Also, the existence 
of face-selective regions in IT opens up the possibility to examine interactions 
between object representations in retinotopic and IT cortex (Tsao et al., 2008a). 
Stimuli were presented for 500 ms ON time and 150 ms OFF time. To correct for 
delays of the screen, we used a photodiode that detected the onset and offset of 
the stimuli. The photodiode’s output was fed into the recording system and later 
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used to synchronize the onset of the stimulus and the neurophysiological data 
during offline analysis. 
Offline Data Analysis. Spikes were re-sorted offline using OfflineSorter (Plexon). 
Trials in which monkeys broke fixation were discarded (using a 1° eccentricity 
fixation window). We discarded cells with insufficient number of trials or spikes 
(<500 or <1500 total spikes for standard test and natural stimulus set, 
respectively), and cells that either had an unclear STA were not centered on the 
receptive field or failed the position test (i.e., when shifting the stimulus as in Fig. 
III-2e, the peak response was not inside the receptive field), leaving a total of 201 
cells. Peristimulus time histograms (PSTHs) were smoothed with a Gaussian 
kernel. For Table III-1, which shows the consistency of cells for artificial and 
natural stimuli shown in Fig. III-5, we determined the proportion of side-of-figure 
selective cells for different stimuli using the same method as in (Zhou et al., 2000): 
side-of-figure selectivity of a cell to a given stimulus was computed using a two-
way anova on side-of-figure and contrast polarity on the average firing rate from 0 
to 500 ms during trials of different conditions and using an unpaired t-test in case 
of only one contrast polarity. Unless stated otherwise, a cell was deemed 
significantly selective to the side-of-figure of a stimulus if p<0.01 and consistent if 
the modulation index for the given stimulus had the same sign as for the standard 
test of single luminance squares. Modulation indices for pairs of matched stimuli 
were computed as 𝑀𝑠1,𝑠2 =  
𝑅𝑠1−𝑅𝑠2
𝑅𝑠1+𝑅𝑠2
, where 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑢𝑠 is the firing rate of the cell in 
response to the stimulus averaged over the 500 ms from onset to offset of stimulus 
presentation. We defined the preferred side-of-figure of each cell based on the 
average modulation index for the standard luminance squares shown in Fig III-2. 
Based on this preferred side, we computed the average modulation index across 
all pairs of matched artificial stimuli (blue and red conditions in Fig. III-5a-d).  This 
average modulation index is positive if the border-ownership coding across 
artificial stimuli is consistent with the border-ownership selectivity for the simple 
luminance square and negative if it is inconsistent. We selected the 50 most 
 
 
86 
consistent cells with the highest average modulation indices across artificial 
stimuli to compute the population average responses shown in Fig. III-5. The 
results did not depend qualitatively on the exact number of selected cells. Before 
averaging, each PSTH was normalized by the average response from 0 ms to 500 
ms after stimulus onset across the shown stimuli. The p-values shown on top of 
each PSTH were computed using two-sided paired t-tests on the normalized 
average responses from 0 to 500 ms after stimulus onset across trials of the 50 
neurons for the preferred vs. non-preferred side. For the scatter plots in Fig. III-6, 
we computed the average modulation index across the two local contrast 
conditions of the luminance square and the average modulation index across all 
artificial stimuli, and computed the correlation with modulation indices for natural 
stimuli. Finally, we compared latencies of the border-ownership signal for full face 
stimuli and ambiguous face stimuli with illusory contours. Traditionally, latencies 
have been computed as the time when the signal first significantly exceeds 
baseline fluctuations (Maunsell and Gibson, 1992; Kiani et al., 2005). However, 
since the response amplitudes were much lower for stimuli with illusory contours, 
we were worried that this definition might be biased toward longer latencies for 
stimuli with lower signal-to-noise ratios. Thus, we (1) only included the subset of 
border-ownership cells in the analysis that showed significantly stronger responses 
to the preferred side for both the full stimulus and the stimulus with illusory contour 
(p<0.05, Welch test). The preferred side was determined by responses to the 
luminance squares. (2) We used a half-peak measurement as latency (Zhou et al., 
2000): we computed the difference of smoothed (SD: 9 ms) PSTHs for preferred 
and non-preferred side and defined latency as the first time that the difference 
reached half of the maximum difference across the 500 ms of the stimulus ON 
time. (3) We repeated the analysis with a change point measure (Sugihara et al., 
2011), which fits a piecewise linear function consisting of two lines to the 
cumulative difference PSTH and defines the latency as the point where the first 
leg, which is fixed as 0, transitions to the second leg, which qualitatively confirmed 
our results. All analysis was performed using Matlab (Mathworks). 
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Segmentation patches 
Summarizing the findings of the previous section, individual cells recorded from 
random locations in V2 and V3 were incapable of reliably signaling border-
ownership across different types of stimuli. This was bad news of our original goal 
of recording from clear signals encoding segmentation and recognition and to 
study their interaction during switches of conscious percept. Therefore, we asked 
(1) whether there are specialized modules where neurons do reliably encode the 
figure-ground segmentation of a scene. Perhaps, we could apply an approach 
similar to the one that led to the discovery of face cells (see Chapter II) and employ 
fMRI paradigms to identify functional clusters of cells that encode a larger amount 
of figure-ground information. And (2) we asked whether we can use a decoding 
approach and use responses of a population of neurons recorded while the 
monkey viewed different types of figure-ground stimuli to decode the figure-ground 
segmentation of each image. Methods for fMRI and electrophysiology were the 
same as described in the section above. 
Identification of fMRI-defined segmentation hotspots. We hypothesized that if 
modules involved in figure-ground segmentation exist, then stimuli containing 
figures on a background would trigger these processes and evoke activation in 
those modules, whereas stimuli without figures would not (since there is nothing to 
segment). We thus presented stimuli containing figures on a background as well 
corresponding control stimuli containing only a background while monkeys were 
being functionally scanned (Fig III-8). We used either texture, luminance, motion, 
or disparity to define each of the figures and their respective background stimuli. 
Analyzing the difference in responses, we found hot spots of activation in V2, V3, 
V4, and V4A that were activated more strongly by stimuli containing figures than 
pure background stimuli. Interestingly, these activations by figures were very 
similar for each of the modalities, i.e., the overlap of each of the contrasts – 
whether defined by texture, luminance, motion, or disparity – was remarkably 
strong. This overlap in hot spot activation was not be explained simply by higher 
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signal-to-noise ratio in those regions: as a control, we performed an fMRI 
experiment comparing colored stimuli to greyscale stimuli. This contrast showed 
very little overlap with the segmentation-related hot spots, except for one patch in 
V4v, raising the possibility that segmentation-related modules may be largely 
separated from color-processing machinery. 
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Figure III-8: Segmentation hotspots overlap across modalities. We first 
mapped retinotopy to determine boundaries of visual areas V1-V4 (a) in three 
monkeys (three columns). We then presented texture-defined stimuli and 
compared activations to control stimuli with full-field background texture which 
revealed regions of activations located mostly in V3 and V4 (b). Outlines of these 
patches are shown in orange in the flat maps below. Stimuli containing figures 
defined by luminance (c), motion (d), or disparity (e) caused activations in 
overlapping regions, while activations evoked by color stimuli had little overlap (f). 
Cluster of consistent cells in segmentation hot spots. We targeted these 
segmentation hotspots with electrophysiological recordings to compare figure-
ground information encoded by neurons inside these regions with neurons from 
outside control regions, including those in the patches defined by color, which had 
previously been called globs and were suggested to be responsible for color 
processing (Conway et al., 2007). During electrophysiological recordings, we 
showed stimuli similar to the fMRI stimuli, in that they were defined by either 
texture, luminance, motion, or disparity. For each modality, either the center or 
edge of a single square was presented on the receptive field of a cell, and as a 
control, we also showed background stimuli without a square. While in general, 
consistent segmentation cells were rare, we did find a cluster of cells inside a 
segmentation hot spot where we, reproducibly across days, found cells that were 
consistent across all four modalities. The location of this cluster also overlapped 
with disparity columns that Adams and Zeki (2001) had studied inside the lunate 
fundus. Similarly to their findings, we found that as we advanced our electrode 
along the lunate fundus, cells changed from being tuned to near disparity to being 
tuned to far disparity (Fig. III-9a). An example cell from the cluster of consistent 
cells is shown in Fig. III-9b. Inside this cluster, cells that were consistent across all 
four modalities were much easier to find than anywhere outside the cluster (Fig. III-
10). 
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Figure III-9: A cluster of consistent cells inside of segmentation hot spot / 
disparity columns. We implanted a chamber almost horizontally so we could 
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make long penetrations in the fundus of the lunate sulcus along V3. Shown in 
the center of (a) is a part of a flatmap showing V3 with retinotopy superimposed 
and 8 recording locations that we recorded along the lunate fundus. Shown around 
the flatmaps are PSTHs representing the disparity tuning (from far, blue; to near, 
red). As the electrode was advanced, neurons changed tuning from preferring near 
disparity to preferring far disparity. The cell recorded at site 5, which also 
happened to be inside a segmentation hot spot (not shown), was consistently 
tuned to the side-of-figure of an edge as shown in the PSTHs in (b). This neuron 
fired more strongly when the top edge of a square was presented over its 
receptive field, regardless of whether the square was defined by luminance, 
texture, motion, or disparity. 
 
Figure III-10: Inside the cluster, cells are remarkably consistent. Left: 
Histograms comparing the proportion of cells that were significant and consistent 
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across 1, 2, 3, or 4 modalities inside and outside of the cluster. Right: Location of 
the cluster, with disparity-defined segmentation hot spot fMRI contrast overlaid. 
Decoding accuracies are higher in segmentation hot spots. We next 
characterized the amount of figure-ground information tuned in population of cells 
from specific structures of the visual cortex, such as segmentation-activated hot 
spots, globs (color modules), and control regions outside of segmentation hot 
spots and globs. To this end, we trained a linear classifier on responses of neurons 
and tried to predict whether a given region of an image was part of a figure, 
background, or a top edge/bottom edge of a figure (chance level thus being 25% 
decoding accuracy). Inside segmentation-activated regions as measured by fMRI 
we found higher percentages of cells tuned to borders compared to outside these 
regions for all modalities and also higher decoding accuracies reaching around 
60% when using 50 neurons for decoding (Fig. III-11). Decoding accuracies in 
control regions were notably lower, and decoding accuracies in globs were 
particularly low.  
 
Figure III-11: Decoding figure-ground information. Decoding accuracy and 
95% confidence intervals (y-axis) against numbers of neurons used (x-axis) for two 
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monkeys. To determine how much information about figure-ground 
segmentation is encoded in different patches of visual cortex, we used a linear 
classifier to extract figure-ground information from responses of either neurons 
from segmentation-activated regions (blue), glob neurons (red), and neurons from 
control regions outside of both segmentation-activated regions and globs. Squares 
defined by different modalities (luminance, texture, motion, disparity) were 
presented at different positions relative to the receptive field (square center, top 
edge, bottom edge, or full background stimulus without the square). A linear 
decoder was trained on a single-trial basis to classify across stimuli whether a 
figure, a top edge, a bottom edge, or background was over the receptive field.   For 
computing confidence intervals, we repeated decoding 100 times, and in each of 
the 100 iterations, a random subset of neurons and trials were selected. 
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C h a p t e r  I V  
MOONEY FACES 
We advise the reader to have a brief glance at Fig. IV-1 and see if he or she 
recognizes the objects in the image. Moreover, he or she should try to infer the 
figure-ground assignment, i.e., determine which regions in the image are 
foreground and which are background. Most subjects will have a hard time doing 
this. Next, turn the page upside-down and try to recognize the object in Fig. IV-1 
again. Now, it should be quite easy to see that the image depicts two faces, 
namely of a woman (my advisor) and of a monkey. Also, it becomes easy to infer 
where foreground and where background is. Importantly, even after turning the 
page back to its normal position (and the faces to their inverted position), the ability 
to recognize and segment the two stimuli persists. Hence, Mooney faces are 
switchable (although the switch can arguably only happen once), and may be 
usable to study whether face patches signal switches in percept. Given the 
previous chapter, another reason that makes the Mooney face an attractive 
potential stimulus for us was that Mooney faces cause the perception of subjective 
contours where the contours of a real, non-degraded face would usually be. 
Experiments described above suggested that border-ownership cells also encode 
to which side these illusory contours belong.
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Figure IV-1: Example Mooney face stimuli. If the reader finds it hard to 
recognize these stimuli after trying for a while, note that the Mooney stimuli have 
been inverted. Putting the page upside-down makes it easy to recognize them for 
most human subjects. 
While humans are very good at recognizing upright Mooney faces from the age of 
18 months (Doi et al., 2009), in most monkeys, Mooney face stimuli activated face 
patches only very weakly (Moeller et al., 2017). Strikingly, one monkey in our 
colony, which anecdotally was also deemed one of the smarter monkeys, showed 
face patch activation to Mooney faces just as strong as to real faces (see Figure 6 
in Moeller et al. (2017)). This raised the possibility that most monkeys may have 
difficulty recognizing Mooney faces as depicting faces in the same way that 
humans have difficulty recognizing upside-down Mooney faces. The outlier 
suggested it may be possible to make monkeys see the Mooney faces in the same 
way that turning the page upside-down helped the reader. Thus, we decided to 
find out why monkeys showed low activation to Mooney faces and if we could 
make them respond strongly to them. Two ideas we pursued for making face 
patches respond to Mooney faces were (1) to figure out what the difference is 
between Mooney faces and cartoon faces (which cause strong face responses) 
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and (2) to animate the Mooney faces. We investigated the two questions with 
electrophysiology and fMRI, respectively, using the same methods as described in 
Chapter III.  
For the first question, we recorded from 85 face-selective cells in face patch MF 
(Fig. IV-2). While face cells in face patch MF responded to Mooney faces slightly 
more than to real objects or Mooney objects, the response was very small, 
confirming results cited above. Indeed, the baseline-subtracted peak response to 
real faces was about four times as large as the response to Mooney faces (Fig. IV-
2a). This could not be simply explained by the fact that Mooney faces were not 
fully realistic faces: even for simplistic cartoon faces, the base-line subtracted peak 
response was almost three times as large as for the Mooney face. Thus, we asked 
what made this big difference between cartoon faces and Mooney faces. For this 
purpose, we created chimeras by exchanging face parts of cartoon and Mooney 
faces (Fig. IV-2b). We found that the outline of the cartoon face had by far the 
strongest influence on responses – cells responded to every second stimulus, 
which corresponds exactly to the stimuli that had the outline of the cartoon face 
present. We confirmed the importance of having an outline through chimeras 
between real faces and Mooney faces (data not shown).  
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Figure IV-2: Responses to Mooney faces can be increased by adding an 
outline. (a) Responses averaged across 85 MF cells (normalized) to real faces, 
Mooney versions of the same faces, real objects, Mooney versions of the same 
objects, and cartoon faces. (b) Top: Schematic illustrating the process of 
generating cartoon – Mooney chimeras by replacing one part (outline, ear, eye left, 
eye right, nose) at a time. Bottom: Response time courses averaged across 85 MF 
cells to each of the 25 = 32 possible combinations of using either cartoon version 
or Mooney version for each part. Diagram on the right indicates for each row which 
parts were Mooney and which parts were cartoon for the respective stimulus. 
For the second experiment, we made a shot-in-the-dark hypothesis that motion 
cues of a naturally moving Mooney face may help to increase face patch 
responses to Mooney faces. Thus, we created movie stimuli of real faces and 
objects moving around in a natural way, and also generated Mooney versions of 
the same stimuli. Mooney versions were created by smoothing the image of each 
frame and thresholding image intensity to create an image made of only two tones. 
We showed these movies, as well as corresponding static images, while monkeys 
were in the scanner to see how animation influences fMRI responses in face 
patches. Consistent with single-unit results described above we found that 
responses to static Mooney faces were significantly weaker than to real faces 
(Fig.IV-3a). Interestingly, animating the Mooney face had a remarkable effect, 
eliciting responses similar in magnitude to real faces. Importantly, this could not be 
explained simply by the motion energy of the stimuli: animating Mooney object 
stimuli did not increase their response. In a second experiment, in the same 
monkey, we additionally showed upside-down static or animated Mooney faces 
(Fig. IV-3b). The animation-induced response increase for upside-down Mooney 
faces was stronger than for Mooney objects but weaker than for upright Mooney 
faces.  We confirmed the main findings across face patches in a total of three 
monkeys (data not shown). 
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Concluding this chapter, we were able to make face patches respond to 
Mooney faces by adding an outline or animating them. One interpretation of these 
results frames them in terms of figure-ground segmentation: perhaps, because 
Mooney faces lack many of their contours (at least physically – they may still be 
perceived subjectively when the Mooney face is recognized), segmentation 
processes fail, and hence the features of a face cannot be grouped together as 
belonging to the same surface. This may impair object recognition processes. 
Adding a physical outline clearly helps the segmentation process, and natural 
motion can also serve as powerful cues to aid segmentation. Further experiments, 
such as using disparity to define the surface of the Mooney face, may gather 
further support for this hypothesis. 
Importantly, unlike the perceptual hysteresis in humans, face patches did not 
appear to “learn” from this experience. For example, for the second day of the 
fMRI experiment, after the monkey had seen both static Mooney faces and their 
animated counterparts for hours, responses to static Mooney faces remained low 
(Fig. IV-3b). Hence, we were not able to exploit Mooney faces as a switchable 
stimulus for our interaction experiments. Different possible hypotheses are 
consistent with these findings: for example, whether the monkey learned that a 
Mooney face represents a face or not, or already knew it from the beginning, it is 
possible that this knowledge is purely semantic and encoded in higher cognitive 
areas, not the face patches. Alternatively, the monkey may have switched from not 
perceiving a face to perceiving a face, but face patches may not represent the 
monkey’s percept but be mere passive filters of the visual input. This underscored 
for us that, before studying the interaction between brain areas, we would first 
need to figure out whether face patches actually represent conscious percept or 
not. We decided to definitely answer this question using binocular rivalry as a 
paradigm, as described in the next half of this thesis. 
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Figure IV-3: Responses to Mooney faces can be increased through 
animation. (a) Response time course, averaged across 14 runs, of the fMRI 
signal. Values above base line mean activation, values below baseline mean 
suppression. Each dot of the line plot corresponds to one functional volume taken 
(repetition time TR = 2 seconds). During each block, consisting of 12 TRs, either 
static real faces, static real objects, static Mooney faces, Mooney face movies, or 
Mooney object movies were presented, interleaved with blank periods (grey). Each 
category consisted of 8 stimuli. (b) Same as (a), but using different blocks on a 
different day. Images presented during blocks were real faces, real objects, static 
upright Mooney faces, static upside-down Mooney faces, upright Mooney face 
movies, and upside-down Mooney face movies. 
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C h a p t e r  V  
A PHILOSOPHICAL TREATISE ON CONSCIOUSNESS 
Definitions of consciousness 
Consciousness is the biggest remaining mystery of nature. While processes 
previously viewed as magical such as life have been elucidated by biology, real 
scientific progress on consciousness is scarce. To date, it remains almost 
completely unclear how consciousness, which can be defined as subjective 
experience or what it feels like to, e.g., see the color the red, maps to the physical 
world. While Aristotle asserted that consciousness must of course reside in the heart 
(Hicks, 2015), these days it is believed that rather the brain has something to do with 
consciousness. Thus, if looking to understand consciousness, one commonly 
glances hopingly at neuroscience and psychology. 
One has to distinguish between generic consciousness and specific contents of 
consciousness. Generic consciousness is the capability of having subjective 
experience at all, i.e., the difference between an awake individual and a deeply 
sleeping or anesthetized person. In neuroscience, the neural correlates of generic 
consciousness are studied by measuring brain states awake vs. asleep or 
anesthetized, or perturbing specific brain regions and see whether this renders the 
patient unconscious. However, we currently have no way of specifically turning off 
consciousness without also turning off a myriad of other processes, such as 
language, planned movement, higher-order thoughts, decision making, etc. Hence, 
it is currently not possible distill the neural correlates of generic consciousness from 
these other processes, which is the reason why I will focus on specific 
consciousness instead. Specific consciousness is about the contents of conscious 
experience, i.e., the subjective perception of the color red vs. the color green. Here, 
we have a greater chance to disentangle the subjective experience of seeing red vs. 
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not from all the other processes that come with it, and can thus hold more hope 
to find the true neural correlates of experience. 
Another distinction one needs to make is between phenomenal and access 
consciousness (Block, 1995). Phenomenal consciousness addresses the 
subjective, first-person view of conscious experience, or what it feels like to 
experience something, which is a private, non-physical sensation that cannot be 
conveyed directly to other entities. On the other hand, access consciousness 
addresses the third-person view of consciousness that can be observed 
behaviorally, i.e., whether a person has access to the perceived information in the 
sense that he can utilize or report it. To make it clear from the beginning, I do not 
believe that neuroscience has a very good shot at the hard problem of fully solving 
phenomenal consciousness, as I do not think that neuroscience will eliminate the 
conceivability of philosophical zombies. Even if we have a complete understanding 
and detailed description of the neural underpinnings of consciousness, it is still 
coherently conceivable for the same physical system to exist but exist in the dark, 
without anyone experiencing what it is like to be in that system. But this 
conceivability shall not demoralize us, as we can still get very close to a full 
understanding of consciousness: in the best-case scenario, we will be able to find 
the states or processes of the brain that empirically coincide exactly with specific 
contents of consciousness and only with consciousness, i.e., the provided 
description of brain processes is not modulated by other, confounding factors. If this 
is the case, we will be able to exactly predict, constrained only by the limits of 
language, what your current phenomenal experience is, and by perturbing exactly 
these processes, you will be able to reproducibly experience any exact conscious 
percept desired. The process description will be sufficient in the sense that if we 
clamp the process and perturb another part of the brain, your conscious percept will 
be unaffected and minimal in the sense that if we miss perturbing a specific aspect 
of the process, we will not be able to provoke the full experience. So even though 
zombies will still be conceivable, the empirically discovered relationship between 
 
 
105 
consciousness and the physical world will be more like a fundamental law, such 
as gravity in physics. After all, we can also conceive of a world with the same 
particles having mass, etc. as in the real world, but gravity happens to be absent. 
This conceivability does not imply that the discovered physical laws of gravitational 
force have not contributed to a deep understanding of gravity. 
Access consciousness seems much easier to solve than phenomenal 
consciousness. We can easily conceive finding the pathway by which, e.g., light is 
picked up by the photoreceptors, processed through several stages, and leading 
eventually to the motor actions of reporting the perceived information. Indeed, 
almost all studies trying to find neural correlates of conscious percepts, discussed 
below, depend on the subjects’ report of what they are perceiving. A critical 
distinction to be made here though is that the subject consciously perceiving 
something is not identical to the subject reporting his conscious percept. Indeed, 
one could decide to never report any experience and would still be conscious (cf. 
dreaming state and locked-in patients). Being conscious of something means 
generally (but not always) that one is capable of reporting it but does not have to. In 
almost all studies in neuroscience, the conscious percept exactly coincides with the 
report of the percept during the experiment, so it is impossible to tell whether the 
neural correlates correlate with consciousness or the report itself. To make things 
worse, there are several other confounding factors, such as attention, decision-
making, and differences in the physical stimulus that need to be controlled besides 
report. Thus, when trying to extract consciousness from the neurophysiological 
soup, one needs to be extra careful not to pick up the things associated with other 
processes that tend to stick to it. 
In the following sections, I will summarize results from the neuroscience literature 
on three major paradigms, flash suppression, backward masking, and binocular 
rivalry, that are being used to distill the neural correlates of a conscious percept. I 
will discuss to which degree the results agree and compare how effective the three 
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paradigms are in dissociating consciousness from other confounding factors. I 
will constrain the scope on results from electrophysiology. A lot of related work has 
been done using psychophysics and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). 
However, psychophysics tells us comparatively little about the brain, and the results 
from fMRI happen to disagree dramatically with electrophysiology regarding where 
the conscious percept is represented, with fMRI generally overestimating the extent 
to which it is represented in the brain (e.g., Tong and Engel (2001)). Since 
electrophysiology is considered the gold standard as to what neurons represent, I 
choose to focus on electrophysiology here, although the discrepancies between 
fMRI and single-unit electrophysiology are an interesting subject for discussion. In 
the end, I will argue for the main thesis of this paper that no convincing dissociation 
between conscious percept and confounding factors has been performed in hitherto 
experiments and will propose an experiment utilizing a no-report paradigm to distill 
the representation of specific contents of consciousness. 
Review of  previous paradigms for specific consciousness 
How does one find the neural correlates of a conscious percept? A moderate 
correlation is not enough: if one flashes light at a subject, the subject will have the 
subjective experience of brightness and coincidently the retina will be activated with 
each flash. Despite the retina’s firing being correlated with the subjective percept, 
one cannot claim it to be the neural correlate of consciousness, because it is not an 
exact correlate. That is, there is a lot of sensory input that we are not conscious of 
but that is represented in the retina. Thus, we need to dissociate what activations 
correlate exactly with the conscious percept and what activations are just driven by 
the mere physical input. To dissociate the physical input from the conscious percept, 
we want to find paradigms where the physical input is fixed but the conscious 
percept changes over time or is different over repeated presentations. The studies 
discussed below aim to achieve this using three different strategies: 
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In backward masking, a stimulus is presented so briefly that it can only perceived 
on some trials but not on others. One can compare neural activity when the stimulus 
is reported to be seen vs. not seen with the physical input being identical in both 
conditions. Flash suppression shows a target stimulus to one eye, while flashing a 
salient distractor stimulus in the other eye. This way, the target stimulus is 
suppressed by the distractor and is only perceived once it recovers from 
suppression after a variable amount of time. Binocular rivalry is an example of 
bistable stimuli, such as the famous face-vase illusion (Rubin, 1980), where the 
percept spontaneously switches between two percepts. As for flash suppression, 
two different stimuli are presented to the two eyes, but the conscious percept keeps 
stochastically alternating between the images in the two eyes. 
Backward Masking. In the ‘‘backward masking’’ paradigm (Breitmeyer et al., 1984) 
an image of e.g., a face or a tool is briefly presented, shortly followed by a visual 
‘‘mask,’’ a meaningless picture aimed at disrupting the recognition process. This can 
render the target image to be at the threshold of recognition, i.e., even for the same 
stimulus, the subject can only sometimes recognize the image. 
In areas associated with object recognition, firing rates (KovAcs et al., 1995) and 
gamma power (Fisch et al., 2009) were increased if the subject detected an object 
in a backward masking task. In the higher-level medial temporal lobe, which 
transforms percepts into memories, firing rates and gamma power of the local field 
potential (LFP) were also increased if the subject detected the stimulus, but there 
was an even earlier deflection in delta power before the increase in firing rates, and 
the differences in LFP power were more predictive than the changes in firing rate 
(Quiroga et al., 2008; Rey et al., 2014). 
Supèr et al. (2001) did not use a mask but showed a stimulus containing a texture-
defined figure to monkeys that they had to saccade to. Comparing trials where the 
monkey succeeded saccading to the figure with trials where he failed, the early 
response in primary visual cortex (V1) was identical, but the late response (>100 
 
 
108 
ms) was suppressed on miss trials, suggesting an influence of feedback to V1 
on conscious perception.  
Flash suppression. During flash suppression, a target stimulus is presented to one 
eye, while a second distractor stimulus is flashed to the other eye, thereby 
suppressing the target stimulus. In single flash suppression (Wolfe, 1984), the target 
stimulus is first presented to one eye, and subsequently both stimuli are shown 
binocularly. The flashing of the distractor stimulus thereby usually suppresses the 
target stimulus, which has not changed. A second paradigm called continuous flash 
suppression (Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005) keeps flashing the distractor stimulus at 
around 10 Hz, which yields prolonged suppression of the target stimulus up to 
minutes. Unlike binocular rivalry discussed below, where the stimuli are usually 
balanced, in flash suppression the distractor stimulus is usually rich in structure, 
such as Mondrian patterns, to increase strength of suppression. In a third paradigm, 
called generalized flash suppression (Wilke et al., 2003), a monocular target is 
suppressed by a binocular distractor in the surround of the target. 
In V1, generalized flash suppression caused no change in firing rate but modulated 
oscillations of the LFP in the 9-30 Hz and gamma range. In the lateral geniculate 
nucleus (LGN), the thalamic structure providing input to V1, no modulations were 
observed, but firing rates in pulvinar, a higher-level thalamic structure associated 
with attention, did change according to stimulus visibility during generalized flash 
suppression (Wilke et al., 2009). Neural activity in prefrontal cortex has also been 
shown to correlate the with conscious percept during single flash suppression 
(Panagiotaropoulos et al., 2012; Kapoor et al., 2018). 
Bistable stimuli and binocular rivalry. If one stimulus is presented to the left eye, 
and a completely different stimulus is presented to the other eye, rather than seeing 
a superimposition of the two, one will usually perceive only one of them, followed by 
the other, alternating stochastically in an endless dance. Since the physical input is 
fixed throughout, the fluctuations in conscious percept are entirely internally 
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generated, providing a good entry point for isolating the neural correlates of 
specific contents of consciousness (Tong et al., 2006; Blake et al., 2014). Binocular 
rivalry is a special case of bistable stimuli, such as the face-vase illusion or 
ambiguous motion, and has the advantage of increased freedom in choosing the 
two images that the percept oscillates between.  
Logothetis and Schall (1989) trained monkeys to report the perceived motion 
direction while viewing bistable motion patterns, and found that MT was modulated 
by the reported motion direction. During binocular rivalry, it was found that only as 
little as 20% of neurons in V1 represent the reported conscious percept and that the 
percentage increases as one goes up the visual cortex hierarchy to V2 and V4 
(Leopold and Logothetis, 1996), disagreeing with the fMRI literature that did find 
strong correlations with the conscious percept even in V1 (Polonsky et al., 2000a; 
Tong and Engel, 2001). In cat V1, Fries et al. (1997) claimed that binocular rivalry 
increased synchrony and regularity of gamma oscillations but not average firing rate. 
In the lower-level, thalamic lateral geniculate nucleus, which provides input to V1, 
no modulation by binocular rivalry was observed (Lehky and Maunsell, 1996). In the 
higher-level object recognition area inferotemporal (IT) cortex, 90% of cells in 
encoded reported percept (Sheinberg and Logothetis, 1997). Activity in the human 
medial temporal lobe and frontal cortex, which are higher-level than IT, has also 
been shown to reflect the reported conscious percept (Gelbard-Sagiv et al., 2018). 
Confounding factors 
When trying to distill the neural correlates of consciousness, one needs to carefully 
control for several confounding factors that tend to co-occur with changes of the 
conscious percept, such as changes in the physical stimulus, attention, report, and 
memory. Otherwise, one may be measuring the neural correlates of these 
confounding factors rather than of the conscious percept. In the following sections, 
we will discuss why each of these confounding factors is a problem and to which 
degree the three paradigms above avoid them. 
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Physical stimulus differences. As discussed above, even the retina will 
respond to changes in the physical input, but we cannot infer from this that the retina 
is a neural correlate of consciousness. Hence, one should try to keep the stimulus 
fixed and only change the conscious percept of it. In binocular rivalry and backward 
masking, the stimulus is constant, or at least the same across repeated trials, 
respectively. For flash suppression, there are two ways to collect and analyze the 
data. (1) One can keep repeating the same flash suppression experiment and ask 
subjects to report when the suppressed stimulus is released from suppression and 
enters the conscious percept. Since the time of suppression is stochastic, one can 
compare activity when the suppressed stimulus starts being perceived at different 
times. (2) In so-called no-report paradigms, the subject is just passively viewing the 
stimulus, and one compares two stimulus conditions, one where the target is 
suppressed by a flashing distractor, and the other where the target is shown without 
the distractor. Here, the problem arises that the physical input is very different in the 
two cases. Consider for example the results above, that the response to a preferred 
stimulus was decreased if a distractor was flashed in the other eye, compared to 
when the preferred stimulus was presented alone. We know from studies in IT, that 
if a distractor is presented, then the response to the preferred stimulus is decreased 
even if the preferred stimulus is perfectly visible, e.g., when the distractor is shown 
next to or transparently overlaid on the preferred stimulus (Bao and Tsao, 2018). 
Thus, it is expected for the distractor to decrease the response, not because the 
conscious percept of the preferred stimulus is suppressed, but just because of the 
physical stimulus difference. Alternatively, in the single flash paradigm, people 
sometimes compare responses to showing only the preferred stimulus first followed 
by binocular presentation, to responses to showing only the non-preferred stimulus 
first followed by binocular presentation. Upon the binocular presentation, they claim 
that the response is stronger if the preferred stimulus is shown second, in 
accordance with perception. However, this is also expected because of the transient 
responses of neurons: the firing rate of a neuron rapidly adapts to a stationary 
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stimulus, so if the preferred stimulus is shown first, the firing rate has naturally 
already declined by the time the second stimulus is flashed. 
Thus, current no-report paradigms of flash suppression have severe problems with 
differences in physical input, whereas backward masking and binocular rivalry come 
out unharmed. 
Attention. Attention has been suggested to be a separate, in some case even 
opposing, process, to consciousness (Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007). Yet, the two often 
go hand in hand, i.e., one becomes conscious of something when paying attention 
to it, so it is challenging to dissociate activity modulations caused by either of them 
in experimental setups. Indeed, of the confounding factors listed here, attention is 
probably the one most difficult to disentangle from consciousness. The paradigm 
having the most severe issues with attention is arguably backward masking. 
Whether a briefly presented stimulus is perceived or not depends a whole lot on the 
general level of arousal, willingness to succeed, and selective attention to the 
stimulus location. Thus, if we find a neural signature that correlates with whether a 
stimulus was perceived or not, it may just be representing the general arousal level 
of the subject.  
For flash suppression, bottom-up attention is an important issue. For the no-report 
flash suppression paradigms, where one compares activity when a distractor is 
flashed or not, it is clear that the flashing of the salient distractor will evoke bottom-
up attention, leading to the improved processing of the distractor and diminished 
processing of the preferred stimulus. Thus, observed modulations may represent 
the object-based attention to the distractor itself, the impoverished representation of 
the preferred stimulus due to impoverished processing, or suppression of the 
preferred stimulus to enhance the distractor rather than the conscious percept. 
In binocular rivalry, the role of attention has been controversial. Although earlier 
literature claimed that binocular rivalry is not under attentional control, it is quite clear 
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when experiencing a binocular rivalry stimulus that one has some kind of 
voluntary control over which stimulus one perceives (see Ooi and He (1999)). Later, 
it was found that compared to other bistable stimuli such as the Necker cube (Meng 
and Tong, 2004), the attentional control over which a stimulus is perceived is less 
for binocular rivalry, and one cannot hold one of the two percepts in awareness 
indefinitely. However, attention could be used for both types of stimuli to change the 
non-selective speed of switching. Later it was suggested that if attention is diverted 
from the rivalry stimulus by asking the subject to do a challenging different task, 
binocular rivalry modulations measured by EEG frequency tagging disappeared 
(Zhang et al., 2011). It has also been claimed that object-based attention causes 
dominance in binocular rivalry (Mitchell et al., 2004). 
Report. Almost all of the studies mentioned above required active report of the 
subject, e.g., by button press, to determine what the conscious percept at a given 
time was. The exception is no-report flash suppression, which caused problems with 
physical stimulus differences, though. Thus, it is possible that all the observed 
modulations of neural activity represented just the act of reporting itself rather than 
the conscious percept. Reporting one’s conscious percept entails several 
processes, such as introspection about what one is perceiving, making a decision, 
and the motor action of e.g., pressing a button. All these processes are known to be 
able to cause modulations in the brain, and are thus important confounding factors. 
Moreover, pondering and reporting the perception of a face may bring with it 
feedback processes for imagining a face, which is known to activate the visual cortex 
(Khuvis et al., 2018). Indeed, Frässle et al. (2014) found that fMRI modulations in 
many brain regions that were observed when the conscious percept changed in 
binocular rivalry with active report vanished when the subjects did not report their 
percept. This is alarming and indicates that the above studies may indeed have 
confounded the conscious percept with the report thereof. 
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Memory. The three paradigms as stated so far do not have severe issues with 
memory, as the percept is read out immediately, and does not require prolonged 
storage in working or long-term memory. One could consider removing modulations 
caused by the report of the percept by not asking the subject to remember the 
switches immediately but report them later. For example, the subject could be asked 
to count the number of switches and report them only later, either verbally or by 
button press. Note that this would only control the motor action of report, and not the 
introspection and decision-making that would still have to occur during the binocular 
stimulation. However, even if the motor action can be removed from the equation, 
another confound would be added instead: neuronal modulations may just be 
representative of how well the percept was transferred into memory and thus 
reportable later on. 
No-report paradigms 
To summarize the previous section, all three paradigms turn out to be highly 
problematic when trying to isolate consciousness from other perception-associated 
processes: each of the paradigms has problems with either attention, report, or 
physical stimulus differences. To the rescue come novel no-report paradigms 
proposed by Naber et al. (2011): unlike the no-report paradigm mentioned earlier in 
the context of flash suppression, the physical stimulus is fixed. However, to 
dissociate report from conscious percept, the conscious percept is not indicated by 
active report, but instead inferred from other behavioral markers that happen to 
coincide with the percept. The first marker that can be used is the so-called 
optokinetic nystagmus. If a moving grating is presented to a subject, its eyes will 
reflexively follow the movement of the grating. It turns out that if two gratings moving 
in opposite directions are presented in binocular rivalry, the eye movement will follow 
the grating that is reported to be consciously perceived. The second marker they 
proposed is pupil dilation. When presented with a bright stimulus, one’s pupil will 
contract. When presented with a dark stimulus, one’s pupil will dilate. When 
presented with a bright stimulus in one eye, and a dark, incompatible stimulus such 
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as orthogonal gratings, in the other eye, pupil dilation reflexively follows one’s 
percept switching during rivalry. Thus, it is not necessary for the subject to actively 
report its percept anymore: we can infer the current percept of the subject based on 
these reflexes that happen to be correlated with and predictive of the conscious 
percept. As mentioned above, Frässle et al. (2014) used optokinetic nystagmus and 
pupil dilation to infer switches of conscious percept in two conditions: either with the 
subjects actively reporting their percept or without them doing any task. They found 
substantial modulation across the brain during active report, but most of the 
activations, including prefrontal cortex, vanished without active report. Thus, it 
remains to be seen which modulations of neural activity actually reflect the 
conscious percept as opposed to report. 
Optokinetic nystagmus and pupil dilation are not ideal markers either, as they bring 
other potential confounds with them (Overgaard and Fazekas, 2016). Monkeys 
anesthetized with ketamine still show switches in optokinetic nystagmus during 
binocular rivalry (Leopold et al., 2002), even though they should not be conscious of 
the stimulus. This casts doubt on whether it is an exact correlate of the conscious 
percept. Furthermore, the smooth eye movements during nystagmus bring 
problems in physical input differences with them. Assume, stimulus 1 is moving to 
the left and stimulus 2 is moving to the right, and you are currently perceiving 
stimulus 1 and hence experience a nystagmus to the left. This means, that most of 
the time, stimulus 1 will be stationary on your retinas while stimulus 2 will be moving. 
If objects are used instead of gratings, another important confound is that the 
perceived object will always be on the center of your fovea, whereas the suppressed 
object will be moving into the periphery. This is important for foveally biased 
receptive fields and contralateral bias in many higher-level regions. On the other 
hand, pupil dilation is also modulated by arousal, uncertainty, reward prediction, and 
motor preparation, so it brings another stack of confounding factors with it.  
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Thus, I propose a third no-report paradigm for inferring the current percept: unlike 
the previous paradigms that are based on reflexes, in this paradigm the subject is 
asked to actively fixate on a fixation spot, that can appear e.g., either on the left side 
or the right side. In the left eye, stimulus 1, e.g., a face, is presented and in the right 
eye, stimulus 2, e.g., a body, is presented, leading to rivalry between the two objects. 
Now, the critical point is that the fixation spot in the left eye is actually different from 
the fixation spot in the right eye, i.e., when the left eye fixation spot is on the left side, 
the right eye fixation spot is on the right side, and vice versa. Perceptually, because 
of the rivalry, the subject will only perceive one object and one fixation spot at a 
given time, and the two will be linked, i.e., when perceiving the face, it will perceive 
the fixation spot of the left eye. Due to this link, we can predict whether he perceives 
face or body from where he fixates. This link between fixation position and perceived 
object only occurs on a single-trial basis, but as a whole is dissociated: half of the 
trials when perceiving a face, the fixation spot will be on the left, half of the trials it 
will be on the right, and the same is true for perceiving a body. Thus, any 
modulations we observe with changes in the inferred percept cannot be caused by 
the fixation spot location. In the subject’s experience, fixation spot location and 
perceived percept are independent. It just needs to follow the one fixation spot it 
sees and does not need to introspect, report, or make decisions about the perceiving 
face or body; indeed it can just ignore the object for this task. This task thus also 
alleviates the attention confound, because the task directs top-down attention to the 
fixation point, so less object-based attention to the face or body is possible. In my 
subjective experience, viewing this stimulus and tracking the fixation spots does not 
abolish rivalry, though. I tested the paradigm in humans that simultaneously reported 
their percept of face or body through button press, and was able to predict the 
reported percept with 86%-98% accuracy. In sum, the proposed third no-report 
paradigm dissociates consciousness from the physical stimulus, report, memory, 
and, to an improved degree, from attention. 
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Conclusions 
We have discussed to which degree neuroscience has helped or could help us to 
better understand specific contents of consciousness. I argued that in the best-case 
scenario, neuroscience has the capability of making real and meaningful progress 
on phenomenal consciousness. Finding the neural pathways for access 
consciousness is comparatively more tractable, but holds several caveats. When 
viewing consciousness from a third-person view, one can only indirectly infer what 
the subject is perceiving. Thus, one needs to be careful not to conflate the state of 
a stimulus being in one’s consciousness, i.e., accessible by processes such as 
report, with the report of said stimulus itself. One needs to carefully control for 
differences in the physical input, attention, introspection, and report, and I argued 
that none of the previous electrophysiological studies has successfully done so. I 
thus proposed a no-report paradigm, complementary to the two no-report paradigms 
already proposed by Naber et al. (2011) with the goal to dissociate the mentioned 
confounding factors from specific consciousness. Compared to previous report and 
no-report paradigms, I have argued that this paradigm is better at distilling the 
conscious percept from the physical stimulus, report, and attention. As a caveat, I 
do not claim that the paradigm fully controls for attention, although the advantage is 
that it diverts top-down attention away from the changing percept. This paradigm 
can thus be used to find out whether previously reported modulations and brain 
regions actually reflect the conscious percept. Finding the neural correlates of 
specific conscious percepts will be an important step towards solving the problem of 
phenomenal consciousness. 
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C h a p t e r  V I  
BINOCULAR RIVALRY 
Representation of  conscious percept in macaque face patches 
From: Hesse and Tsao (2020), "Representation of conscious percept without 
report in the macaque face patch network". In : bioRxiv. Submitted to eLife. 
 
Abstract. A powerful paradigm to identify the neural correlates of consciousness is 
binocular rivalry, wherein a constant visual stimulus evokes a varying conscious 
percept. It has recently been suggested that activity modulations observed during 
rivalry could represent the act of report rather than the conscious percept itself. Here, 
we performed single-unit recordings from face patches in macaque inferotemporal 
(IT) cortex using a no-report paradigm in which the animal’s conscious percept was 
inferred from eye movements. We found high proportions of IT neurons represented 
the conscious percept even without active report. Population activity in single trials, 
measured using a new 128-site Neuropixels-like electrode, was more weakly 
modulated by rivalry than by physical stimulus transitions, but nevertheless allowed 
decoding of the changing conscious percept. These findings suggest that macaque 
face patches encode both the physical stimulus and the animal’s conscious visual 
percept, and the latter encoding does not require active report. 
Introduction. Having conscious experience is arguably the most important reason 
why it matters to us whether we are alive or dead. The question what signals in the 
brain reflect this conscious experience and what signals reflect obligatory 
processing of input regardless of conscious experience is therefore one of the most 
important puzzles in neuroscience. For example, activations in the retina may 
correlate with the conscious percept of flashing light but are arguably entirely driven 
by physical input, much of which never evolves into a conscious percept. Another 
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driver of neural activity that can be confounded with signals related to conscious 
perception is report. Recently, it has been suggested that brain regions may 
correlate with conscious perception simply because they are driven by the active 
report of it (Aru et al., 2012; Frässle et al., 2014; Safavi et al., 2014; Tsuchiya et al., 
2015; Koch et al., 2016; Overgaard and Fazekas, 2016; Tsuchiya et al., 2016; Boly 
et al., 2017; Block, 2019, 2020; Kapoor et al., 2020). 
A paradigm known as binocular rivalry is useful for distinguishing responses related 
to conscious perception from those driven by obligatory processing of physical input 
(Tong et al., 2006; Blake et al., 2014). When two incompatible stimuli such as a face 
and an object are shown to the left and right eyes, respectively, one does not 
perceive a constant superimposition of the two, but instead one’s percept alternates 
between face and object even though the physical input is fixed (Fig. VI-1a). Since 
these alternations are internally generated, they cannot be attributed to pure 
feedforward processing of external input. 
In previous studies, researchers trained monkeys to report their percept during 
binocular rivalry by releasing a lever and found that the proportion of cells modulated 
by the reported percept increases along the visual hierarchy, with as little as 20% of 
cells showing modulations in V1 (Leopold and Logothetis, 1996) compared to 90% 
of cells showing modulations in IT (Sheinberg and Logothetis, 1997). Using fMRI, 
Tong et al. found that the human fusiform face area responds to reported perceptual 
switches (Tong et al., 1998). The reported percept also modulates activity of single 
units in the human medial temporal lobe and frontal cortex (Gelbard-Sagiv et al., 
2018). 
Although binocular rivalry isolates the conscious percept from physical input, an 
important confounding factor remains. In all studies cited above, the monkey or 
human subject always actively reported their percept by a motor response. Thus it 
is possible that the observed neuronal activations were due to the act of report itself, 
including introspection, decision making, and motor action accompanying report, 
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rather than a switch in conscious percept. This concern was emphasized in an 
fMRI experiment by Frässle et al., who compared modulations in the brain with and 
without active report (Frässle et al., 2014). Many of the modulations observed in 
higher-level brain regions such as the frontal lobe disappeared when subjects did 
not actively report perceptual switches. 
To infer the subject’s percept in the absence of report, Frässle et al. used two no-
report paradigms that depended on pupil size and optokinetic nystagmus, 
respectively. If the stimuli in the two eyes have different brightness, the subject’s 
pupil size will vary according to the dominant percept’s brightness and can thus be 
used to infer the percept. As a second method, Frässle et al. exploited optokinetic 
nystagmus. They presented gratings moving in opposite directions in the two eyes, 
causing the subject’s eye position to reflexively follow the direction of the dominant 
grating.  
These no-report paradigms allow accurate prediction of the subject’s percept but are 
not free of confounds themselves (Overgaard and Fazekas, 2016). First, pupil size 
is known to correlate with arousal, surprise, attention, and other confounding factors 
(Hoeks and Levelt, 1993; Bradley et al., 2008; Preuschoff et al., 2011). Second, 
when optokinetic nystagmus is applied to moving non-grating stimuli such as natural 
objects that drive IT cortex, there will be confounding physical stimulus differences. 
For example, the dominant stimulus that is smoothly pursued by the subject’s eyes 
will tend to be stationary on the subject’s fovea and optimally modulate IT areas with 
foveal biases, while the non-dominant stimulus will be more eccentric and have 
increased motion velocity. Moreover, optokinetic nystagmus is still present in 
monkeys where the conscious percept is diminished due to anesthesia with low 
doses of ketamine (Leopold et al., 2002). 
Here, we introduce a new no-report paradigm that relies on active tracking of a 
fixation spot, unlike the reflex-based paradigms mentioned above. In this fixation-
based paradigm, the subject is required to maintain fixation on a jumping spot, a 
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task that many animals in vision research are already trained to perform. While 
following the fixation spot, subjects view either unambiguous, monocular stimuli 
physically switching between a face and an object, or a binocular rivalry stimulus 
that switches only perceptually. For the binocular rivalry stimulus, a fixation spot is 
shown to each eye at different positions on the screen. Thus, when the subject 
perceives a face in the left eye, he/she will generally perceive only the fixation spot 
in the left eye and saccade to it, ignoring the fixation spot in the right eye. In this 
way, the subject’s percept can be inferred from his/her eye movement patterns 
without active report.  
In a second innovation, we performed electrophysiological recordings using a novel 
128-electrode site Neuropixels-like probe that allowed us to measure responses 
from large numbers of cells simultaneously. This allowed us to address for the first 
time the extent to which neural activity is modulated by conscious perception in 
single trials. Sheinberg and Logothetis (1997) found that 90% of IT cells were 
modulated by conscious perception, but the response modulations reported in that 
study during the rivalry condition were clearly smaller than those in the physical 
condition. This decrease could have been due to mixed selectivity of cells for the 
conscious percept and the physical stimulus on single trials. Alternatively, cells could 
have been modulated just as strongly by perceptual as by physical alternations and 
the decrease could have been due to incorrect reporting of the percept on some 
trials. Inter-trial averaging confounds these two possibilities. 
To explore correlates of conscious perception, we targeted recordings to macaque 
face patches ML and AM. The macaque face patch system constitutes an 
anatomically connected network of regions in IT cortex dedicated to face processing 
(Tsao et al., 2006; Grimaldi et al., 2016; Chang and Tsao, 2017). To date, most 
response properties of cells in the face patch network can be explained in a 
feedforward framework without invoking conscious perception. For example, the 
functional hierarchy of this network, with increasing view invariance as one moves 
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anterior from ML to AM (Freiwald and Tsao, 2010), can be explained by simple 
feedforward pooling mechanisms (Leibo et al., 2017). The representation of facial 
identity by cells in face patches through projection onto specific preferred axes can 
also be explained by feedforward mechanisms (Chang and Tsao, 2017). At the 
same time, it has been postulated that the fundamental architecture of the cortex 
may be a predictive loop, in which inference guided by internal priors plays a key 
role in determining what we see (Rao and Ballard, 1999). For example, one 
explanation for binocular rivalry is that it directly reflects our knowledge that two 
objects can’t occupy the same space (Hohwy et al., 2008). The hierarchical 
organization of the face patch network, together with its specialization for a single 
visual form, makes it a promising testbed to examine the neural circuits’ underlying 
construction of conscious visual experience, beyond feedforward filtering of visual 
input. 
Here, we recorded from fMRI-identified face patches ML and AM in two monkeys 
using high-channel electrodes while we inferred the animals’ conscious percept 
through the no-report paradigm described above. We found that high proportions of 
cells in both face patches (61% in ML and 81% in AM) encode the conscious percept 
even without active report. Population activity of perceptually-modulated cells was 
more weakly modulated during rivalry than during physical stimulus transitions in 
single trials. Nevertheless, we could still reliably decode the dynamically changing 
percept. Overall, these findings suggest that cells in macaque face patches encode 
both the physical stimulus and the animal’s conscious visual percept. 
Results. We first confirmed that it is possible to correctly infer a subject’s conscious 
percept using a fixation-based no-report paradigm through a behavioral experiment 
in humans. We presented binocular rivalry stimuli consisting of a face (e.g., Obama) 
in the right eye and a non-face object (e.g., a taco) in the left eye, causing the percept 
to stochastically alternate between the two (Fig. VI-1a). Each of the stimuli contained 
a fixation spot that jumped to one of four possible locations every trial. Trials were 
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800 ms long and contained no blank period, i.e., stimuli were presented 
continuously. If subjects fixated at the fixation spot presented in the right eye on a 
given trial, we inferred that they perceived the face and vice versa for the object. To 
verify that the percept of face or object could be inferred from fixations, we instructed 
6 naïve human subjects to perform the fixation task while simultaneously reporting 
their conscious percept with button presses. On trials where the percept switched, 
subjects also switched the fixation spot they were following (Fig. VI-1b). We were 
able to infer which image the subjects were consciously perceiving with accuracies 
ranging from 86% to 98% across subjects (average: 93%, Fig. VI-1c).  
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Figure VI-1: A novel no-report paradigm. (a) Illustration of binocular rivalry 
stimuli used in the paradigm. Four example trials are shown. Each trial was 
presented continuously for 800 ms each without blank period between trials. The 
first and second row show stimuli in the left and right eyes, respectively. If different 
stimuli are shown to the left and right eye, as in this example, one’s percept will 
spontaneously alternate between the two, as shown in the example perceptual 
trajectory in the third row. Stimuli in each eye contained a fixation spot at one of four 
possible positions that the monkey was trained to fixate on. (b) Example eye traces 
from a human subject. Red and blue traces show the distance of the eye position 
from the fixation spot that is shown in the right and left eye, respectively. Thick lines 
show the average. Traces are aligned to the onset of a trial where the subject 
reported that the percept switched from face to object (left), or object to face (right). 
(c) The bar plot shows the average proportion of those trials where the percept 
inferred matched the percept reported by button press. White circles show 
accuracies of individual subjects. We inferred that a subject was perceiving face or 
object if the subject fixated on the face fixation spot (i.e., fixation spot in the eye of 
the face stimulus) or object fixation spot (i.e., fixation spot in the eye of the object 
stimulus), respectively, for at least half of the trial. 
We next used the same method in monkeys to infer their conscious percept while 
recording from face patches ML and AM in IT. Importantly, the two monkeys in this 
study had never been trained to report their percept. They had previously been 
trained to maintain fixation on a spot (presented binocularly) so they learned to 
perform the task within one or two days, respectively (reaching performance of 
maintaining fixation on a spot on at least 80% of all trials). We presented two types 
of stimuli. In the “physical” condition, unambiguous monocular stimuli were 
physically switched between face and object. In the “perceptual” (binocular rivalry) 
condition, the same face and object were continuously presented to the right and 
left eye, respectively, so any changes in percept were internally generated. To 
account for individuals’ eye dominance, we balanced the contrasts of the stimuli in 
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the two eyes so that the monkey followed both fixation spots equally often in the 
rivalry condition. We inferred switches during rivalry when monkeys behaviorally 
switched from following the fixation spot in one eye to following the fixation spot in 
the other eye, as shown in the example eye traces in Fig. VI-2a, top. Spike rasters 
aligned to onset of trials where the percept switched from an example ML cell 
recorded in the same session are shown in Fig. VI-2a, bottom. Fig. VI-2b compares 
average response time courses to physical switches to face or object with responses 
to perceptual switches in example cells from ML and AM. Both example cells 
responded more strongly to a physically presented face than object, which is 
expected since they were recorded from face patches. Importantly, in the binocular 
rivalry condition, when the monkey perceived a face as inferred by its eye 
movement, the response of both cells was also higher than when the monkey 
perceived an object. Since the physical stimulus was identical in both cases, the 
response reflected its conscious percept of a face rather than just the physical input. 
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Figure VI-2: Example face cells modulated by both physical and perceptual 
switches to face.(a) Top: Example eye traces from a macaque performing the task 
aligned to a trial where the inferred percept switched from face to object (left) and 
from object to face (right), respectively. Red and blue curves indicate distances from 
the face and object fixation spots, respectively (as in Fig. VI-1b). Bottom: Spike 
raster of an example ML cell recorded in the same session as for the top panel. 
Responses are aligned to all trials where the inferred percept switched from face to 
object (left) and from object to face (right), respectively. (b) Left: Coronal slices from 
magnetic resonance imaging scan showing recording locations for the two example 
cells in this figure (top: face patch ML, bottom: face patch AM). Color overlay shows 
functional MRI activation to visually presented faces vs. non-face objects. Middle: 
Peristimulus histograms (PSTHs) show neuronal response time courses aligned to 
trial onsets where the visual stimulus was physically switched from face to object 
(blue) or from object to face (red). Right: PSTHs aligned to trial onsets where the 
inferred percept switched from face to object (blue) or object to face (red). ML cell is 
same cell as in (a). Shaded areas indicate standard error mean across trials. 
We recorded a total of 347 cells in ML and 210 cells in AM that were selective, i.e., 
showed a significant difference between face and object in the physical switch 
condition (p<0.05, two-sided t-test). Population results of all selective cells are 
shown in Fig. VI-3. Since we recorded from face patches, most cells showed 
stronger responses to the physically presented face stimulus. Importantly, most cells 
kept their preference in the perceptual condition. In face patch ML, 61% of cells were 
significantly modulated by the conscious percept in the binocular rivalry condition 
and showed preference consistent with the physical switch condition (p<0.05, two-
sided t-test), while 9% of cells were significantly but inconsistently modulated. In AM, 
a face patch that receives input from ML (Grimaldi et al., 2016) and is the highest 
patch in the face patch hierarchy within IT (Freiwald and Tsao, 2010), the 
percentage of consistent modulation increased to 81%, with only 1% showing 
inconsistent modulation. For both patches, there was a clear correlation between 
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modulation by physical stimuli and modulation by the percept in binocular rivalry 
(𝑟 = 0.72, 𝑝 < 10−31). Thus, in a no-report paradigm, cells in IT exhibit modulations 
by the conscious percept that reflect their response tuning to physically 
unambiguous inputs.  
After eliminating the report confound, two important potential confounds remain. 
First, cells could be selective for the eye-of-origin of the fixation point that the animal 
is following (e.g., a cell could respond selectively to a fixation spot in the fovea of the 
left eye). Second, since we presented binocular stimuli using red-cyan anaglyph 
goggles, a confound could arise if cells were selective for the color of the fixation 
spot that is in the fovea. To control for these two potential confounds, we switched 
the colors and eye-of-origin of the face and object stimuli, i.e., where the face and 
its corresponding fixation spot were previously presented in red in one eye, they 
were now presented in cyan in the other eye and vice versa for the object (Fig. VI-3 
supplement 1). If cells followed color or eye-of-origin, then all the dots in the upper 
right quadrant in Fig. VI-3, Supplement 1a should move to the lower left corner in 
Fig. VI-3, Supplement 1b. Instead, the majority of cells followed the object identity 
rather than color or eye-of-origin for both the physical and perceptual condition (𝑝 <
10−29 for physical condition and 𝑝 < 10−11 for perceptual condition, one-sided t-test, 
alternative hypothesis that modulation indices are greater than 0). This confirms that 
cells in IT cortex indeed represent the conscious percept rather than the color or 
eye-of-origin of the fixation spot. 
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Figure VI-3: High proportions of face cells show modulation by conscious 
percept. Scatter plot shows modulation indices 
𝑅𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒−𝑅𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡
𝑅𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒+𝑅𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡
 measuring the 
difference in responses (i.e., average spike count 𝑅) on trials where the inferred 
percept was face or object, respectively, for the physical monocular condition (x-
axis) and perceptual binocular rivalry condition (y-axis). Squares show cells from 
ML, and circles show cells from AM. Open and filled markers indicate cells without 
and with significant difference between perceived face and perceived object 
response in the binocular rivalry condition, respectively. 
To determine if one can decode the percept on a given trial from population activity, 
we performed recordings from multiple neurons simultaneously using S-probes with 
32 electrode sites and passive Neuropixels-like probes with 128 electrode sites (see 
Methods for details). Fig. VI-4 shows recordings from face patch ML in one session 
using the Neuropixels probe. In this session, we recorded 81 cells simultaneously, 
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of which 63 were face-selective (Fig. VI-4a). An example population time course 
snippet of cells recorded simultaneously in the perceptual switch condition showed 
clearly stronger activity across the recorded population during perception of face 
compared to object (Fig. VI-4b). The average population response across cells to 
perceptual switches is shown in Fig. VI-4c. We found above-chance decoding of the 
perceptual condition in all 12 sessions (in all but one session, responses were 
recorded in both ML and AM, and cells were pooled across the two patches). Cross-
validated accuracies of linear classifiers across different sessions are shown in Fig. 
VI-4d (see Methods). Decoding accuracies were 99% for the best session and 95% 
on average for the physical condition. For the perceptual condition, decoding was 
88% on the best session and 78% on average. 
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Figure VI-4: Multi-channel recordings allow decoding of conscious percept 
on single trials. (a) Left: Average responses (baseline-subtracted and normalized) 
of cells (rows) to 96 stimuli (columns) from 6 categories, including faces and other 
objects. Right: Waveforms of cells corresponding to rows on the left. Face-selective 
cells indicated by gray vertical bar on left. (b) Top: Example eye trace across 24 
trials as in Fig. VI-1b in a binocular rivalry session (i.e,. only perceptual, no physical 
switches). The inferred percept across trials according to eye trace is indicated by 
shading (red = face, blue = non-face object). Small black dots on top of eye traces 
indicate time points where our method detected saccades (see Methods), which 
were used in Fig. VI-5 and Fig. VI-5, Supplement 1. Bottom: Response time course 
snippet of a population of 81 neurons recorded with a Neuropixels probe in ML 
simultaneously to the eye trace at top. Each row represents one cell; ordering same 
as in (a). Face-selective cells indicated by gray vertical bar on left. (c) Normalized 
average population response across all significantly face-selective ML cells 
recorded from one Neuropixels session (same session as in (a), (b) to perceptual 
switch from object to face (red) and face to object (blue). Shaded areas indicate 
standard error mean across cells. (d) Cross-validated decoding accuracy of a linear 
classifier trained to discriminate trials of inferred percept face vs. inferred percept 
object for the physical switch condition (x-axis) and perceptual switch condition (y-
axis). Each plus symbol represents a session of neurons recorded simultaneously 
with multi-channel electrodes. 
 
Looking at the population time course, we noticed bursts of activity that appeared to 
be triggered by saccades, which occurred even when an object was perceived (blue 
epochs in Fig. VI-4b; small black dots on top indicate detected saccades). This 
raised the possibility that cells modulated by perception may still carry information 
about the physical stimulus. To investigate this further, we selected cells that (1) 
showed both significant physical and perceptual modulation and (2) consistently 
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preferred the face over the object. We then averaged responses across these 
cells and computed response time courses triggered by individual saccades, 
grouped by whether a saccade occurred during a trial inferred to be face or object, 
respectively (Fig. VI-5). We observed response modulations for both physical and 
perceptual conditions starting around 130 ms after saccade onset (Fig. VI-5a). In 
the physical condition, a saccade during an object epoch led to response 
suppression, while a saccade during a face epoch led to response increase. In 
striking contrast, in the rivalry condition, saccades led to response increase in both 
object and face epochs. As a consequence, during rivalry the response difference 
to a saccade between face and object, though significant (𝑝 = 10−23, two-sample t-
test), was weaker than during the physical condition.  Computing histograms of 
responses averaged across neurons for individual saccades shows that responses 
in the rivalry condition were less bimodal and spanned a smaller range compared to 
the physical condition (Fig. VI-5b). Importantly, this difference in response profiles 
between physical and perceptual conditions was apparent even when pooling 
across both face and object trials (Fig. VI-5b, middle), and hence cannot be 
explained by mistakes in inferring the percept from eye movements. We computed 
the absolute value of these responses and found the difference in response 
distributions to be significant (Figure VI-5b, right, 𝑝 = 6 ∙ 10−35, two-sample t-test on 
absolute value distributions). 
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Figure VI-5: Saccade-triggered responses are less bimodal during rivalry. (a) 
Single-trial responses during saccades averaged across simultaneously recorded 
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ML neurons from the same session as in Fig. VI-4b that were significantly face-
selective for both physical and perceptual condition. Individual neuron responses 
were normalized to make -1 correspond to mean object response, 1 correspond to 
mean face response, and 0 correspond to the average of the two. Rows of each plot 
correspond to response time courses to individual saccades, aligned to saccade 
onset, and sorted by average response during 0 to 400 ms after saccade onset. 
Top: Physical condition. Bottom: Perceptual condition. Left, middle, and right 
columns correspond to saccades during (inferred) object, face, and across both, 
respectively. The difference between perceptual and physical conditions in the third 
column shows that this difference cannot be simply attributed to mislabeling of 
perceptual state by the no-report paradigm. (b) Histograms of saccade-aligned 
responses averaged across a time window of 0 to 400 ms after saccade onset and 
across neurons (after normalizing as in (a)) that were significantly modulated for 
both physical and perceptual condition. Blue, red, and gray responses correspond 
to counts of saccade responses during object, face, and either, respectively. Top: 
Physical condition. Bottom: Perceptual condition. Left: Saccades for face and object 
plotted separately in red and blue, respectively. Responses were normalized to be 
0 if the response was equal to the average of the face and object response, and 1 if 
equal to either the average face or average object response. Middle: Saccades for 
either face or object plotted in grey. Right: Absolute values of normalized responses 
plotted in light grey. 
The observation of different response profiles for physical and perceptual conditions 
was not specific for saccades: histograms were also less bimodal and spanned a 
smaller range for the rivalry condition when triggering responses on trial onsets 
rather than saccades in both ML (Fig. VI-5, Supplement 1a, 𝑝 = 9 ∙ 10−15) and AM 
(Fig. VI-5, Supplement 1b, 𝑝 = 0.0014). Therefore, it appears that throughout rivalry, 
for perceptually-modulated cells, response differences between face and object are 
less pronounced than in the physical condition, and this is true in both ML and AM. 
One tantalizing explanation for this phenomenon is that perceptually-modulated 
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cells may be multiplexing information about both the physical stimulus and the 
perceptual state during single trials, allowing both to be simultaneously represented 
across the face patch hierarchy.  
Discussion. We have shown that face patches ML and AM in macaque IT cortex 
are modulated by conscious perception and do not merely encode the physical 
input. Importantly, monkeys in this study had never been trained to actively report 
their percept. Instead, we were able to infer their percept from eye movements using 
a new no-report paradigm. Thus, activity modulations attributed to switches in 
conscious perception in IT cannot be explained simply by active report.  
Previous single-unit recordings in IT cortex using active report to infer the percept 
found 90% of cells represent the conscious percept (Sheinberg and Logothetis, 
1997). Here, we found proportions of 61% in ML and 81% in the more anterior patch 
AM. The quantitative difference may be due to several factors including different 
recording sites (Sheinberg and Logothetis recorded from both upper and lower 
banks of the superior temporal sulcus in a less specifically targeted manner), 
imperfect accuracy of the no-report paradigm, and differences in stimuli and analysis 
methods. Importantly, our results show that the majority of cells in IT cortex do 
represent conscious perception and not merely active report and its accompanying 
cognitive factors. Furthermore, this new paradigm makes studies of consciousness 
in monkeys more accessible, by replacing the need to train the animal to signal its 
conscious percept (which can be a laborious process) with a simple task that only 
requires animals to follow a fixation spot. 
Our results show that for cells that are modulated by conscious perception, the 
modulation is not “all-or-none.” First, we found that the average response 
modulation during the perceptual condition was weaker than during the physical 
condition (Fig. VI-3). This was also found in a previous study of rivalry (Sheinberg 
and Logothetis, 1997). This could be explained either by incomplete modulation, or 
by imperfect labeling of the animal’s perceptual state. The key question is: what 
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happens during single trials? In the rivalry condition, do responses in single trials 
look like those to either physically-presented faces or objects? By recording from a 
large number of face cells simultaneously using a novel 128-electrode site probe 
specifically designed for use in primates, we could address this question for the first 
time. Surprisingly, we found a dramatically different response profile on single trials 
between the perceptual and physical conditions (Fig. VI-5). Whereas in the physical 
condition responses clustered into two groups, in the rivalry condition, responses 
appeared unimodal, lying in between the two clusters for the physical condition. This 
suggests that single cells are multiplexing both the conscious percept and the 
veridical physical stimulus during single trials, such that information about both the 
perceived and unperceived stimuli remain constantly available in IT cortex. Future 
experiments varying the identity of the unperceived stimulus will be needed to further 
test this hypothesis. An alternative explanation is that cells are not modulated by the 
identity of the suppressed stimulus, and simply encode the dominant stimulus with 
reduced gain when presented in rivalry. 
Compared to previous approaches that attempted to isolate representations of the 
conscious percept, our new no-report binocular rivalry paradigm has several 
advantages: For flash suppression, where a stimulus flashed in one eye suppresses 
the stimulus in the other eye, report is also not required (Wolfe, 1984; Wilke et al., 
2003; Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005). However, in that case, the physical input when the 
target is perceived vs. when it is suppressed is not identical, and thus any 
modulation observed may be driven entirely externally. Indeed, it is known that if a 
distractor stimulus is presented simultaneously with a preferred stimulus, the 
response can be reduced compared to when the preferred stimulus is presented 
alone as a result of simple normalization mechanisms (Bao and Tsao, 2018). 
Another paradigm that has been widely used to study the neural correlates of 
consciousness is backward masking. Here, the stimulus is presented for such a 
short time before being masked that sometimes it enters consciousness and 
sometimes not (Breitmeyer et al., 1984). So far, backward masking has always 
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relied on report. Also, it is more susceptible to modulations arising from bottom-
up withdrawal of attention or low-level (e.g., retinal) noise, whereas in binocular 
rivalry, perceptual switches appear to be internally generated. One potential 
confound described by Block as the “bored monkey problem” is that the monkey 
may still be thinking about whether it is perceiving object or face and internally report 
it even if it is not required to actively report it (Block, 2020). It is methodologically 
very difficult to entirely remove this confound, but the fact that monkeys had to 
simultaneously perform a very challenging unrelated task of saccading to jumping 
fixation points should at least alleviate this concern. Thus, to the best of our 
knowledge, this study shows representations of the conscious percept in IT cortex 
in the most confound-free way to date. Our study complements a study conducted 
in parallel by Kapoor et al. (2020) that found modulations by conscious percept in 
prefrontal cortex using a different no-report paradigm based on optokinetic 
nystagmus.  
The existence of two directly-connected functional modules with a hierarchical 
relationship (ML, AM) that both encode the conscious percept of a particular type of 
object opens up the possibility for future studies to investigate how changes in the 
conscious percept are coordinated across the brain. Recordings and perturbations 
in multiple face patches simultaneously using high-channel population recordings 
may reveal the dynamics of information flow, e.g., whether switches occur in a 
feedforward or feedback wave. This may yield insight into the mechanism for how a 
conscious percept emerges in the brain as an interpretation of the world that is 
consistent across different levels of representation. 
Methods. All animal procedures in this study complied with local and National 
Institute of Health guidelines including the US National Institutes of Health Guide for 
Care and Use of Laboratory Animals. All experiments were performed with the 
approval of the Caltech Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC). The 
behavioral experiment with human subjects for the 
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human psychophysics experiment complied with a protocol approved by the 
Caltech Institutional Review Board (IRB). 
Targeting. Two male rhesus macaques were implanted with head posts and trained 
to fixate on a dot for juice reward. We targeted face patches ML and AM in IT cortex 
for electrophysiological recordings. ML and AM were identified using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Monkeys were scanned in a 3T scanner 
(Siemens), as described previously (Tsao et al., 2006). MION contrast agent was 
injected to increase signal-to-noise ratio. During fMRI, monkeys passively viewed 
blocks of faces and blocks of other objects to identify face-selective patches in the 
brain. Recording chambers (Crist) were implanted over ML and AM. Guide tubes 
were inserted into the brain 4 mm past the dura through custom printed grids placed 
inside the chamber, and electrodes were advanced to the target through the guide 
tube. Both chamber placement and grid design were planned with the software 
Planner (Ohayon and Tsao, 2012). After insertion of tungsten electrodes, correct 
targeting of the desired location was confirmed with anatomical MRI scans. 
Electrophysiology. Recordings were performed using tungsten electrodes (FHC) 
with 1 MΩ impedance and, after correct targeting was confirmed, with 32-channel 
S-probes (Plexon) with 75 µm and 100 µm inter-electrode distance, and with passive 
Neuropixels-like probe prototypes (IMEC) (Jun et al., 2017; Dutta et al., 2019). 
These prototypes were a limited stock of test devices that were developed and used 
for testing as part of the development of primate Neuropixels probes and are not 
available for other labs. Unlike the final product, the prototypes had 128 passive 
electrode sites across 2 mm (arranged in two parallel staggered bands), but used 
the same electrode materials and shank specifications (45 mm total shank length). 
All electrodes were advanced to the target using an oil hydraulic Microdrive 
(Narishige). Neural signals were recorded using an Omniplex system (Plexon). 
Local field potentials were low-pass filtered at 200 Hz and recorded at 1000 Hz, and 
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units were high-pass filtered at 300 Hz and recorded at 40 kHz. Only well-isolated 
units were considered for further analysis. 
Task. Monkeys were head fixed and viewed an LCD screen (Acer) of 47-degree size 
in a dark room. Monkeys viewed stimuli of 5-degree size wearing red-cyan anaglyph 
goggles custom made with filters to match the red and green/blue emission 
spectrum of the screen, respectively, so that inputs to left and right eye could be 
controlled independently. Emission spectra were measured using a PR-650 
SpectraScan colorimeter (Photo Research). Eye position was monitored using an 
eye tracking system (ISCAN). In the first phase of the experiment, monkeys 
passively viewed at least 5 repeats of 61 screening stimuli in pseudorandom order 
(250 ms ON time, 100 ms OFF time) with a fixation spot of 0.25 degree diameter in 
the center of the screen. Screening stimuli consisted of 20 images of faces and 41 
images of non-face objects. During this phase, monkeys received a juice reward for 
maintaining fixation for at least 3 seconds. Subsequently, for the main experiment, 
stimuli contained one or two fixation spots at one of four possible locations (top, 
bottom, left, and right, 1 degree from the center) and were presented for 800 ms ON 
time and 0 ms OFF time. In the case of two fixation spots, stimuli contained one 
fixation spot per eye, and the two spots never appeared at the same location. During 
this phase, the monkey received a juice reward if it maintained fixation within 0.5 
degree of one of the fixation spot for at least half of the trial duration (i.e., 400 ms, 
not required to be contiguous). Stimuli during the main experiment included (1) a 
monocular face/monocular object with one fixation spot, and (2) a binocular stimulus 
composed of a face and a fixation spot in one eye, and an object and a second 
fixation spot in the other eye. To improve rivalry and reduce periods of mixture, face 
and object stimuli were presented on backgrounds consisting of gratings that were 
orthogonal in the two eyes. Moreover, we applied orthogonal orientation filters (with 
concentration 𝜎𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 = 0.5°) to the face and object stimuli, respectively, to increase 
local orientation contrast. 
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Online analysis. Spikes were isolated and sorted online using the PlexControl 
software (Plexon). During the screening phase, the average number of spikes during 
the time window from 100 ms to 300 ms was calculated for each unit and stimulus. 
For each stimulus, the average response across units was determined after 
normalizing the response of each unit by subtracting the mean and dividing by the 
standard deviation for the unit. Subsequently, the face stimulus with the highest 
average response and the object stimulus with the lowest average response were 
chosen to generate stimuli for the main experiment. 
Offline analysis. For human subjects, the inferred percept based on button-presses 
on a given trial was determined according to the last report the subject made before 
the end of the trial. For humans and monkeys, we also determined their inferred 
percept based on eye movements depending on which fixation spot they fixated on 
if they fixated on one of the fixation spots for at least half of the trial duration (i.e., 
400 ms, not required to be contiguous). We computed L-1 norms for computing the 
distance between eye position and a given fixation spot. We accounted for a 
saccade delay of on average 350 ms, by analyzing the eye data 350 ms until 1150 
ms after trial onset.  For Figures VI-3 and supplement, VI-4d and VI-5 supplement, 
in order to exclude trials during which the percept switched back to the opposite 
percept, we also required the following trial to have the same inferred percept as the 
current trial. Spikes were re-sorted using the software OfflineSorter (Plexon). For 
Neuropixels, since the high density of electrodes allowed the same neuron to appear 
on multiple channels, we used Kilosort2 to re-sort spikes (Pachitariu et al., 2016). A 
total of 551 and 408 cells were recorded in monkey A and monkey O, respectively. 
To correct for delays in stimulus presentation, we used a photodiode that detected 
the onset and offset of the stimuli. The output of the photodiode was fed into the 
recording system and later used to synchronize the onset of the stimulus and the 
neurophysiological data during offline analysis. Peristimulus time histograms 
(PSTHs) were smoothed with a box kernel (100 ms width). For computing 
modulation indices, we used the average spike count across trials as response. 
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Decoding analysis was performed with a support vector machine with a linear 
kernel (Matlab fitcsvm) trained to discriminate trials where the inferred percept was 
face or object, respectively. As predictor variables, we used the spike count during 
the 800 ms of each trial for all simultaneously recorded neurons. All decoding 
accuracies were cross-validated (leave-one-out). In more detail, one trial was 
chosen for testing and the rest of the trials for training, and this was repeated for all 
trials to compute decoding accuracies. Criteria for detecting a saccade were as 
follows. A saccade was detected at time t if the distance between the mean eye 
position during t-100,...t-2 ms and the mean eye position during t+2,...t+100 ms was 
greater than 0.5 degree, and the eye position during t-100,...t-2 ms and t+2,...t+100 
ms, respectively, stayed within 0.5 degree of the respective mean for at least 80% 
of the duration of each period.  We also required consecutive saccades to be at least 
100 ms apart from each other. All analysis was performed using Matlab 
(MathWorks). 
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Supplementary material 
 
 
Figure VI-3, Supplement 1: Color and eye-of-origin confound control. 
Left: Scatter plot similar to Fig. VI-3, but modulation indices 
𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑−𝑅𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑
𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑+𝑅𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑
 
now show the difference between preferred and non-preferred stimulus. The 
preferred stimulus is face if the response to face is higher and non-face object if the 
response to non-face object is higher in the physical condition. Thus, by definition 
the x-values of all cells are positive. Right: Scatter plot of modulation indices 
𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑−𝑅𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑
𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑+𝑅𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑
 for the same preferred and non-preferred object identities of 
stimuli when the colors and eye of origin of the two stimuli were switched; 
importantly, the preference of a given stimulus identity was assigned based on 
responses to stimuli of the original color and eye of origin stimulus responses. N = 
192 for ML and N = 120 for AM for both plots. 
 
 
144 
 
 
 
145 
Figure VI-5, Supplement 1: Lack of bimodality is a general trademark of 
rivalry. (a) Trial responses in ML are less bimodal during rivalry. Histograms have 
same conventions as Fig. VI-5b, but instead of averaging neuron responses for 
individual saccades, responses are averaged across trial duration for individual 
trials. (b) Trial responses in AM are less bimodal during rivalry. Same conventions 
as in (a), but instead of the Neuropixels-like probe in ML, cells were simultaneously 
recorded from AM. Due to technical limitations, the 128-channels Neuropixels-like 
probe did not reach the depth of AM, and cells were recorded using a 32-channel 
S-probe instead. 
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Recordings in human epilepsy patients 
Besides studying binocular rivalry without report in macaque face patches, we 
have also conducted preliminary experiments in humans. This work was done in 
collaboration with Varun Wadia and Ueli Rutishauser at Cedars Sinai in epilepsy 
patients that had been implanted with depth electrodes for surgical treatment of 
epilepsy. The advantage of this system is that, in humans, we can directly 
compare modulations during active report and without report since humans can be 
easily instructed to report their percept, as compared to a lengthy training process 
in animals. Moreover, the human patients had electrodes implanted across a large 
number of brain areas (including pre-supplementary motor area, amygdala, 
orbitofrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and hippocampus), in order to 
localize the origin of seizures, allowing us to investigate representations of 
conscious percept across all these areas simultaneously and holding the potential 
to study interactions between them. 
We used the same paradigm for inferring conscious percept from eye movement 
as in monkeys. Unless stated otherwise below, methods were the same as in the 
previous section of this chapter. In addition to following fixation spots, subjects 
were at one part of the experiment also instructed to report their percept by 
pressing one of two buttons (indicating perceived stimulus 1 and perceived 
stimulus 2, respectively) on a response pad (Cedrus). All four subjects in this 
preliminary study volunteered for the study and gave informed consent. This study 
was approved by the Institutional Review Boards of Cedars-Sinai Medical Center 
and Huntington Memorial Hospital. Instead of ISCAN, we used an EyeLink camera 
(SR Research) to track eye position. We recorded from up to ten surgically 
implanted macroelectrodes, each containing eight 40-μm diameter microwires 
(Rutishauser et al., 2010; Minxha et al., 2018). We recorded broadband (0.1-
9000Hz filter) signal sampled at 32 kHz using a Neuralynx Atlas system 
(Neuralynx). Signals were locally referenced to one of the eight microwires in a 
given brain area. For spike-sorting, we used a semi-automatic template matching 
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algorithm described in (Rutishauser et al., 2006). Only well-isolated units were 
included in further analysis. 
In an initial session, usually in the morning of the same day as the main 
experiment, we let the patient passively view a set of 63 screening stimuli. 
Screening stimuli were grayscale images of faces and objects and were presented 
for 10 repetitions each with an ON time of 500 ms and a blank OFF period varied 
between randomly between 600 and 900 ms. Subjects were instructed to passively 
view the screening stimuli, however, at random times every 20-40 images they 
were presented with a yes/no catch question about the previous image that 
subjects answered by button press, in order to have subjects keep paying attention 
to viewed stimuli. We then selected two stimuli that elicited the strongest 
responses in two (non-overlapping) sets of neurons, and generated binocular 
rivalry stimuli from them. 
After analyzing the results of the screening session and generating stimuli, we 
performed the main experiment for each patient. The main experiment consisted of 
several stages, including a (1) calibration stage to adjust the contrast of the two 
binocular rivalry stimuli until the subject followed the two fixation spots equally 
often, (2) a physical switches stage, where the viewed stimulus switched physically 
between two monocular stimuli, while subjects followed the one fixation spot, (3) a 
binocular rivalry without report stage, where subjects perceived rivalry switches 
following one of the two fixation spots, and (4) a binocular rivalry stage with report 
stage where subjects followed one of the two fixation spots and at the same time 
actively reported perceptual switches by button press. The only difference between 
the stimuli presented to humans and stimuli presented to monkeys was that for 
humans, fixation spots changed position every 2000 ms rather than 800 ms to 
allow for more time to find the fixation spot, given the lack of training compared to 
monkeys. 
Doing the task in humans, we were faced with some challenges, such as getting 
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good eye signals through corrective glasses plus red-cyan filters and finding 
cells responding strongly to one of the stimuli during stimuli that persisted until the 
afternoon session, hence the data presented here is preliminary. Yet, from the 
experiment stage where we both inferred the percept from eye movement and 
instructed subjects to report their percept, we were able to infer that the paradigm 
worked well to predict their button presses from eye movement, with average 
accuracies of 87%. Below are two example cells from left and right pre-SMA 
(Fig.VI-6). The two cells showed responses to a physical switch from stimulus 1 to 
stimulus 2 (red) or from stimulus 2 to stimulus 1 (blue), with a slight preference for 
switches to stimulus 1 (top cell), or switches to stimulus 2 (bottom cell), 
respectively. Importantly, both cells showed responses even in the binocular rivalry 
condition without any physical change, when a switch of percept was inferred from 
eye movements, and appeared to keep their preference. This was true whether the 
patient actively reported their percept or not, showing that this pre-SMA activity 
was not just due to report and its accompanying factors. Given that the selectivity 
was not very strong, it is important to also show that the apparent response to 
perceptual switches was not just due to saccades and accompanying afferent 
copies of motor responses or changes in visual input. The right column thus shows 
activity aligned to saccades where the percept remained constant, e.g., where the 
patient was perceiving stimulus 1, and made a saccade because the fixation spot 
in the left eye changed position but kept following the fixation spot in the left eye 
(blue). Responses aligned to these events were relatively flat. This suggests that 
responses in pre-SMA encode switches in conscious percept rather than 
confounding factors such as report or saccades. Note that this data is still 
preliminary and further experiments with more selective cells are needed to 
confirm these findings and determine coding of conscious percept in the other 
brain areas that were recording targets.  
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Figure VI-6: Pre-SMA cells responding to physical and perceptual 
switches. Two example cells recorded in one patient from pre-SMA in the left 
hemisphere (top) and right hemisphere (bottom) respectively. Responses are 
aligned to saccades to a fixation spot when the percept was switching (left column) 
or when a saccade was made without the percept switching, i.e., when the patient 
kept following the same fixation spot (right column). The three rows for each cell 
correspond to three stages of the experiment, where the patient was doing the 
fixation task while physically switching monocular stimuli were presented (first 
row), where the patient was doing the fixation task while perceiving switches 
during binocular rivalry and actively reporting the percept by button press (second 
row), or where the patient was doing the fixation task while perceiving switches 
during binocular rivalry without report (third row). Blue and red lines indicate 
responses when the perceived stimulus was the left eye stimulus or right eye 
stimulus, respectively (as inferred from eye movement). 
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C h a p t e r  V I I  
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Are conscious switches feedforward or feedback? 
We have shown that cells in face patches are modulated by conscious percept 
during binocular rivalry, but strictly speaking, that does not prove that face patches 
represent the conscious percept of a face in general. After all, it is possible that 
activity in the face patches could be explained as passive filter from V1 input, if 
one postulates that V1 is fully responsible for switches during binocular rivalry. In 
other words, since in binocular rivalry, the conscious percept appears to switch 
between the two eyes (despite studies claiming otherwise (KOVAcs et al., 1996; 
Logothetis et al., 1996)), it may be completely resolved and explained by 
competition of monocular channels within V1 or LGN (Blake et al., 1980; Blake, 
1989). Thus, it would be not much more than a mechanical, intra-cortical shutting 
of one eye, alternating every few seconds. In this scenario, with face patches 
simply reflecting the shutting and gating of low-level eye information in V1, it would 
be far-fetched to interpret our results in the framework of face patches 
representing consciousness. However, models of competition between monocular 
populations seem to be at odds with electrophysiological experiments that reported 
no or only weak traces of modulation by conscious percept in LGN (Lehky and 
Maunsell, 1996) and V1 (Leopold and Logothetis, 1996; Keliris et al., 2010), 
respectively, and that found no difference between monocular and binocular 
neurons. Alternatively, binocular rivalry may be a special case of a more general 
phenomenon of how the brain constructs a conscious percept.  We put forward the 
hypothesis that this generation of a conscious percept may be tightly linked to the 
process by which the brain resolves ambiguous input and generates an 
interpretation of the world that makes sense and can recreate sensory input. Some 
theories of consciousness in the literature state that the initial feedforward 
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processing is unconscious and automatic, and the signal is required to reach a 
higher-level region to rise into awareness (Dehaene et al., 2003; Baars, 2005; Lau 
and Rosenthal, 2011), with some of the theories claiming that the signal 
additionally needs to be fed back from the higher-level regions to lower-level 
regions (Hochstein and Ahissar, 2002; Lamme, 2006).  Evidence for feedback is 
indirectly suggested by what can be described as one of the biggest discrepancies 
between fMRI and electrophysiology literature: in fMRI experiments, V1 strongly 
reflects the conscious percept during rivalry (Polonsky et al., 2000b; Tong and 
Engel, 2001). However, electrophysiology studies show that actually only a small 
proportion of V1 cells (~18%) is modulated by conscious percept at all (Leopold 
and Logothetis, 1996), and only higher-level regions encode conscious percept 
reliably (~90% of cells in IT) (Sheinberg and Logothetis, 1997). For the 
extracellular local field potential (LFP), it turned out that low-frequency power 
followed conscious perception whereas higher frequency power does not (Gail et 
al., 2004; Wilke et al., 2006; Maier et al., 2008). This discrepancy can be resolved 
with the knowledge that high-frequency LFP power reflects more the spiking of 
neurons, whereas low-frequency power and fMRI signals are more affected by 
input from neuromodulatory systems. Thus, the observed modulation of fMRI 
signal may reflect feedback from higher-order cortices or subcortical targets 
(Belitski et al., 2008; Magri et al., 2012). 
To distinguish these different scenarios, we need to find out where and how 
switches in binocular rivalry are generated. Unfortunately, virtually all studies to 
date have merely investigated which neurons or brain regions correlate with a 
given conscious percept, but this has given us little insight into the mechanisms of 
how a conscious percept is constructed across the brain. Having shown that face 
patches encode the specific conscious percept of a face puts us in a unique 
position to go beyond studying correlates and dissect the neural mechanisms of 
how a new conscious percept is constructed and dynamically propagated across 
the brain. We are in a unique position because the face patch system is comprised 
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of nodes in a functional hierarchy, that are directly anatomically connected and 
all encode the same category of object. This is critical because it allows us to study 
the dynamics of information flow as a new conscious percept is established and 
propagated through the hierarchy. E.g., if new conscious percepts are generated 
through a top-down mechanism, we would be able to tell, as in that case the 
higher-level nodes of the hierarchy should show signatures of the switch before the 
lower-level nodes, and vice-versa for a bottom-up mechanism. By simultaneously 
recording from nodes at two different levels of the hierarchy, we are thus able to 
distinguish between possible mechanisms of conscious percept generation. 
Moreover, we are now equipped with the right tools to study it. While traditionally 
we have been a single tungsten electrode lab, I had a hunch that for my purpose 
we would need to record from large populations of neurons, and I hence 
contributed a handful of high-yield recording techniques to the lab by learning the 
surgery and successfully implanting new types of electrodes such as V-probes, S-
probes, Utah arrays, brush arrays, and Neuropixels electrodes, thereby setting up 
systems with the capacity to record from up to 512 channels simultaneously.  
In Fig. VI-4, we showed an example of the world’s first recording with 128-ch. 
Neuropixels protoype probes designed specifically for primates. We have since 
started to record from multiple face patches simultaneously, inserting a 
Neuropixels probe into face patch ML and an S-probe (for technical reasons 
regarding the length of the probe) into face patch AM. Through this experiment, we 
are hoping to dissect the mechanisms of binocular rivalry and determine whether 
perceptual switches are propagated through a feedforward or feedback 
mechanism. Preliminary data is shown in Fig. VII-1, but please note that this is still 
early stages of the experiment, and results have yet to be confirmed or 
disconfirmed. The rationale is that if conscious percepts are generated and 
propagated through a feedforward mechanism, we should see activity in ML, the 
lower node of the hierarchy first, followed by activity in AM, which receives input 
from ML. In case of a feedback mechanism, we should see the reverse. 
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Figure VII-1: Latencies of switches in ML vs AM. (a) Example population 
time course of face cells recorded simultaneously with Neuropixels probe in ML 
and S-probe in AM for the physical condition (top) and perceptual condition 
(bottom). Cells on top of black horizontal line are from ML, cells below are from 
AM. Magenta vertical lines indicate switches of ML activity from silent to active, 
i.e., putative switches from object to face. (b) Average activity in ML and AM 
aligned to switches inferred by ML activity for physical condition (top) and 
perceptual condition (bottom). Left column shows activity averaged across ML 
switches for each cell, right column also averages across cells. Dashed vertical 
lines in the right plot indicate latencies at which activity in ML (black) or AM (red) 
reached half of the peak value. 
Fig. VII-1a shows example population time course snippets from ML and AM 
recorded simultaneously. We inferred switches from ML activity alone, by finding 
time points where face cells changed from being silent to being active (magenta). 
These are putative time points where the stimulus or percept possibly switched 
from object to face. We then looked at AM activity around these ML-inferred 
switches. In the example, it looks as if for physical switches, AM cells fired slightly 
later than ML cells, whereas for the perceptual switch, AM cells started firing a 
slightly earlier. We averaged activity across all ML-inferred switches of a session to 
compare response latency of ML and AM (Fig. VII-2b). For physical switches, ML 
cells average activity reached its half-peak before AM, as is expected since AM is 
later in the hierarchy of visual processing and receives direct feedforward input 
from ML Intriguingly, for perceptual switches, the converse was true: AM reached 
its half-peak earlier than ML. Thus, this preliminary data is consistent with a top-
down mechanism for switches of conscious percept. Further experiments are 
necessary to see if this result can be reproduced, trace down whether there is a 
source of conscious percept generation in the brain, and determine the causal role 
of different nodes of the network.  
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Future experiments on mechanisms of  consciousness 
The experiment of the previous section, recording from ML and AM simultaneously 
during binocular rivalry, holds the potential of yielding one important puzzle piece of 
the mechanisms of consciousness: whether switches in conscious percept during 
rivalry are generated through a bottom-up or top-down mechanism. E.g., if we find 
that AM does indeed show activity before ML during perceptual switches, that would 
suggest that switches originate from a region higher than ML. Possible candidates 
would include e.g., the prefrontal cortex or hippocampus. Where do we go from 
there, and how can we find this source (assuming there is one region that has 
absolute authority in conscious percept selection, rather than the whole brain acting 
as a recurrent network to converge to a solution)? We can use the same strategy 
that we used for recording from ML and AM to trace down the origin of the signal, 
by recording from ML/AM to detect switches and recording from other brain regions, 
e.g., prefrontal cortex or hippocampus at the same time and comparing latencies. 
This assumes that we can find a stimulus that drives both ML/AM and the new 
region, but there are face patches outside of inferotemporal cortex, including in 
perirhinal, prefrontal, and more (see Chapter II, section Anatomical organization) 
that can be targeted. Assume we find that a given region X has a latency lower than 
ML and AM. Then we can look at the regions that are connected to X, by electrically 
stimulating region X in an fMRI experiment, and see which other regions light up, 
and see if one of those regions has even lower latency. By repeating this process, 
we should eventually arrive at the source of conscious percept construction, if there 
is one. 
Performing simultaneous recordings can show us where a new conscious percept 
first becomes explicit, but that does not prove a causal role of the region. Once the 
putative source of conscious percept generation is identified, it will be fascinating to 
find out what happens if we inactivate it or stimulate it. We hypothesize that after 
inactivation, the animal will fail to show switches of conscious percept or re-
interpretations of the world, both neurally and behaviorally. There may also be other 
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surprising side effects accompanying inactivation of the site, besides lack of 
switches in the binocular rivalry paradigm, if we go as far as conjecturing that we 
create a philosophical zombie monkey.  
Another interesting possible experiment involves stimulation and recording at the 
same time to answer the question of whether a given region can causally bias the 
percept and behavior during binocular rivalry: the idea is to stimulate a higher-level 
association region, such as face patch PR in perirhinal cortex or in hippocampus to 
evoke the memory of a face, while recording from face patches in inferotemporal 
cortex using an ultra-high yield probe such as Neuropixels. Assuming the evoked 
memory causes the perceptual visualization of a face, and this visualization is 
represented in face patches in inferotemporal cortex, we should be able to 
reconstruct the face the monkey was seeing during stimulation from the recorded 
face cell activity, since we have previously cracked the code of face identity in IT 
face patches and can reconstruct the face a monkey was seeing from a hundred 
face cells. Inserting the stimulation electrode into different sub-regions may evoke 
percepts of different faces that we should be able to reconstruct on a single-trial 
basis by recording from hundreds of neurons with Neuropixels probes. Assuming 
we can reconstruct what face is perceived due to stimulation, we can then make 
binocular rivalry stimuli out of exactly that face in one eye, and another face or object 
in another eye. Using the no-report paradigm to infer his percept, we can then find 
out whether stimulation of the higher-level site will bias the animal to perceive the 
face evoked by stimulation, i.e., whether he will follow the fixation spot in the eye of 
that face more often. If so, this would imply that this region has a causal influence 
on conscious percept generation and suggest the possibility that this influence feeds 
back all the way to V1 to select the stimulus from the respective eye, since it also 
enhanced the fixation spot of that eye. Inactivating other regions while stimulating 
may further reveal which regions play a causally necessary role in propagating the 
conscious percept. 
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Summary of  thesis main results 
 In bistable illusions, switches of conscious percept appear to be propagated 
across multiple layers of representation to generate a consistent 
interpretation. 
 The macaque face patch system may provide a key for unlocking the mystery 
of the neural mechanisms of conscious perception. 
 Consistent border-ownership cells are hard to find in random locations of 
retinotopic cortex, but the average population signal encodes segmentation 
for artificial and natural stimuli. For stimuli with subjective contours, border-
ownership signal latencies are longer. 
 Using fMRI, one can identify segmentation-related hot spots. When recording 
in these cells, one can find clusters of cells that do signal segmentation 
consistently across stimuli. The segmentation of an image can be decoded 
from populations of neurons in segmentation hot spots. 
 One can make face patches respond to Mooney faces by adding an outline 
or animating them. 
 When trying to distill representations of conscious percept, one needs to distill 
conscious percept from several confounding factors. 
 Conscious percept is encoded in inferotemporal face patches and can be 
decoded from a population of neurons. 
 Recording or perturbing several nodes of the cortical processing hierarchy 
simultaneously has the potential to dissect the mechanisms of conscious 
percept generation and propagation, e.g., whether the mechanism is top-
down or bottom-up
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